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Abstract 
This thesis examines the nature and limits of workers' organisation during the 
Russian transition from communism, on the basis of a detailed case study of a 
South Kuzbass coal mine, 'Taldym', conducted between 1994 and 1996. Miners 
have been the most militant group of Russian workers since the perestroika era, 
while the workers and trade union at Taldym are among the most active in their 
industry. 
The thesis considers the issue of workers' organisation in the transition period 
from two perspectives. First, it asks why it has proved so difficult for the former 
communist trade unions, which organised the overwhelming majority of Soviet 
workers in the past, to transform themselves into independent organisations 
capable of representing workers' interests during the transition period. This, it is 
argued, is not primarily a problem of political will within the union bureaucracies, 
but is a structural problem at the enterprise level, the nature of which is explored 
in a detailed analysis of the dilemmas and constraints confronting the mine trade 
union committee. 
Second, the thesis examines why, given the limited extent of reform within the 
union, workers have not organised within or outside existing structures to defend 
their interests in the face of the catastrophic drop in their living standards. The 
analysis focuses on the way in which the structure of the traditional Soviet 
enterprise and the characteristic forms of informal relations which developed 
within it inhibited any form of independent collective organisation. This argument 
not only explains the apparent quiescence of Russian workers in the reform 
period, it also provides a more sophisticated understanding of the way in which 
Soviet workers were integrated under communism than that provided by 
established theories. 
The concluding section of the thesis considers the nature of workers' influence on 
the post-communist recomposition of the Russian state and economy. 
11 
'One cow can keep a whole family ' (mine trade union president). 
Valya, a brigadier in the zaryadnoe, milking her cow. 
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I ntrod uction 
At the beginning of the transition from communism in Russia workers' opposition 
was seen as one of the forces most likely to de-rail economic refonn. Why this 
opposition has failed to materialise is a question of central importance in 
contemporary Russian politics. Furthennore, the weakness of organised workers' 
opposition to refonn also casts doubt on the established accounts of Soviet social 
stability, because these theories cannot account for the strength and persistence of 
the fonns of social integration which existed in Soviet society. This thesis 
addresses these issues through an analysis of the attempted refonn of the fonner 
communist trade unions and of the changing fonns of social integration of workers 
in the traditional Soviet and post-Soviet enterprise. 
The introduction will first discuss the research strategy and the choice of the mine 
referred to here as 'Taldym'i as the site of the main case study. This is followed 
by an account of the methodology used in the study. The introduction will 
conclude with an exposition of the thesis structure, indicating the content of the 
individual chapters. 
Research strategy and choice of research site 
When I began my fieldwork my focus was more narrow than the above description 
of the themes of the thesis implies. Initially I was interested in how far the existing 
IAIl names associated with the mine have been changed to protect informants. Other local names 
have not been changed. 
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trade unions and workers' organisations were able to represent their members' 
interests during the transition. It was clear from the literature, which is discussed 
in Chapter Two, that both the new independent workers' organisations and the 
former communist trade unions had major problems in this regard. My starting 
point was therefore to ask why representation of workers' specific interests was so 
problematic in post-Soviet Russia even after the substantial liberalisation that 
occurred in the late Gorbachev era. Proceeding from the argument, made in the 
British context but equally applicable to Russia, that it is within the workplace that 
unions 'organise, sustain and renew themselves' (Fairbrother, 1990: 147), I 
decided that my research should focus on the activities of the unions at enterprise 
level with the aim of precisely identifying the nature of the barriers to the reform 
of the former communist unions and the growth of their independent rivals. This 
project implied detailed examination of social processes - something to which the 
case-study method is particularly well suited (Kozina, 1996). 
In my initial proposal I had already decided that my study should focus on the coal 
industry, because mineworkers had been one of the most active groups of workers 
in the perestroika period and after. In the wake of the 1989 and 1991 miners' 
strikes there was considerable renewal of the former communist miners' union, 
Rosugleprof, with members of the strike committees being elected to replace 
members of the old mine union committees. The former official miners' union (as 
the ex-communist unions are also known), has also had to face competition after 
the formation of the rival Independent Miners' Union (NPG), which claims 
genuinely to represent workers' interests. For these reasons Rosugleprof was 
assumed to be the official union most likely to be showing signs of reform and 
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therefore a suitable focus for a study of the unions in transition, while the NPG 
was the most influential of Russia's new unions. 
Having identified the mining unions as the subject of my enquiry, the next step 
was to find a suitable site for the analysis of their operation at enterprise level. In 
the first stage of research, in the summer of 1994, a variety of South Kuzbass 
mines around Novokuznetsk, Osinniki and Mezhdurechensk were visited and 
interviews were conducted with mine trade union presidents, other union officers 
and workers, as well as with regional union officers. This provided an overview of 
the working of the unions at a mine level,2 as well as the basis on which to select a 
mine for a detailed case study. I had initially intended to analyse a mine 
organisation of the NPG as well as a Rosugleprof trade union committee, but the 
interviews with NPG leaders at mine, town and regional level conducted during 
this phase of research convinced me that that the NPG was a corrupt and dying 
institution, which had completely lost touch with its members.3 Since I had 
decided to focus on only one of the two miners' unions, I chose to concentrate on 
a case-study of one enterprise. Given that my aim was to identify why the official 
trade unions, in spite of their declared intentions, had not reformed themselves 
into organisations representing their members, I needed to choose a strong 
2The conclusions of th is stage of the research are presented in Ashwin, 1995. 
3This is not to say that the corruption of the NPG is not an interesting issue, but this process has 
already been analysed by Clarke et al., 1995 and I1yin, 1996. By the time I got to the Kuzbass 
there was very little left to say (although I felt the need to satisfy myself of this before deciding to 
concentrate on Rosugleprof.) 
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'negative case' where the union committee was active and committed to reform. If 
such a union had not managed to transform its mode of operation, this could not 
be explained by personal factors such as laziness or inertia on the part of the trade 
union president and the case would thus highlight the structural constraints on 
change within the union. 
Taldym was chosen because the initial research at the mine revealed the union to 
be one of the most radical and active in the region. In contrast to many of his 
counterparts at other mines in the region, the trade union president at the mine is a 
very energetic man who tries, in his own terms, to do his best for his members. On 
a day-to-day level the president pursues an open-door policy and expends a lot of 
time and trouble attempting to resolve the problems of workers who come to see 
him, albeit problems almost invariably related to housing, allotments, material 
help or holiday vouchers rather than work-related issues. This is a definite 
departure from the policy of his predecessor who had set and limited times at 
which he would receive workers.4 Moreover, he is an extremely effective operator. 
For example, without his continual pressure, the mine administration would have 
certainly handed over one or all of the kindergartens that remain in its hands to the 
local administration before now: something which would equally certainly prove 
to be a death sentence for the facilities in question, since the head of the local 
administration is quite candid about the fact that the settlement does not have the 
money to maintain them. (In addition to this, the trade union president has a recent 
mandate: he was re-elected as union president in 1996.) 
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The Taldym trade union president also has a very good reputation within 
Rosugleprof. He is locally viewed as a strong and intelligent leader, and he has 
repeatedly been offered posts within the South Kuzbass territorial committee of 
the union (which he has turned down). He usually plays the leading role in 
promoting union action in the south Kuzbass and is highly critical of the 
conservatism of his counterparts at other mines, claiming that most of them have 
no leadership qualities and are unfit for the posts to which they had been elected. 
At a national level the Taldym president is also a prominent figure. He is a 
member of the national tariff commission, so he is well informed about union 
policy and makes regular trips to Moscow. As one worker from the mine put it, 'in 
Moscow he's na ty': able to refer to his bosses in the informal 'you' form, a sure 
sign of respect. In Moscow too the Taldym president is renowned for his 
radicalism: at the 1996 quinquennial congress of Rosugleprof he publicly 
criticised the union President, Vitalii Bud'ko, for his timidity and is generally 
critical of the union leadership. 
Not only is the union president at the mine known as a radical, the Taldym 
workers are some of the most active in the South Kuzbass. The mine was the site 
of one of the first major strikes in 1989, was the first to join the general miners' 
strike which started in Mezhdurechensk in July 1989 and the Taldym workers 
refused to settle after the miners in Mezhdurechensk had gone back to work. 
Although I only became interested in the changing forms of workers' social 
integration within the enterprise once I had already began work at Taldym, the 
4The present trade union president and vice-president were first elected in 1991. 
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demonstrated radicalism of the Taldym workers in comparison with their 
counterparts at other mines also made this a suitable site for this element of the 
research. 
A small NPG organisation grew out of the strike committee at the mine, but it has 
never attracted more than a hundred members, and at the time of writing has only 
a formal existence. The president of the organisation has speaking rights at all-
mine meetings, and always participates, often taking a different position from the 
Rosugleprof committee, as well as providing reports of the national and regional 
activity of the NPG. The NPG president attempts to present himself as 
independent from management, but nevertheless his authority among workers is 
low and his speeches are often interrupted by hostile comments from the floor. 
When asked about the NPG in interviews workers often display only a hazy 
knowledge of its existence and they are almost always ignorant of the principles 
which distinguish it from Rosugleprof.s The Taldym trade union committee has 
thus proved robust in the face of competition: the president regards his NPG 
counterpart more as an irritating fly than a disturbing thorn in the flesh. 
The Rosugleprof mine president is proud of his record; as he said during the 
preparations for an (abortive) strike in August 1996, 'everyone will be looking at 
Taldym to see what we decide; we always lead the way.' This activism, and the 
proven potential for worker mobilisation at the mine, make Taldym a particularly 
5NPG presidents at the mine level generally see the defining feature of their union as the fact that 
they do not allow managers in their ranks. This does not, however, render them immune to the 
structural pressures to co-operate with enterprise management. 
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appropriate and interesting place to investigate the nature and limits of change at 
the enterprise level. 
The question of how far the arguments developed in the thesis can be generalised 
is considered both within individual chapters and in the conclusion. 
Methodology 
In line with the structure of the thesis, there were two main strands to the research 
at Taldym: work with the trade union and research among the workers. This 
section will first briefly outline the way in which I related fieldwork and analysis 
within my research, before moving on to discuss the specific strategies I adopted 
with regard to the union and the workers. The issues of recording data and 
language will be discussed at the end of the section. 
I attempted to ensure a constant interaction between my evolving analysis and my 
fieldwork practice. In approaching any new group (be it a mine trade union, a 
, 
work collective or an occupational category such as labour brigadiers) I first of all 
sought general information about the issues I had identified as being of interest 
either on the basis of secondary literature or my own earlier research. For 
example, I would usually begin interviews with mine trade union presidents by 
asking them to outline their functions, and to say how these had changed in the 
last few years. (I was interested in the impact of the 'reform' of the union on their 
work, but did not say this because this would implicitly demand that they produce 
evidence of change rather than continuity as proof of their union's newly-
announced 'independence'). I transcribed interviews almost immediately, usually 
during the evening of the day they were conducted, while in my research diary I 
7 
would note thoughts that occurred to me during the mine visits. I would then, 
having carried out a number of such general interviews, conduct a preliminary 
analysis of the material I had gathered in order to generate detailed hypotheses to 
be tested out in further interviews. In many cases this led me to shift my focus and 
suggested new lines of questioning I had not previously considered. 
The trade union 
Research with the trade union involved repeated interviews with the trade union 
president and vice president and members of the presidium; interviews with shop 
trade union presidents; observation in the trade union office; observation of 
meetings of the trade union committee and of shift meetings. I attended important 
annual events such as the meeting to conclude the collective agreement (in 1995), 
the celebration of the 'Day of Trade Union Workers' (in 1994) and 'Miners' Day' 
(in 1996), and was also taken by the trade union to see the facilities which it helps 
to administer, such as the kindergartens and the prophylactic care facility. In 
addition to this, I asked the workers I interviewed about the union. 
Several detailed interviews were conducted with the trade union president and 
members of his team. Initially, the questions were quite general and were designed 
to gain an understanding of how the trade union operated at the mine and the way 
in which it had changed since the 1989 strike. Then, as my knowledge of the mine 
deepened, I was able to discuss specific issues which highlighted the attitudes of 
the officers to their work in a way which general questions could not. This can be 
seen in Chapter Five, for example, where the material gathered from detailed 
discussions with the trade union president over his attempt to reform the pay 
8 
system at the mine is used to illuminate the nature of the relationship between the 
union and management. 
I developed a good relationship with the trade union committee, who were very 
welcoming and allowed me unrestricted access to their office. I spent many hours 
sitting in there, often waiting (and often in vain) for a quiet moment in which to 
interview the trade union president. The office was graced with an almost constant 
flow of workers and pensioners, and I thus had ample opportunity to discover the 
type of questions with which the union was approached, as well as the way in 
which it dealt with its members. Amid the bustle of the office it seemed to me that 
my presence was quickly forgotten: the fact that I witnessed a range of reactions to 
members on the part of the trade union officers - from solicitous and 
compassionate to impatient and brusque - indicates that they were responding to 
particular individuals and situations rather than concentrating on projecting a 
certain image for my benefit. 
The trade union president positively encouraged me to attend trade union meetings 
while I was at the mine, and made no objection to me taping them. In short, I was 
offered a great deal of assistance, which was not accompanied by any attempt to 
control my movements: the trade union president was quite happy for me to 
wander around the mine talking to whomever I wished. 
My initial contact with the mine was through the trade union. It is an indication of 
the influence of the union committee that, when I decided to conduct a more 
detailed case study at the mine, they simply informed the director of my intentions 
9 
and he left me to my own devices.6 The director did call me in for a brief chat (the 
main purpose of which seemed to be to determine whether I could secure any 
British investment for the mine), but he placed no restrictions on my movement 
round the mine. This meant that I was free to visit brigades of surface workers 
unhindered, so long as I did not prevent them from working. 
I also conducted a limited number of short interviews with members of the mine 
administration (as well as with the head of the settlement administration) in order 
to gain specific pieces of information. Generally, however, managers were far 
more suspicious than the workers and union officials. They answered questions 
very generally, or not at all, and would often spend a long time grilling me about 
the source of my research funding. They were clearly perplexed by my presence, 
and seemed to find it hard to believe that I had a purely academic interest in their 
mine. I did not want to encourage anyone to complain to the director about my 
research so I limited my contact with senior members of management to a bare 
minimum. (I did, however, have more contact with line managers). 
The workers 
My research on 'workers' focused on collectives (the name given to work groups 
within the enterprise) rather than individual workers. During the phase of research 
6The director who was in place when I first started working at the mine was somewhat in awe of 
the trade union president, in whom he knew he had a powerful opponent. The director who took 
over from him at the end of 1996 has a good relationship with the trade union. I had met him 
before he became director and he was very welcoming when I returned to the mine in August 
1996. 
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in which I was selecting the mine at which to conduct my main case study I 
conducted a number of group interviews with both surface-workers and miners at 
Taldym. The workers had been almost universally scornful about the 
'representation' offered by the mine trade union committee (even though it 
seemed to me to be a great deal more active than its counterparts at other mines) 
and I was thus concerned to discover whether work groups had developed 
informal mechanisms to defend their interests in the absence, as they saw it, of 
adequate formal channels of representation. This research question led me to focus 
on immediate work collectives in order to discover how they dealt with day-to-day 
conflicts; to examine whether the 'collectives' themselves constituted defensive 
alliances; to find out whether the shop trade union committees played a greater 
representational role than workers' allowed in interviews, and so on. My strategy 
was to select a number of collectives for detailed research in order to analyse both 
their internal relations and the way that they related to management and the trade 
union. I also sought more general information about workers' lives and this was 
easier to process in the light of the understanding I developed of their collectives. 
The collectives selected were all from auxiliary shops, although a selection of 
individual miners from both production and development shops were interviewed 
outside work. This focus was partly determined by an interest in 'women's 
collectives' in the mine, which have so far received very little attention in the 
research on Russian mineworkers, and partly by ease of access: it was possible to 
sit for long periods observing the work of surface workers (and maintenance 
workers who work both on the surface and underground), something which was 
precluded in the case of miners. 
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The 'women's collectives' selected for detailed research were: the lampovaya, 
where the miners arrival at and return from work is recorded and their lamps are 
recharged and serviced; the zaryadnoe de po (locally known only as the 
zaryadnoe), where the batteries used for in-mine transport are re-charged; the 
central kotel'naya (boiler house) which provides heat and hot water for 
Vishnovka; and one of the mine's two 'technical complexes', the Vishnovskii 
complex, where the coal is improved by the manual removal of lumps of rock as 
the coal passes on a conveyor. The 'men's collectives' studied were a brigade of 
fitters from one of the in-mine transport shops, responsible for the maintenance of 
the conveyors in the mine; a brigade of fitters responsible for repairs in the 
kotel'naya, and one of the brigades responsible for the 'modernisation' and 
adaptation of newly-acquired mine machinery and the upkeep of the old in a shop 
known as URZO. 
These collectives span a range of statuses in the mine. The lampovaya is one of 
the 'best' 'women's collectives' at the mine and competition for jobs there is stiff. 
The technical complex, meanwhile, is one of the lowest status work places in the 
mine: the work is highly unpleasant, while the women who work there have a 
reputation for being 'rough'. The zaryadnoe is situated between these two 
extremes, and the kotel 'naya is positioned just below it. Comfort, ease and 
cleanliness are the basis for the gradations between women's collectives' (but not 
'Daily discomfort is accorded far more significance in these gradations than long-term health risks. 
The gases emitted by the batteries of, the zaryadnoe contain cadmium at several times the safe 
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men's):8 there is very little variation in the pay and skill grade allocated to them. 
Meanwhile, the male fitters from the transport shop occupy a similar status to their 
neighbours in the technical complex, though in a male rather than a female 
hierarchy. This is an insubordinate collective, which is low paid in comparison 
with other male collectives. The workers of URZO, meanwhile, work in what 
Russians refer to as 'a warm place' where the money is good, the labour turnover 
is low and the work is, according to those who do it, satisfying and creative. There 
is very little tension between managers and workers in this collective. 
There were two sides to my work with the collectives. One was to visit their 
workplaces, to sit and observe their work, their interactions with each other and 
with their managers and during breaks, to conduct short, informal interviews or 
simply to chat with workers. The other was to interview certain members of the 
brigades outside work in greater detail. In a number of brigades I developed close 
relationships with certain workers who would invite me round to their houses for 
meals and, in some cases, for whole weekends. 
My visits to the collectives were generally welcomed by workers,(a~though some 
collectives were more op~n than others. On my first visit to collectives, workers 
/!''' ':.:' . 
would generally gather round and, after I had asked them some questions, they 
level, but this is still seen as a more desirable work place than the technical complex where the 
work is harder and dirtier, but where the coal dust is less noxious than the gas of the zaryadnoe. 
'The variations in the pay of male manual workers at the mine are far greater~ A face-worker in the 
one of the most successful shops earns nearly four times as much as the lower paid male surface 
workers. 
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would reciprocate with questions about what I thought of Russia, about my life, 
the political situation in Britain and so on. They would usually invite me to return. 
On subsequent visits I generally received less attention and it was easier to 
observe and conduct more specific discussions with a few workers rather than the 
whole group. Generally on my arrival someone would immediately, in accordance 
with the local tradition of hospitality, make me a cup of tea and often give me 
something to eat. Having welcomed me and 'done right' by me, however, the 
workers would usually return to their conversations. They would periodically 
reassure me with smiles, winks and friendly pats, but generally they would 
continue without undue attention to my presence. This was ideal: I felt very 
welcome, but I was also able to observe the ebb and flow of life in the collective: 
encounters with managers, political arguments, discussions about the previous 
night's soap opera and so on. If they were discussing events at the mine, however, 
I could usually find a member of the collective who would explain the intricacies 
of any interesting situation to me. 
In addition to working at the mine, I also developed close relations with a number 
of workers from my chosen collectives who invited me to their homes. The 
material I gathered during these visits was invaluable: respondents were not 
surprisingly more relaxed and confiding in their own homes. I used a variety of 
techniques during these visits: I conducted taped interviews (with those workers 
who would allow it); had long informal conversations; observed the interactions 
within the family and I was also shown family photo albums, certificates of merit 
from work, medals and other such mementoes. During the first interview I would 
usually obtain brief work and life histories, and ask general questions about life 
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and work in the settlement. Then in subsequent interviews I would follow up on 
specific issues, arising either from my analysis of earlier interviews or my 
knowledge of current affairs at the mine. Since, however, these visits were 
considered by the workers to be primarily social occasions. I also spent a great 
deal of time having informal conversation round the meal table. Such 
conversations were often as valuable as the interviews themselves: rather than 
being driven by my interests, they were more open and thus gave a greater insight 
into workers' own priorities and preoccupations. Especially interesting in this 
regard were conversations between friends in which I played little part. On one 
occasion, for example, one of my respondents bumped into an old school friend 
she hadn't seen for several years on her way to collect me. She invited her friend 
to join us for lunch. and I was thus treated to two fascinating life stories.9 On such 
occasions I would take notes as soon as I had the opportunity,1O recording what 
direct quotations I could remember. and the substance of any interesting 
discussions. In this way I was able to gain a strong impression of workers' 
concerns, the way they organised their home lives, the way their home and work 
lives intersected, their standard of living and so on. The insights I gained in this 
way were vital: I could not have predicted. for example, that the issue of access, in 
9What my respondent told her friend did not contradict what she had told me in the series of 
interviews 1 had conducted with her, but the emphases she placed on various events in her life 
differed. I also acquired important new information, such as the fact that she earned almost twice 
as much from selling her cows' milk as she received in wages from the mine. 
1°1 was open about the fact that 1 made notes and kept a research diary, although 1 did not, for 
obvious reasons, take notes during these informal conversations. 
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particular to facilities such as the mine's tourist base, were the cause of far more 
frustration than health and safety violations. Thus, my informal social interaction 
allowed me to refine my research questions and analysis on the basis of local 
perceptions of priority issues. 
Those who were happy to be interviewed outside work and invited me to their 
homes tended to be the more self-confident, gregarious members of their 
collectives; they were usually 'good talkers' with strong opinions. Obviously, this 
had some influence on the nature of the material gathered, but since one of my 
themes was why there was so little overt resistance, working with the boldest and 
most outspoken members of the collective made sense: such workers acted as 
'negative cases' of my evolving hypotheses about the forms of dependency 
fostered within the mine. Moreover, such workers also tended to be the informal 
leaders of their work groups and their normative conceptions of 'the way things 
should be' tended to be those which dominated in their collectives. 
My sex also obviously had a strong influence on the process of developing such 
relations with workers. While women were able to invite me to their homes, men 
were not. First, such an invitation would have a hint of impropriety to it and, 
secondly, Russian rules of hospitality decree that guests who are not close friends 
must be well-fed: thus while women can make impromptu invitations, men are not 
at liberty to do so without knowing whether their wives will be available, and 
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prepared, to cook. 11 For this reason, my interviews with male workers were 
gathered in a slightly different way to those with female workers. In both cases I 
interviewed workers within their collectives, but, since there are no suitable public 
meeting places in Vishnovka, I had less chance to spend time with members of my 
chosen 'men's collectives' outside work. Therefore, in order to gain a deeper 
sense of the way in which women workers differed from their male counterparts, 
in addition to my work at the mine, I conducted longer interviews at home with 
the husbands, sons and male family friends of my close female respondents. 
The difference in the nature of the material that I was able to gather from male and 
female collectives was the most significant way in which my sex influenced my 
research. With female collectives I had equal access to their work environment, 
their home life, and the specifically 'women's world' of commiserative 
conversations about drunken husbands and so on. By contrast, I did not gain 
access to the parallel male sphere, although I did on one occasion conduct a group 
interview with a group of miners who were drinking vodka in a friend's flat after 
work. Although this was a limitation, my status as a foreigner did to some extent 
mitigate my status as a woman. For example, male workers tended to express their 
ideas about women to me as if I was a breed apart, in no way connected to those 
about whom they were moaning, joking or talking. 
IIAlthough most Vishnovkan men are capable of fending for themselves when their wives are 
working, any serious cooking is nearly always done by women. Cooking is generally seen as 
'women's work'. 
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Recording data 
I had a notebook computer with me and, as already mentioned, I recorded my 
material in the evenings or at the earliest possible opportunity. I taped interviews 
where possible, but also took copious notes. I usually transcribed (and 
simultaneously translated) interviews the day I took them, often in a slightly 
abbreviated form using my notes rather than the tape. When quoting from such 
interviews I have always referred back to the tape. I also occasionally had 
particularly successful interviews transcribed for me by native Russian speakers. 
Where the respondent requested that I did not use a tape recorder I reconstructed 
their words on the basis of my notes and memory. Similarly, as mentioned above, 
I attempted to record as much as possible from informal conversations. I also kept 
a research diary in which I recorded my daily activities, impressions, ideas, short 
conversations I overheard or had on buses and trains, as well as my frustrations, 
fears and petty triumphs. 
Language 
I conducted all my interviews and conversations in Russian, although I received 
some assistance from the Russian sociologist Olga Pulyaeva with my first series 
of interviews with mine presidents. Initially my understanding was better than my 
spoken Russian and I tended to rely on a prepared list of questions, though later 
my language improved and I was able to be far more spontaneous. There were 
times when I was frustrated by my inability fully to comprehend the conversations 
that were going on around me. This was particularly the case when workers were 
denouncing management, something which tended to involve a lot of mat, the 
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Russian sub-language of curses. The research would, of course, have been easier if 
I was a native speaker, and I no doubt missed some highly revealing and quotable 
exclamations made in my presence. At the same time, however, my status as an 
outsider did, as mentioned above, give me access to information that I might 
otherwise not have had. 
Thesis structure 
Chapter One explains the role of the trade unions under communism and the way 
in which workers were integrated into the state socialist system. Russia's official 
trade unions did not collapse along with the communist system which spawned 
them, and still claim to organise two thirds of Russia's employees. Although the 
official unions have not been able to represent workers' interests effectively 
during the transition period, they have not been superseded by new forms of 
workers' organisation. This chapter explains both the reasons for the durability 
and the ineffectiveness of the unions. 
The resilience of the unions and Soviet forms of enterprise organisation calls into 
question established theories of Soviet social integration, which cannot explain the 
stability of post-Soviet society. This chapter introduces a new approach to the 
question of the relationship between the communist regime and working class 
which sees the crucial site of integration as being within the enterprise, or what 
was referred to as the 'labour collective'. The discussion of the trade unions and 
labour collective also argues that these institutions are distinctively Soviet and 
differ considerably from apparently similar forms of social organisation which 
exist under capitalism. 
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Tracing the history of the former communist trade unions and the workers' 
movement from the perestroika era onwards, the second chapter highlights the 
problems faced both by the new workers' organisations which emerged after the 
1989 miners' strike and the official unions which declared their intention to 
reform. Neither type of organisation proved able to break the established pattern of 
relations within the enterprise: the new unions were either incorporated or 
excluded, while their official counterparts continued to function in partnership 
with management as they had done in the past. Since, however, the official trade 
unions still have a mass membership, it is the question of their transformation 
which is dealt with by the case study. 
Chapters Three and Four introduce the case study through an analysis of the 
mining settlement of Vishnovka and the mine. Chapter Three describes the 
community and highlights the role of the mine within it, indicating how far the 
enormous influence of the enterprise over workers' lives is a feature specific to 
small mining settlements and how far this results from the structure and 
organisation of Soviet enterprises more generally. In addition to this, the chapter 
also analyses the way the community has been affected by reform, an appreciation 
of which is crucial to understanding the prospects for union reform and worker 
organisation within the mine. Meanwhile, Chapter Four describes the structure and 
organisation of the mine, concentrating on the impact of privatisation on the mine. 
Taken together these chapters contextualise the case study, providing an essential 
sense of the way in which the mine and community operate. 
Chapter Five is a case study of the attempts of the Taldym union committee to 
adapt to its changing environment. The analysis of the union at Taldym 
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exemplifies the dilemmas faced by the enterprise committees of the former official 
unions in the transition period, and highlights the contradictions of their position 
after the demise of the Communist Party within enterprises. In particular, it 
considers how far the constraints on union reform are structural, and how far they 
are the product of ingrained behaviour and perceptions on the part of trade union 
officers, the mine administration and workers. 
Proceeding from the analysis of Chapter Five, which shows that at the mine level 
the union still operates in partnership with management, Chapter Six asks whether 
the shop trade union committees operate within the same constraints as the mine 
union committee. The chapter considers what impact the mounting tension in the 
mining industry is having on the shop trade union structures. Are they playing any 
role in channelling the conflict or is it passing them by? 
Having established that the union does not yet effectively represent workers in 
previous chapters, the following section of the book asks why workers have not 
organised outside the union in order to defend their interests. Russian workers 
generally express a strong attachment to collectivist principles and appear to have 
a highly developed sense of class consciousness. Their failure to launch any 
effective collective protest against the rigours of reform is thus particularly 
puzzling. Chapters Seven and Eight seek to explain this apparent contradiction, 
arguing that the forms of collectivism sponsored within enterprises actually 
inhibited rather than promoted workers' self-organisation. 
Chapter Seven shows the way in which the structure of the Soviet regime of 
production, which constitutes the labour collective as a 'supplicatory unity', and 
the internal dynamics of the enterprise to which the system of state paternalism 
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gave rise, constituted a barrier to the definition and defence of workers' specific 
interests. Workers identify strongly with the ideal of the united labour collective, 
but they are also acutely aware of the deep division which exists within this 
supposedly solidaristic entity. Through the analysis of this contradictory 
consciousness, the chapter highlights the way in which the structures in which 
they were located constrained the action of workers. The first section considers the 
form of workers' identification with the enterprise fostered by state paternalism, 
while the second section goes on to examine the main forms of division within the 
enterprise and the form of oppositional consciousness to which these gave rise. 
The chapter argues that what above all characterises this consciousness is that it is 
negatively defined and is not expressed in any form of workers' self-
organisation.12 The last section then attempts to provide an explanation for this 
limitation on the basis of the analysis developed in the first two sections. It also 
asks how far the structural barriers to workers' organisation identified by the 
chapter are being eroded by transition. 
Within the Soviet enterprise work groups were also constituted as 'collectives' 
and Chapter Eight asks why it has not been possible for workers to realise the 
collectivist potential apparently immanent in this form of organisation. It takes 
one particular collective - the all-women's collective of the /ampovaya - and 
12The phrase 'complaining in corners', which often crops up in interviews in various forms, 
captures the nature of opposition within the enterprise: 'They [the workers] are like slaves. They 
will complain in corners, but they will never do anything'; 'They whisper in corners, but as soon 
as the director comes along they say, "Oh yes, Petr Petrovich, ... of course, I'll see to it at once'" . 
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examines the changing potential for collective organisation at the grass roots 
through an analysis of the history of the collective from the Gorbachev era 
onwards. 
The first section of this chapter focuses on the nature of workers' relations to their 
immediate work collectives. It deals with the question of gender differences in this 
relationship, arguing that the form of relations found in the lampovaya, despite 
certain specific elements, is characteristic of the mine as a whole. The chapter 
goes on to chart the development of social relations in this collective from the late 
perestroika period onwards. It argues that, while the collapse of the Party and the 
erosion of discipline at the mine allowed work collectives more autonomy, 
workers have not built on the gains made during the strike movement. The reasons 
for this again relate to the structure of the Soviet enterprise. The relationships of 
dependency which constitute the enterprise as a supplicatory unity are reproduced 
within the enterprise so that individual shops and collectives have a common 
interest in securing the best deal from the enterprise administration. Thus, in the 
same way that the director is seen as the 'representative' of the enterprise in the 
'outside world', line managers represent the interests of collectives within the 
enterprise. Workers' reliance on this form of representation inhibits self-
organisation within their collectives and also renders them very vulnerable if - as 
occurred in the case of the lampovaya - their 'representative' turns against them. 
Chapter Nine considers workers' reaction to change from a different angle: instead 
of asking why workers are not organising, it analyses the nature of their survival 
strategies during the transition period and the political implications of these. For 
although workers do not constitute an organised presence on the political stage, 
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their responses to reform, be they individual or collective, nevertheless play a 
crucial role in the post-communist recomposition of the Russian state and 
economy. 
The argument developed in the chapter is that workers adopt complementary 
strategies in the face of reform. On the one hand, they are far from indifferent to 
the loss of security provided by the social guarantees of the past, or to the 
destruction of the collective institutions of social and welfare provision. But rather 
than seeking to build a new relationship between individual and collective, in 
which the workers would take control of their collective institutions, they remain 
locked into the alienated forms of symbolic collectivism inherited from the past. 
Meanwhile, as a complement to their search for collective salvation, workers are 
also very active in pursuing individual survival strategies. Enterprise collectivism 
is thus coming under pressure from below as workers increasingly look outside the 
enterprise for their survival - which in turn reduces the possibility of their 
mounting a collective response to transition and reinforces their dependence on 
authoritarian leaders. The complementary perspectives of individualism and 
'alienated collectivism' adopted by workers are a key force in shaping the labour 
collective, and Russia, of the future. 
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Chapter One: Soviet trade unions and the 
integration of Soviet workers 
This chapter provides an analysis of the form of Soviet trade unionism and the 
means through which workers were integrated into the Soviet state. It also 
establishes the specificity of the communist trade unions and Soviet enterprise 
paternalism, which was a key integrating mechanism in Soviet society, through 
comparison to 'Western' forms of trade unionism and capitalist forms of 
paternalism. This lays the foundation for the analysis of the nature and limits of 
workers' organisation during the transition from communism in Russia which 
follows in later chapters. 
The theoretical basis of Soviet trade unionism 
The famous slogan of the early period of Stalinist industrialisation instructed 
union officials to turn their 'faces towards production' (Ruble, 1981: 13), meaning 
that they were to direct their attentions to the overriding task of plan fulfilment. 
The unions were deprived of any independence that they had retained during the 
period of the New Economic Policy (NEP): those who opposed the new policy 
were dismissed as 'right deviationists'. But the Soviet model of trade unionism 
was not simply a product of the Stalin era. Certainly, it was during this era that the 
unions settled into their specific role and position within the Soviet polity and 
enterprise. The theoretical basis of Soviet trade unionism had, however, already 
been laid down by Lenin. 
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Lenin's position partly emerged from the need to reach a compromise between the 
contending factions at the Tenth Party Congress in March 1921, but it also 
exhibited familiar Leninist preoccupations such as the vanguard role of the Party 
and the need for rapid industrial growth to combat Russia's long-lamented 
backwardness. Lenin negotiated a middle path between the syndicalist programme 
of the Workers' Opposition, which sought to give unions control over industrial 
production, and the 'production' platform of Leon Trotsky and Nikolai Bukharin, 
which advocated the statisation of the trade unions, and their transformation into 
'production unions' that would manage compulsory labour programmes, improve 
productivity and enforce labour discipline. The victorious proposal of the Group 
of Ten supported by Lenin meanwhile allowed for a circumscribed form of union 
independence within the boundaries determined by Party policy.) This 
compromise between Party factions formed the basis for Lenin's prescription for 
'The Role and Functions of Trade Unions Under the New Economic Policy', 
which was adopted as policy by the Central Committee on 12 January 1922, and 
was published five days later in Pravda (Carr, 1952: 326). The arguments he 
developed in some respects referred specifically to the NEP period in which the 
market and private trading were restored, small-scale private enterprise was 
permitted, and 'large-scale' (factory) production was re-organised on commercial 
lines. But Lenin's view of the proper relationship between workers, trade unions 
and the Soviet state was not only applicable to this period and formed the 
theoretical justification of the role of trade unions in the Soviet state thereafter. 
IFor more details on this debate see Carr, 1952: 222 - 227. 
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The commercialisation of production in the NEP period would, according to 
Lenin, 'inevitably give the masses the impression that there is an antagonism of 
interest between the management of the different enterprises and the workers 
employed in them' (Lenin, [1922] 1947: 760), and in this situation the job of the 
trade unions was to defend workers' interests and to try to ensure that their living 
standards were raised. To this end the trade unions were permitted to 'constantly 
correct the blunders and excesses of the business organisations resulting from the 
bureaucratic distortions of the state apparatus' (p. 761), which would in turn 
further the cause of socialism because 'the ultimate object of every action taken by 
the working class can only be to fortify the proletarian state and the proletarian 
class state power' (p.762). This last sentiment gets to the crux of the Leninist 
position on Soviet trade unions: under socialism, or the transition to socialism, the 
interests of the (socialist) state and the working class are identical and therefore 
the role of unions is reduced to one of 'mediators' (p.762), trying to avert the 
disputes arising from 'distortions' through a 'foresighted policy' (p.763). Disputes 
over union priorities were to be settled by a 'higher authority': the Communist 
Party (p.767), which alone comprehended where the objective interest of the state 
and working class lay. 
The common interests of the workers and the socialist state (run by the vanguard 
of the working class, the Communist Party) might not be immediately apparent to 
the workers, however. This possibility did not elude Lenin who was quite clear 
about the fact that trade unions should be under the control of the Party. Trade 
union groups should be run by 'responsible comrades', though not necessarily 
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Party members (p.766),2 who should be on the one hand close to the workers and 
able to 'stoop to their level', but at the same time able to resist the temptation to 
'pander to the prejudices and backwardness of the masses' (p.767). Thus, in place 
of self-organisation among workers, the 'responsible comrades' were to 'judge the 
mood, the real aspirations, needs and thoughts of the masses' (p.766). Lenin 
recognised that one of the greatest dangers facing the Communist Party was 
'divorcement from the masses' - a grave risk considering the self-appointed 
vanguard of the working class had no reliable institutional mechanisms for 
maintaining links with the class in whose name they exercised their dictatorship -
and the trade unions were supposed to avert this danger by becoming, in Lenin's 
famous phrase, 'transmission belts from the Communist Party to the masses' (p. 
766). 
Although the Party wanted to be kept informed of the workers' mood, however, 
they believed themselves to be fully cognisant of the 'real' interest of the working 
class. For Lenin and all the Bolsheviks this was clear cut: it lay in increasing the 
output of manufactured goods by 'enormous dimensions' (p.763). The trade 
unions were therefore charged with enlisting 'the working class and the masses of 
working people generally for all branches of the work of building up the state 
2The Eleventh Party Congress in 1922 decided that only Party members of several years standing 
could be elected to leading posts in the trade unions. As E.H. Carr remarks with reference to this 
decision, 'The fate of the trade unions was an excelIent illustration of the way in which the NEP, 
by conceding a measure of economic freedom, provoked a strengthening of direct political control 
by the Party over individuals or organs which might be tempted to abuse this conditional freedom' 
(Carr, 1952: 328). 
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economy' (p.765). They should explain to workers that this was in their interest, 
while fighting to improve labour discipline. In addition to this, the trade unions 
were to act of 'schools of communism' (p.764), training the future managers of 
Soviet industry and providing a channel for the advancement of workers. 
The later position of the trade unions under state socialism was not definitively 
anticipated by Lenin and the role of the unions was progressively refined, most 
notably through the addition of social and welfare functions within the enterprise. 
Aside from the social duties that the unions acquired, however, the main features 
of Soviet trade unions can be traced back to the Leninist ideological heritage. 
First, the unions were never intended to be an expression of workers' self-
organisation: they were to be subordinated to the control of the Communist Party 
'which alone will be capable of withstanding the inevitable petty-bourgeois 
vacillations ... and the inevitable traditions and relapses of narrow-craft unionism 
or craft prejudices among the proletariat' (Lenin, [1921] 1947: 684). Secondly, the 
supposed coincidence of the interests of the socialist state and the working class 
meant that the unions' role was minimised to that of mediators. And though the 
unions were formally allowed to the correct 'distortions' of the bureaucratic state, 
the definition of what was and was not a distortion was ultimately in the hands of 
the 'higher authority'. Thus, the defensive function of unions was even in theory 
whittled away to tinkering within the parameters set by the state. Lastly, Lenin 
laid the foundation for the co-operation between the unions and management by 
asserting that part of the unions' role was to press for improvements in 
productivity and labour discipline since this was in the objective interests of the 
working class. Nevertheless, Lenin did, it should be stressed, genuinely struggle 
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with the problem of the relationship between the socialist state and the working 
class. But this was not the case with the later Soviet theorists who dealt with the 
question of trade unions. They trotted out a neat formula whenever it was 
required, in unreflective justification of trade union subordination: there was no 
conflict of interest between the Soviet state and working class, and trade unions 
existed to deal with the non-class economic struggle against bureaucratic 
distortions, themselves conveniently passed off as survivals of capitalism.3 
After Lenin: The fate of the unions 
Under Stalin, the trade unions lost any defensive functions they had retained 
during the NEP period and were enjoined in the quest for increased production. 
The unions' chief concerns became those of 'socialist emulation' and other 
production-raising strategies. From 1929 - 34 the central union agencies even 
attempted to use collective agreements as an instrument for increasing 
productivity (Ruble, 1981: 17), but this attempt proved ineffective and collective 
agreements ceased to be concluded altogether between 1937 and 1947. 
Meanwhile, the unions also acquired a role in welfare provision within 
enterprises.4 After the abolition of the People's Commissariat of Labour in 1933, 
3See, for example, Kuusinen, 1961: 529. 
4An earlier, short-lived attempt to put social insurance under the auspices of the newly-created All-
Union Central Council Of Trade Unions (VTsSPS) had been made between 1917 and 1921 
(Madison, 1979: 85). 
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the unions accepted responsibility for the distribution of welfare benefits.s Given 
the tightly circumscribed representational role of unions and their limited 
effectiveness in the struggle for increased productivity, social administration 
quickly became their most important practical function within the enterprise. It 
filled the days of union officers and defined their position as part of the enterprise 
administration: effectively the unions functioned as enterprise social welfare 
departments. The fact that the unions were to give priority to the interests of 
management rather than workers in the execution of their welfare work was 
established early on. In 1938 factory trade union and management officials were 
required to consider attendance and production records in the distribution of 
welfare benefits (Ruble, 1981: 24). Although this requirement was annulled in 
1951, in practice the control of welfare benefits gave the unions a good deal of 
discretionary power over workers and they were expected to use it: there were, for 
example, 18 different categories of disability allowance, which could be granted or 
not according to criteria such as length of service, work record and the role played 
by alcohol in the disability (p. 88). 
The shift from coercion to encouragement as a means of promoting industrial 
growth which characterised the Khrushchev era obviously had implications for the 
role of the unions. Their role was enhanced by a resolution of the Central 
5These included sickness and invalidity benefits, maternity benefits and child care allowances for 
low income families, but not unemployment benefit which was abolished in October 1930. These 
benefits, though distributed by the unions, were financed through state tax of 4.4 - 14 per cent 
against each ministry'S and enterprise's pay roll. 
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Committee of the Communist Party in December 1957. This demanded increased 
worker involvement in production administration and also accepted the need to 
improve the education, safety and welfare of Soviet workers. The resolution also 
stated that the collective agreement was the juridical foundation for all trade union 
activity at the enterprise level. Nevertheless, promoting production remained the 
unions' primary obligation, and their relationship with the Communist Party was 
not altered by the resolution (Ruble, 1981: 33 - 4). The 'central task' of the unions, 
defined in the Preamble to their by-laws, was unambiguous and unchanged from 
that defined by Lenin: 'to mobilise the masses for the attainment of our principal 
economic goal - the creation of the material and technical basis of communism, 
for the further strengthening of the Soviet Union's economic and defence power, 
for ensuring a steady rise in the people's material and cultural standards' (Godson, 
1981: 113). 
The functions of Soviet trade unions 
The traditional arguments about Soviet trade unions focus on the issue of whether 
the trade unions had the 'dual function' of imposing the policies of the Party from 
above at the same time as defending workers' interests (Ruble, 1981) or whether 
they were simply part of the repressive apparatus (Conquest, 1967, Schapiro and 
Godson, 1981). Clarke et al. (1993: 93 - 94) have challenged these arguments, 
however, claiming that at the enterprise level the trade unions were an instrument 
of the enterprise administration and that this was in fact their dominant role. Their 
'dual functions' therefore involved supporting enterprise management and acting 
as a 'transmission belt' for the Party. From the Khrushchev period, along with 
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raising productivity the unions were supposed to support the social policy of the 
party within the enterprise by defending individual workers against unscrupulous 
management. Thus the unions were partly constituted as a check on management, 
and could receive support from the Party in this capacity. The extent to which they 
could perform this role on an everyday basis, however, was limited by their close 
integration with management: serious confrontations between enterprise 
management and unions would only occur if the union was prompted and backed 
by the Party. 
The main characteristics of the official trade unions were, first, that they organised 
approximately 98 per cent of the workers. The unions were organised on the 
branch principle in unions which grouped together all the employees (including 
the managers) from a particular branch regardless of their function and belonged 
to a central confederation, the VTsSPS.6 The primary enterprise trade unions were 
grouped together in regional organisations as well as branch organisations. The 
trade unions were governed by the principle of 'democratic centralism', which in 
theory combined centralised command with initiative of the rank and file, though 
in practice there was no space for the latter 'democratic' element. There were 
supposedly elections for all posts in the union, but these also were governed by the 
principles of democratic centralism - those voting took part in a 'democratic' 
6Khrushchev made an abortive attempt to re-organise the unions along territorial lines as part of 
his plan to reform the economy on the basis of regional economic councils (sovnarkozy). After the 
attempt to unseat him in June 1957, however, Khrushchev was disinclined to force this measure on 
the resistant trade unions and the branch union Structure remained. 
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procedure constrained by the strongest centralism in which the candidates were 
nominated from above. 
A formal statement of the functions of Soviet trade unions by an official of the 
USSR State Committee on Labour and Wages (Piatakov, 1962) published for 
consumption in the West, listed the following functions of enterprise trade unions: 
participation in the drafting of production and investment plans; the receipt of 
reports from management about production plans; expressing an opinion on 
candidates for management, and monitoring of management performance on 
labour issues (the lax could be reported to the 'responsible bodies'); participation 
in decisions regarding job evaluation and the organisation of production 
conferences. The functions of 'examination of labour disputes', and monitoring 
health and safety appeared near the bottom of this list, though it did also include 
higher up the conclusion of collective agreements with management, and the 
representation of workers over issues of work, living conditions and culture. The 
trade unions also, as mentioned above, administered social insurance and social 
facilities provided at an enterprise level such as sanatoria, holiday facilities and so 
on. 
Although such a range of duties might not seem particularly exceptional, precisely 
those issues with which the Western observer would expect the trade union to be 
most concerned are those which in this list are largely formal duties. The official 
trade unions' representational remit, including housing and cultural issues, on the 
surface appears quite wide, reflecting the fact that the enterprise was the basic unit 
of Soviet society, which provided not only employment, but also housing, medical 
care, and leisure facilities for its workers. Hence the trade union committee was 
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supposed to be concerned with all these questions. As mentioned above, however, 
these supposedly representative functions were closely bound up with the role of 
the union in stimulating higher productivity and improving labour discipline. The 
trade unions' involvement in issues of service and leisure provision was a source 
of patronage and control rather than an extended frontier in collective 
representation. 
The character of the 'collective agreements' negotiated by the unions requires 
explanation. There was little room for 'negotiation' of this agreement, since 
allocation was determined by the centrally-determined plan. The union was 
allowed to comment on the document drawn up by management, and drew up the 
sections concerned with welfare provision, but since it was only a document of 
formal significance there was little need for effective consultation.' The trade 
unions were also supposed to monitor the implementation of the collective 
agreements, health and safety rules and to mediate in disputes. This in practice did 
not occur, however, because the trade union was the weakest member of the 
factory triumvirate composed of itself, management and the Party. It was heavily 
dependent on management for the goods and services it controlled, and in terms of 
the career structure its officers were part of enterprise management. Therefore, in 
'Since conditions of employment were outside the scope of the collective agreement, the Party 
periodically attempted to make it serve other functions. As has been seen, in the early Stalin period 
it was hoped that collective agreements could serve as a means of improving productivity, while in 
the Khrushchev era the enterprise collective agreement was supposed, according the December 
1957 Central Committee resolution, to be one of the ways in which trade unions could participate 
in management (Ruble, IS I : 34). 
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practice the union officials had no interest in creating conflict within the 
enterprise. Meanwhile, workers, since they did not see the union as existing as a 
channel to represent their interests, did not exert any pressure on their unions to 
defend them collectively, though they might seek the help of an efficient union 
official over personal problems such as housing, debt and so on. 
As mentioned above, the unions were supposed to represent the grievances of 
individual workers. The union was, for example, obliged to give its agreement to 
any dismissals of workers proposed by management. McAulay estimates that in 
Leningrad in the period of her study (1957 - 65), the unions agreed to half of all 
management requests for dismissal. The reason generally given for refusing assent 
was that the worker should be given another chance, rather than because there was 
no legal basis for dismissal (McAulay, 1969: 123). Such defence, however, took 
place within the parameters set by the Party. Thus the unions did, to a limited 
extent, defend workers' interests, but only as these were defined from above by 
the Party and not as expressed by workers from below. In the case of dismissals 
the trade unions' attitude was governed not by a commitment to defend workers, 
but by the interests of the enterprise as a whole, as represented by the Party. From 
the Party perspective, reasons for keeping a worker included the labour shortage, 
and the potential social disruption that could come from leaving undisciplined 
workers outside the care and control of the labour collective. But, as McAulay 
notes, if a worker was having a bad influence on others (mainly by persuading 
them to drink), or worked in a young collective, the trade union was very unlikely 
to defend him or her: production was the Party's number one priority. The 
enterprise trade unions were not only constrained by Party priorities, they were 
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also rather toothless watchdogs over the implementation of the central Party 
policy, because they could only assert themselves when they had the backing of 
the Party Committee within the enterprise. This would usually occur in the context 
of conflict within the enterprise administration, or of a Party campaign organised 
from above (Clarke et al., 1993: 112). 
The unions had a similar level of effectiveness in their role as promoters of 
productivity. As indicated above, they were supposed to act to break the collusive 
relations that developed between workers and managers seeking to merely 
negotiate an achievable plan and meet it, thus acting in the interests of the working 
class as a whole by raising production. But again the unions did not have the 
requisite power to challenge the established industrial culture of enterprises: they 
were too weak in relation to management and the Party to pursue this abstract 
'interest' of the working class. Rather, they collaborated with the Party and 
enterprise administration to ensure that the prevailing form of relations within the 
enterprise were not challenged. The enterprise unions were therefore at the same 
time constrained by their formally prescribed role and unable properly to fulfil it. 
Workers and the Soviet state 
Soviet trade unions did not defend workers' interests, workers were not allowed to 
vote in free elections, nor to form their own organisations, and yet there was little 
overt conflict between workers and the regime. How was this social peace 
maintained once the extreme terror of the Stalin era was over? The most common 
explanation is that a 'social contract' existed between the regime and the working 
class. Workers offered their compliance in return for security of employment, 
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stable prices, gradual improvement in consumption levels, a relatively egalitarian 
system of remuner~tion and because the Party allowed them 'considerable 
personal freedom as workers and consumers' (Hauslohner, 1987: 58).8 Although 
the subscribers to the social contract thesis do allow that repression existed, they 
play down its significance, and assert that the stability of the system rested on 
'volunteered (rather than coerced) compliance' (Hauslohner, 1987: 57). This view 
is very similar to that of David Lane, who argues that Soviet workers were 
'incorporated' (Lane, 1985: 165) and again places the emphasis on worker consent 
rather than regime manipulation, claiming that 'inputs of mass loyalty are not 
absent in the Soviet Union' (p. 166). In opposition to such views, authors such as 
Viktor Zaslavsky (1982) and Don Filtzer (1992, 1994) have stressed that it was the 
regime-propagated 'atomisation' of the working class which explains the lack of 
resistance in the post-Stalin era. Both claim that the regime forced workers to 
respond to their subordination as individuals rather than as a collectivity: 'it is 
difficult to expect workers to resort to collective initiatives when individual action 
proves at least partially effective' (Zaslavsky,1982: 51). 
The argument to be advanced here differs from these interpretations of the 
relationship of workers to the Soviet state, in that it sees the integration of workers 
ILinda J. Cook (1993) lists the following authors as subscribing to the idea of a 'trade otT of social 
welfare benefits for workers' quiescence' (p. 219): Peter Hauslohner (1987); Waiter Connor 
(1988: 67 - 85); Ed A. Hewett (1988: 39 - 50); Seweryn Bialer (1980: 158. 165); Gait Lapidus 
(1983: 188·192), and George Breslauer (1984: 220.222). 
38 
as something which took place within the enterprise.9 Neither the idea of 
'atomisation' nor the 'social contract' and 'incorporation' theses adequately 
explain the way in which workers related to authority in the Soviet Union because 
they deal with the abstraction of 'the Russian working class', rather than linking 
the political behaviour of workers to the form and content of their lives. 
This is not to deny that both ways of seeing the relationship between workers and 
the regime contain important elements of the truth. First, the material security of 
Soviet workers did play an important role in ensuring political quiescence: the fact 
that strikes tended to occur in reaction to price rises or piece rate revisions bears 
eloquent testimony to the fact that workers did expect a certain minimal standard 
ofliving.lo But although it is the case that living standards rose considerably in the 
Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras, Soviet workers still had adequate cause for 
grievance. The appalling working conditions and safety standards of Soviet 
enterprises are notorious; the chronic housing shortage blighted the lives of 
9 Andrew Walder similarly sees relations within the enterprise as the key to the political control of 
Chinese workers, although in the Chinese case the Communist Party played a far more significant 
role within the enterprise than its Russian counterpart (Walder. 1986). 
IOW. D. Connor has used the evidence of strikes to argue for the existence of a social contract. He 
notes that there was a wave of strikes in 1962, the year of nation-wide price increases. After these 
strikes the regime realised that price stability was an important element of the 'social contract' and 
did not openly raise the prices of basic foods again until the Gorbachev era. The fact that strikes 
occurred in reaction to any erosion of living standards has led Connor to conclude that 'Brezhnev 
era strikers saw themselves as standing up against violations of a just social contract' (Connor, 
1991: 221). 
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generations of Soviet families condemned to live in the dreaded barracks or 
communal apartments; 11 from the late 1960s there were increasing shortages of 
food and consumer goods so workers were often forced to save rather than spend 
their money, and underdevelopment of the service sector meant there was little 
relief to be had from work and overcrowded homes other than that which came in 
vodka bottles.12 Meanwhile, the benefits which derived from the regime's fear of 
working class revolt were not universally enjoyed. Conditions varied greatly 
within enterprises, between enterprises, between sectors and between regions: 
within enterprises the main production workers were favoured with higher wages 
and greater access to non-cash benefits than the auxiliary workers; pay in heavy 
industry was higher than in light industry; male workers were better rewarded than 
female workers who were concentrated in light industry and auxiliary positions, 
and there were significant regional differences both in wage levels and in terms of 
food and other supplies, the effect of which was compounded by the fact that 
freedom of movement was limited by the internal passport system. 
Material security was undoubtedly important to Russian workers. But is it really 
credible to argue that female textile workers living in dormitories, or miners living 
IIln 1958 Soviet workers still usually lived in communal apartments with shared kitchens and 
bathrooms. This gradually improved, but although urban dwelling space rose from approximately 
7 square metres per person in 1965 to 8.3 in 1975, this was still well below the official 'sanitary 
norm' of 9 (Con nor, 1991: 123 - 4). 
12Zaslavsky claims that the maintenance of vodka supplies even when other goods were in short 
supply was an important means through which the regime neutralised discontent (Zaslavsky, 
1982). 
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in one-roomed flats with their families were 'bought off by the beneficence of 
their communist masters? One answer to such criticism is to stress the fact that the 
Soviet labour force was 'unsophisticated' (Lane, 1985: 166). But although a major 
point of comparison in the pre-Gorbachev era was the Soviet past rather than 'the 
West', this does not mean that workers were satisfied with their lowly lot. Another 
point of comparison was Soviet managers who had access to closed stores, decent 
housing and the monopoly on enterprise leisure facilities. The common complaint 
of Russian workers when interviewed that it is only such managers and those 
connected to them who are granted the privilege of living 'like human beings' (po 
chelovecheskii), potently reveals that however 'unsophisticated' they may have 
been, workers were not satisfied by the minimal material satisfaction on offer to 
them under communism. This is therefore not in itself sufficient explanation for 
workers' lack of resistance: they were far from seduced into political slumber. 
Zaslavsky and Filtzer place far more emphasis on regime control strategies in their 
explanation of the lack of organised worker resistance. For Filtzer, the crucial 
determinant of workers' behaviour was their inability to organise collectively. 
They were 'atomised to an extreme degree' because: they had no means of 
influencing political events through parties or trade unions; political opposition of 
an individual or collective nature was prevented by a 'ubiquitous and brutal secret 
police' which quickly crushed incipient organisation, and because of the 'hyper-
individualization of the labour process and incentives' which 'reinforced the 
disintegration of workers' solidarity' (Filtzer, 1992: 224 - 7). Therefore, the only 
avenue open to workers was to develop individualised forms of resistance _ 
absenteeism, drunkenness, pilfering enterprise property, insubordination, job-
41 
changing and control over production - which the system could tolerate because 
the goods produced were not 'commodities seeking realisation as exchange 
value' .13 Meanwhile, Zaslavsky also sees job security and rising living standards 
as only part of the explanation for the lack of collective resistance on the part of 
workers. He again emphasises the political monopoly of the Communist Party and 
the threat of repression, while also highlighting the regime's deliberate 
segmentation of the working class through the creation of different status groups 
within it, and the safety valve offered by individual survival strategies such as job 
changing. Certainly, these authors are right to stress the role of repression and the 
regime's divisive tactics. The role of fear cannot be minimised: as late as 1989, 
when the miners went on strike, one strike leader claimed that, 'Everyone had an 
instinctive fear that the strike might be suppressed by military force' (Clarke et al., 
1995: 71 ).14 But placing so much explanatory significance on repression leaves 
one burning question unanswered: why did a workers' movement not emerge once 
the fear of reprisals had subsided after 1989, especially in the face of all the 
provocations proffered by the economic reformers? 
The view of the Soviet working class as 'atomised' is also radically at odds with 
other interpretations. David Lane has, for example, taken the completely different 
view that workers' consent was secured through 'positive forms of incorporation' 
I3That is, enterprises were not required to make a profit, but only to make the plan. 
14Rumours of past repression certainly aided the regime: in 1989 the miners were aware of the 
demonstration which had been put down by force in Novocherkassk in 1962 killing an estimated 
70 - 80 demonstrators (Clarke et al., 1995: 28). 
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which bound the worker to the Soviet system (Lane, 1985: 163).15 His portrayal of 
Soviet workers suggests that they were well integrated within the labour 
collectives of their enterprises, and that apparent manifestations of alienation such 
as alcoholism and poor labour discipline were in fact only survivals from 
'traditional Russian culture' (p.164): memories of the village rather than any form 
of resistance were responsible for the negative features of Soviet industrial culture. 
How can two such apparently contradictory views of Soviet workers be 
reconciled? The answer to this question provides the key to understanding the 
relationship between the regime and working class in the Soviet Union and begins 
to explain why removal of the threat of repression did not have a bigger impact. 
The Soviet enterprise 
The Soviet enterprise, as its other nomenclature - the labour collective16 - implies, 
was far more than a workplace. As the universal provider, it pervaded most 
spheres of life. It provided for a whole range of workers' needs - from 
kindergarten places for their children to help with burying their dead. A 
IS According to Lane this incorporation was secured through: permanence of employment; rising 
living standards; the organisation of enterprises into collectives providing social services to 
workers; toleration of slack labour discipline; the fact that managers and workers were socially 
closer than in the West and workers appreciated strong managers, and the fact that trade unions 
were incorporated, as were 'natural leaders' among workers who were promoted or given a role in 
the Party or trade union. He does also note that the 'threat of sanctions' was effective in binding 
the workers to the system. 
16 This term refers to all the enterprise employees, from director to cleaner. 
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substantial portion of state functions for the social protection of the population 
were carried out through the enterprise, which was structured as a paternalistic 
community (The Samara Research Group, 1995). In most cases there was no 
alternative means of securing access to the services offered by the workplace. 
The average large enterprise provided: 
• Housing; 
• Rest and leisure facilities such as 'palaces of culture', sanatoria, holiday resorts 
and camps for children; 
• Kindergartens (which, since Russian children begin school at the age of seven, 
also provide the first years of schooling); 
• Prophylactic health care facilities, and sometimes local primary health care 
facilities; 
• Allotments; 
• Potato plots; 
• Shops selling goods often in short supply at low prices; 
• Grants to relieve financial hardship or pay funeral expenses; 
• Guarantees for its workers' loans from local suppliers of expensive goods such 
as furniture; 
• Services such as workplace hairdressers; 
• New year's presents to employees' children. 
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These services were crucial to the survival of workers in what was essentially a 
non-monetary society. The Soviet Union did have a currency, albeit a 'soft' one, 
and workers were paid cash wages, the level of which, relative to prices, was 
important to them. 17 Nevertheless, many of the necessities of life could not be paid 
for in roubles: as indicated by the above list, a whole range of services were 
received from enterprises as a form of payment in kind, while a significant 
percentage of food consumed was grown by the workers themselves on land 
provided by the enterprises. The state retail sector was poorly developed and 
workers were often unable to spend their income. As shortages grew worse in the 
Brezhnev era, the level of savings grew. By 1980 the total savings in the Soviet 
Union were equal to seven months of national retail (state and co-operative) trade 
turnover, or, hypothetically, enough for all the people employed in the national 
economy to take 209 days of unpaid leave and survive (Connor, 1991: 119). The 
fact that people were able to save so much from what were low wages clearly 
indicates the marginal role of money within the system. Thus, survival without the 
payment in kind that went along with membership of a 'labour collective' was, for 
most people, impossible: in the Soviet Union it was not just love that money could 
not buy, but a wide variety of very concrete things. Since the Soviet economy was 
characterised by conditions of shortage of even basic goods, access to goods and 
17W.D Connor (1991) provides a record of all Khrushchev and Brezhnev era strikes about which 
he was able to obtain information. A significant number of these strikes - which were mounted at 
considerable risk· were motivated by either wage cuts or price rises (pp. 213 • 225). 
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services was far more important than the means to pay for them. IS There was a 
clear hierarchy of access which was determined by position: a whole range of 
goods was only available to people who had achieved a certain status. Thus, the 
Soviet Union can be said to have had a non-monetary economy because money 
did not act as a universal equivalent. 19 Within this context, the benefits provided 
by enterprises were not 'perks', but necessities: survival outside a labour 
collective was not a realistic prospect in the Soviet Union. 
Enterprises were the basic social unit of Soviet society, and they did not only meet 
workers' material needs. The enterprise also acted as a social focus. Soviet 
provincial cities, towns and settlements did not have a wide range of public 
meeting places. Those that did exist were often connected to the enterprise. The 
'palace of culture' was an important local meeting place, for example, where films 
would be shown, dances and celebrations held and so on. Especially in small 
settlements the enterprise structured the life of the local community. 
The centrality of the labour collective was also reflected in the ideological 
significance accorded to it by the communist authorities. It was not just a unit of 
18 A study into the importance of money as a measure of welfare in Russia concluded on the basis 
of survey evidence that, 'money does not influence a family's ability to get by .... There is no 
significant relationship between being in a high or low income group and the likelihood of getting 
by' (Rose and McAllister, 1993: 26). Given that this study was conducted after 'marketisation' 
had already begun this finding strikingly confirms the argument set out above. 
19This is based on the conception of money advanced by Marx in Capital. He argues that it is 
defined by its form as the universal equivalent (Marx [1867] 1990: 180 -1). 
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economic production, it was a unit of social and cultural reproduction of the 
correct norms and values. The idea of the kollektiv (collective) was part of 
Bolshevik culture in the pre-revolutionary period, and was associated at this time 
with the 'God-building' tendency within the Party. Although Lenin was able to 
label 'God-building' as a deviation, the notion of collectivism retained the 
spiritual dimension attributed to it in the writing of Lunarcharsky, Bogdanov and 
Gorky (Kharkhordin, 1996: 4 - 6). After the revolution the name kollektiv was 
reserved for groups closely connected to the communist cause, and in most cases 
referred to a Party cell. Then in the 1930s Stalin's emphasis on individual 
responsibility - which reached its zenith in the Stakhanovite campaign - meant that 
collectivism became somewhat suspect, while the link with the Communist 
Conscience which had existed in everyday usage also weakened (Kharkhordin, 
1996: 10). By the 1950s, however, the term kollektiv began to be used to refer to 
almost all groups within Soviet society: 'Collectives were everywhere, one 
entered a collective as a small child, passed from one to another in the course of 
one's life, but one was never (normally) outside a collective. The network of 
collectives constituted the entire terrain of social life' (Khakhordin, 1996: 12). The 
generalisation of the term kollektiv meant that it lost its specific political 
connotation, but Soviet social science of the 1970s still defined a kollektiv as a 
group which served socially-defined goals rather than a narrow group interest. To 
pursue the latter was to be a 'false collective'. 
An enterprise was thus a kollektiv par excellence, serving the cause of communism 
by meeting the plan. 'The labour collective' was a concept with spiritual, moral 
and mythical dimensions, born of the heady combination of the communist 
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reverence for collectives and sense of the dignity of labour. The importance of the 
labour collective was highlighted in a variety of symbolic ways. For example, 
outside most enterprises would be an 'honour board' displaying photos of workers 
who had distinguished themselves in some way, while traditions such as the 
provision of presents at New Year for workers' children emphasised the idea that 
the enterprise was as much a community as a workplace. Workers also had a 
responsibility towards the collective which was underlined by their (compulsory) 
participation in 'Subbotniks' - occasional unpaid working Saturdays. 
Meanwhile, individual work groups within the enterprise were also referred to as 
'collectives', and again they had both a symbolic and a real influence over the life 
of the individual worker. For example, in the case of an individual having an 
opportunity to travel abroad, a reference would be required from their immediate 
work collective. The 'opinion of the collective' would also be taken into account 
in court if a worker was charged with a minor offence, and a judge could place a 
defendant who had been found guilty under the supervision of their work 
collective. Although in such situations the deliberative role of the work collectives 
concerned was largely formal - the view of managers or Party officials was what 
counted - the symbolic significance accorded to the 'opinion of the collective' 
underscored the fact that Soviet enterprise was conceived as a moral as well as a 
productive community. Along with the stress on collectivism, the regime also 
propagated the idea that work (especially of an unpleasant, physical variety) was 
inherently meaningful and noble. Enterprises were adorned with statues, pictures 
and murals of heroic workers emblazoned with slogans such as 'Glory to the 
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Miners!', while days were nominated to honour different professions, so that the 
trade union of a large enterprise containing a myriad of different types of worker 
would be forever organising festivities. 20 The fact that work itself was accorded a 
moral significance only heightened the status of the labour collective as a key 
locus of meaning in Soviet society. 
The integration of Soviet workers 
The relationship between the regime and the working class was mediated through 
enterprise paternalism and collectivism. Indeed, the preceding account of the 
enterprise as a total community would seem to add weight to David Lane's claim 
that the Soviet working class was 'incorporated'. But it is not sufficient to see 
workers as integrated into cosy collectives. They were also divided and 
encouraged to respond to the administration as individuals as the supporters of the 
'atomisation' thesis claim. Soviet enterprise paternalism at once constituted 
workers as members of a collective and forced them to behave as individuals: 
'communist' collectivism was encouraged, but any forms of 'false' collectivism 
were stifled. This idea is a major theme of this thesis which will be developed in 
detail in later chapters, so the main elements of the argument are only sketched 
here. Workers were provided with benefits by the paternalist enterprise. But the 
fact that they had no other way of obtaining such crucial things as housing meant 
2°A mine, for example, would not only celebrate 'Miners' Day'. it would also mark the 'Day of the 
Medical Workers', the 'Day of Trade Union Workers' and so on. Often parties would be held at 
enterprise leisure facilities for the workers concerned. 
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that they were highly dependent on their workplace. Moreover, enterprise social 
provision was always characterised by its inadequacy. Nearly all enterprises had 
long housing waiting lists and there was competition for kindergarten places, 
holiday vouchers, allotments and so on. So enterprise social provision was 
effectively discretionary. The benefits on offer were mediated through individual 
managers or members of the trade union committee, and workers were therefore 
required to cultivate individual relationships with authority figures in order to 
survive. This was not only true of benefits. The punitive regimes and payment 
systems of enterprises were also governed by informal, individual relations. This 
helps explain why Soviet workers have been seen as both 'incorporated' and 
'atomised'. They were bound to the system through social provision within the 
labour collective. But the form of this social provision divided workers. The most 
effective way for them to meet their needs was to behave as individuals rather than 
to organise as a collective. 
To say that only individualised forms of resistance were open to workers is, 
however, not the same as saying that they were 'atomised'. As Andrew Walder 
has argued with regard to China, rather than being atomised workers under 
communism were involved in a 'rich sub-culture of instrumental-personal ties 
independent of the party's control' (Walder, 1988: 7). Such involvement was 
necessary to obtain official approvals, housing and other public and private goods 
controlled by low-level officials, and though such ties were not officially approved 
of they were structurally encouraged by the system which created scarcity and left 
many questions of distribution to the discretion of enterprise and local officials. 
On one level the effect may have been the same as that posited by the 
50 
'atomisation' thesis: collective organisation proved almost impossible. But looked 
at in terms of the potential for change the two ways of viewing the working class 
have quite different implications. 'Atomisation' imposed from above by 
repression would only last as long as the legacy of fear, whereas networks of 
profitable personal ties developed to circumvent the limitations imposed by a 
bureaucratic state would not merely dissipate as the state began to change. 
Meanwhile, the idea of 'incorporation' implies a level of consensus which did not 
exist at the Soviet enterprise. Compared to Japanese workers in large firms 
operating a policy which has been termed 'welfare corporatism' (Dore, 1973: 
275), for example, Soviet workers were outrageously insubordinate. Indeed, if the 
attitudes and behaviour of Soviet workers are measured against those described in 
Ronald Dore's classic comparison 'British Factory - Japanese Factory', they are 
far more similar to those of the British workers.21 And yet the resistance of Soviet 
workers was contained and never attained an organisational expression as it has in 
Britain: they may have outdone the British in cursing and absenteeism, but 
collectively Soviet workers were far weaker than Japanese workers. That this is so 
again underlines the fact that the integration of Soviet workers was a complex 
business: hostility to authority coexisted with identification with the enterprise; 
21Dore encapsulates the resentment of British workers with a long exert from an interview with a 
shop steward at the firm he calls 'English Electric'. This workers' critique of 'bloody 
disorganised' management could have easily been culled from an interview with a Russian 
worker. The key beliefs that Dore singles out as characterising the British workers' attitude to 
authority - that managers are 'overprivileged ... inefficient ... and ... owe their jobs to influence 
rather than merit' - are also constantly encountered among Russian workers (Dore, 1973: 2S 1 .3). 
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conflict was endlessly created and contained. As long as the Soviet system of 
production remained intact some kind of equilibrium could be maintained. The 
question is whether workers will continue to be integrated in the same way now 
the traditional Soviet enterprise is in jeopardy. 
The specificity of the Soviet system 
How unique were Soviet trade unions and Soviet enterprises? The following 
sections looks in turn at the unions and then at enterprise paternalism. This section 
argues that although there are some similarities between the dilemmas which beset 
Soviet trade unions and those confronted by their Western counterparts, the 
differences between the fonner communist trade unions and trade unions 
operating under capitalism are far greater than those between, say, Swedish and 
British trade unions. This is because the organisations grew up in two quite 
distinct economic and political environments and were created to serve different 
ends. Similarly, the next section argues that while enterprise paternalism also 
exists under capitalism, most notably in Japan, it is of a qualitatively different 
nature to that which existed in the Soviet Union. 
At a central level, the role of unions might not seem so different from that in 
countries with 'corporatist' arrangements such as Sweden or Gennany. Although 
the unions were not really represented in the Central Committee and Politburo, 
they were able to provide infonnation and advice to the branch ministries and 
Goskomtrud (the State Committee for Labour and Social Questions) and to liaise 
with Gosplan (the State Planning Committee). What is significant here is not how 
much influence the unions were accorded, but why they were accorded it. For 
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example, it has been argued with regard to Sweden that a consensus developed 
between the state and the major interest organisations which co-operated to 
maximise economic growth. international competitiveness. control society and 
divide up the national product (Crouch, 1979: 187; Lehmbruch, 1982: 17; 
Schimitter, 1974: 104, cited in Fulcher. 1987: 232), while it has also been claimed 
that the labour movement was integrated and subordinated through this 
'corporatism' (Panitch, 1980: 12). Such an arrangement, it could be argued, was 
not so different from that which persisted in the Soviet Union. Unions had some 
influence and participated, along with the Party and economic ministries, in the 
business of maximising economic growth, controlling society and dividing up the 
national product just as they did in Sweden. The crucial difference, however, is 
that while it might be argued that the independence of Swedish unions was 
undermined by their co-operation with employers and the state, the Swedish trade 
union confederation (LO). as the grass roots rebellion of the late 1960s reminded 
them, were ultimately responsible to a distinct constituency and their co-operation 
with employers at a central level depended on their ability to deliver the support of 
their members for any decisions they made. In contrast, the interventions of the 
Russian unions at a central level were only indirectly influenced by their supposed 
constituency. They were supposed to express the interests of the working class, 
but only in their capacity as Party-State organisations: that is, they were allowed a 
certain amount of influence by the Party which they were then able to use in 
negotiations at a central level. Hough has shown that the unions did pursue certain 
distinct policy objectives in their discussions with state bodies. For example, in 
the discussions for the 1977 constitution and the five year plan of the early 1980s, 
53 
alongside their ritual statement of the importance of improving productivity, the 
unions also argued that this could be achieved through wage increases, 
improvements in housing conditions, educational and cultural measures, 
improvements in services and safety measures (Hough, 1979: 376). Thus, to a 
certain minimal extent workers were 'represented'. But this differs from the types 
of centralised bargaining described above, in which what is prior is not state 
recognition, but the power that unions derive from their members. 
Soviet trade unions' relationship with their members is indeed what above all else 
distinguished them from their counterparts in capitalist countries. There is, of 
course, no one form that this relationship takes within 'genuine' trade unions. 
Even within Western Europe, on which the following discussion will mainly 
focus, there are major differences between the levels of involvement of ordinary 
members within their unions. It is important to realise this, in order to avoid 
structuring the arguments about Russian trade unions around an implicit 
comparison with a hybrid 'healthy' trade unionism assumed to exist in 'the West'. 
The British trade union movement, for example, has a long and strong tradition of 
shop-floor involvement, but even here one of the most prominent commentators 
on the movement has remarked on the way that certain features of union 
organisation such as the closed shop and union member agreements 'creates mere 
paper trade unionists .... They relate to the union passively, as atomised individuals 
and not as participants in a living collectivity. Not surprisingly, "the union" 
represents a distant and impersonal power not an expression of their own identity 
and interests' (Hyman, 1989: 179). This could at one level also serve as a 
description of the relationship between Russian unions and their members. But 
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while bearing in mind that Western trade unions are not necessarily the picture of 
institutional health, it is important to emphasise the ways in which they differ 
from the unions spawned by communism. 
The main difference between the trade unions in the West and those that existed 
under communism is that the former were created to represent the interests of 
workers under capitalism whereas Soviet trade unions, as has been argued above, 
never had an unambiguous mission to represent their members. Debates about the 
relationship between unions and their members in the West tend to revolve around 
the question of how far union organisations develop an institutional interest 
distinct from that of the members they are supposed to represent. Variations of this 
debate have been current ever since Michels, writing about the German Social 
Democratic Party in 1915, asserted the 'iron law' that 'organisation implies the 
tendency towards oligarchy' (Michels, 1915: 37): as politics became more 
complex, so the emergence of a caste of profession leaders became a technical and 
practical necessity. More recent formulations of the debate see the central tension 
within unions as being between hierarchical accommodative forms of unionism 
and workplace-based activity (Fairbrother and Waddington, 1990: 16) which 
expresses the fact that unionism functions both as part of and in opposition to the 
labour capital relation (p.44). That is, as Hyman has put it, 'external constraints -
the power of employers and the state - impose forceful limits on the purposes 
adopted by trade unions. They find themselves accorded legitimacy, recognised 
and even encouraged, only when their aims and actions do not seriously challenge 
the continuation of capitalism' (Hyman, 1975: 92). Nevertheless, such pressures 
are balanced by the 'practice of workers themselves' (p. 92). The paradox of trade 
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unionism is therefore that 'workers' organisations which are defined and 
constituted through struggle tend also to contain and inhibit such struggle' 
(Hyman, 1989: 181). 
Such fonnulations have not gone unchallenged. It has been pointed out, for 
example, that far from always being sold-out by compromising leaders, union 
members sometimes prove to be more conservative than their leaders, as in cases 
where they refuse to take strike action (Kelly, 1988: 156). Others, meanwhile, 
have criticised the ethos of 'workerism' or 'rank-and-filism' which they claim 
infonns the critique of bureaucratisation and have noted that 'the extent to which 
worker interests can be promoted without fonnal organisation is limited' 
(Batstone, 1988: 86). The main point to be made about the debate, however, is that 
whether the gulf between unions and their members is emphasised or minimised, 
what is at issue is the tensions which exist in union organisations. Such tensions 
arise because while unions have their own institutional interests and vary in the 
degree to which they involve their members, without their members they would 
have no raison d 'e/re at all. However bureaucratic a union organisation might be, 
it is therefore always subject to some kind of pressure from its members. For 
example, Sweden has a highly centralised and disciplined fonn of trade union 
organisation. There have been moves towards more decentralised bargaining since 
the 1980s, initiated by the employers, but prior to this bargaining was carried out 
centrally between the LO and employers' organisation, SAF. In the 1940s 
balloting on collective bargaining in Sweden was abolished (Kjellberg, 1992: 90) 
and unions have generally been expected to show 'social responsibility' in 
exchange for social refonns and improved material conditions (p. 95). As 
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mentioned above, in the late 1960s this led to mounting dissatisfaction among 
workers which expressed itself in a wave of wildcat strikes. Such action showed 
the extent to which the relationship between the unions and their members had 
weakened, but it also demonstrated that the loyalty of union members could not be 
taken for granted forever: as one commentator has argued, 'the success of Swedish 
corporatism depended on the strength of the labour movement and it was this very 
strength which meant that internal discontent became expressed in a strong radical 
surge' (Fulcher, 1987: 249). Corporatist arrangements in Germany faced similar 
problems. The trilateral co-operation of the Konzertiete Aktion ( concerted action), 
which lasted from 1967 - 77, gave the unions influence, but the consensual wage 
policy also limited the extent to which they could pursue their members' 
immediate interests. Konzertiete Aktion therefore came under heavy pressure from 
rank and file union members who could see no benefits in return for their 
voluntary wage restraint (Jacobi et al., 1992: 239). 
The relationship between Soviet trade unions and their members was 
fundamentally different. While Western trade unions ultimately derive any power 
they might have from their members, any power possessed by Soviet trade unions 
was conferred on them by the Party and enterprise management. Their role was 
defined independently of their members: as already discussed, this was to act as an 
adjunct to management, administering the 'social sphere' of the enterprise. Their 
action was in no way constrained by their relationship with their members: indeed, 
in a sense they did not have a relationship with their members who were 'paper 
trade unionists' par excellence. Thus the 'practice' of Soviet workers, as will be 
discussed later in the thesis, did not exert any direct pressure on the unions to 
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change. Soviet trade unions were therefore fundamentally different organisations 
from their Western counterparts. This has two implications. First, as has already 
been argued, the transformation of the Russian unions can only come about 
through a reform of the relationship these organisations have with their members. 
Secondly, the dynamics of 'union renewal', if any such renewal occurs, can be 
expected to be different from that in unions originally constituted with the aim of 
representing workers. For example, it is possible that enterprise trade unions may 
not see their future in worker representation at all, but may transform themselves 
into enterprise social welfare departments22 or become commercial organisations. 
Nevertheless, as in the West, the crucial site of change will be within enterprise, 
because it is only at this level that any redefinition of the meaning of union 
membership can take place. 
Paternalism 
Within contemporary capitalism paternalism is a particular form of managerial 
strategy which firms can opt for or reject according to its perceived profitability. 
Soviet enterprise paternalism, by contrast, was not simply a chosen managerial 
style, but was an integral part of the Soviet industrial system, or, as the Samara 
Research Group put it, Soviet paternalism was not 'a particular kind of 
management strategy' but a 'particular form of production relations' (The Samara 
22Clarke et al. (1993) claim that towards the end of 1992 there was an increasing tendency for 
union presidents to be appointed to the position of Deputy Director responsible for social and 
welfare questions and thus for the union to merge with enterprise management (p. 193). 
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Research Group, 1995: 128 - 9).23 The state provided a whole range of services 
and important forms of payment in kind through the enterprise and this defined 
both the Soviet managerial remit and workers' sense of entitlement. Soviet 
paternalism is therefore quite distinct from the forms of paternalism which exist 
under capitalism. The following section will mainly concentrate on a comparison 
with Japan where the paternalism of large firms is apparently most similar to that 
which existed in the Soviet Union. 
The distinction between Soviet state paternalism and capitalist enterprise 
paternalism is not only of theoretical significance. The crucial practical 
implication is that the dependence of Soviet workers on their enterprises was of a 
qualitatively different nature from that which workers develop within capitalist 
paternalist firms. There are three main ways in which the two forms of 
organisations differ. First, the benefits provided by capitalist 'paternalist' firms are 
often very limited. For example, Martin and Fryer, in what is intended to be a case 
study of capitalist paternalism, cite very few tangible benefits provided to the 
workers at 'Casterton Mills', the firm in Lancaster supposed to exemplify this 
2JThe Samara research group identify the main features of Soviet enterprise paternalism as being: 
the charismatic leadership of the director who is seen as the 'father' of the collective; strongly 
hierarchical management; closed information which supports the authority of the director; 
egalitarian principles of wages and distribution, which though not always practiced, are expected; 
non-monetary relations; the ideology of paternalism, which the Samara Research group sum up as 
'a particular atmosphere, a sense of collectivism, unity, of a common business, supported by the 
ideology of socialist society' (The Samara Research Group, 1995). 
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form of organisation (Martin and Fryer, 1973).24 Secondly, Soviet state 
paternalism was monopolistic in its social provision: a whole range of goods and 
services could only be secured through the workplace in the Soviet Union. This is 
quite different even from the situation in a country such as Japan where capitalist 
enterprise paternalism is a common form of industrial organisation. Large 
enterprises in Japan often provide a wide array of benefits for the permanent part 
of their workforces such as housing, health insurance, recreational facilities and 
pensions, and thus the first argument regarding the extent of the provision is not so 
relevant in this case.2S But although workers in Japan are provided with benefits, 
they have alternatives; they are not forced to depend on their firms. Consumer 
markets in Japan are fully developed and are not characterised by shortages: there 
is, for example, a free market in housing even if the terms on which it can be 
obtained through the workplace are more attractive (Walder, 1986: 23). The effect 
of the two systems are therefore quite different: the position of a worker whose 
wages can purchase most of the necessities of life, even if at a pinch, is actually 
quite different from that of one who cannot purchase a variety of goods and 
services but has to apply to her enterprise to obtain access to them. 
241t apparent from the account of Martin and Fryer that the 'paternalism' they describe is largely a 
matter of style rather than substance. Later commentators such as Warde (1989), however, have 
argued that even this circumspect account exaggerates the extent of paternalist practice in 
Lancaster. 
2SThe range of provision in the Soviet Union was wider than in Japan, however. 
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The second distinction is important on a macro-level: through the imposition of a 
monopolistic form of social provision through the enterprise, the Soviet authorities 
were able to define the enterprise as the centre of the worker's world. The third 
distinguishing characteristic of the Soviet form of paternalism concerns the mode 
of its administration within the enterprise. Soviet enterprise provision was, as 
already mentioned, always characterised by its inadequacy, while distribution was 
left to the discretion of the administration and trade union. As has already been 
seen in the discussion of the role of the unions, a politicised approach to social 
provision was positively encouraged: unions were supposed to use benefits as a 
means of controlling workers. This is quite different from the situation under 
Japanese enterprise paternalism where provision is adequate and the mode of 
distribution is not deliberately designed to foster dependency: benefits do not have 
to be competed for, begged for, bribed for. Dore characterises the form of 
paternalism on offer in large Japanese enterprises in the following way: 
The favours that count materially - the welfare benefits, the housing, the 
educational loans and the dormitory accommodation for one's children studying 
in Tokyo - are all specified and contractual: their distribution rule-bound and 
institutionalised as employee 'rights'. And the loyalty which is bought by these 
favours is an institutional, not a personal loyalty .... The personal paternalism of 
the foreman and section chief ... could disappear entirely without having any 
effect on the main institutions of 'welfare corporatism' (Dore, 1973: 274 - 5). 
In contrast to this, there is nothing 'contractual' or 'rule-bound' about Soviet 
paternalism: it is personal, particularistic, discretionary. The personal dependency 
of workers on their managers is the key to the success of the system. One of the 
central problems of paternalism identified by Newby is that while it tends to 
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disguise fundamental conflicts of interest it also 'grants subordinate individuals 
certain prerogatives which '" tend over time to be appropriated as "rights'" But 
this immanent contradiction can, he argues, be managed through face-to-face 
contact (Newby 1977: 70 - 71). And this is exactly how it is managed in the 
Russian context: the collectivist potential that the sociologists Abercrombie and 
Hill discern in paternalism is negated because enterprise paternalism takes the 
form of patronage of individual workers by individual managers (Abercrombie 
and Hill, 1976: 414).26 
Soviet state paternalism in which social provision was delivered by the state 
through the enterprise represented a particular form of social organisation and 
means of integrating workers. Its specificity lay in the monopolistic position of 
enterprises, and in the type of informal relations which developed to determine 
distribution in the 'shortage economy' of the enterprise. The combined effect of 
these features was to subject workers to a particular form of dependence on the 
26Abercrombie and Hill's definition of paternalism is based on the idea that it is 'a collective form 
of social organisation' in which 'all subordinates stand in the same relation to the paternalist' (p. 
414). This is contrasted with patronage which is seen as an individualistic form of relations, based 
on face-to-face contact. They moreover argue that 'paternalism is a relation which entails "total 
involvement", while patronage is partial' (p. 416). The Russian example does not fit this clear cut 
distinction. First, enterprise paternalism takes the form of patronage of individual workers by 
individual members of the administration, and secondly, it could be argued that the 'total 
involvement' of Soviet workers in their enterprises was defined as much by their dependence on 
the patronage networks at work as by the construction of the paternalist enterprise as the centre of 
their world. 
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enterprise. Understanding the nature of workers' relationship to the enterprise is 
the key to explaining workers' failure to organise during the transition period. 
Certainly, this analysis raises questions about the future. The economic reform 
project is designed to reconstitute Russian enterprises as productive capital and 
this implies that the state will no longer deliver social protection through the 
workplace. State paternalism is indeed being eroded: enterprises are by law now 
supposed to divest themselves of sotskul 'tbyt, the collective abbreviation used to 
refer to the social services provided by enterprises (literally it stands for 'social, 
cultural and everyday [ services]'). They have not generally seized on this 
opportunity to embrace the bright capitalist future with alacrity, but as state 
finance is cut they will be forced to redefine the nature of their provision. This 
raises the prospect of a move towards enterprise paternalism, in which the position 
of the union would be defined not as an agent of the Party-state within the 
enterprise, but as a bosses' union.27 Alternatively, there might be a gradual waning 
27This also raises the question of how the distributive regimes within enterprises would develop. 
Abercrombie and Hill argue that paternalism can adapt to 'become compatible with the central 
principles of modem society', as they claim it has in Japan, while patronage is in opposition to 
these and 'continues so long as modem institutions fail to regulate social life according to legal-
rational criteria' (p.416). This formulation implies that there is one form of 'modem society' - one 
governed by legal-rational criteria - towards which 'less developed' nations are progressing. 
According to such a view, the marketisation of Russia should begin to sweep away patronage 
networks. But within the Soviet enterprise it was patronage rather than paternalism (understood as 
a collective form of social organisation) which was the key to managerial power - something that 
calls into question Abercrombie and Hill's view of the durability of the respective systems. 
63 
of paternalism. Either of these developments would alter the way in which 
workers were integrated into the enterprise and the state. The implications of 
changes that have occurred to date are considered in later chapters, but in place of 
speculation the main task of this thesis is to show the way in which the Soviet 
heritage has shaped and is shaping workers' reaction to reform, and how workers' 
responses in turn influence the transformation of the Russian enterprise and state. 
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Chapter Two: Trade Unions after the Fall of 
Communism 
The official trade unions in the fonner Soviet Union were, as argued in the previous 
chapter, an integral part of the communist system. Given the role that the trade 
unions played in the old system, it might have been expected that with the advent of 
refonn workers would leave the old structures in droves to fonn their own 
organisations designed specifically to represent their interests. In fact, however, this 
did not occur: although the miners' strike of 1989 seemed to hail a flowering of the 
independent workers' organisation in Russia, the movement did not expand beyond 
its narrow base in the mining and aviation industries. 1 Meanwhile, the official 
structures continued to exist, and claimed to be undergoing a process of refonn into 
independent organisations. The fonner official unions did not face a mass exodus of 
members, although the independent trade unions vigorously disputed their claims to 
IThe same pattern also emerged in most of the former East European satellite states. In Eastern 
Europe indigenous union movements had gradually lost their independence in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s and had been subjected to the same dual subordination as the Soviet trade unions. 
Only in the cases of Poland, where Solidamosc grew up as a mass workers' opposition to 
communism in 1980, and in Albania, where the extreme oppression of the Hoxha era meant that all 
official organisations were discredited, did a mass alternative to the official unions emerge. (The 
United Trade Unions of Albania (TUA) suffered a dramatic membership loss after the general strike 
of May 1991 led by the new independent trade union, the Union of Independent Trade Unions of 
Albania, the BSPSH). The similarities between developments in Eastern Europe and Russia are 
instrUctive, and will be highlighted in this chapter. For more details on Eastern Europe see Ashwin, 
1994. 
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have reformed and argued that they only retained their members through a 
combination of inertia and underhand means such as their control of enterprise 
social security. The early post-communist history of the trade union movement thus 
became characterised as a struggle between the 'pure' independent trade unions and 
the corrupt, sclerotic former communist trade unions; apparently a classic case of 
might versus right.2 Such a framework initially did not seem too inappropriate in the 
Russian context,3 but as reform progressed, workers' pain deepened and the 
lThe most crude version of this debate did not occur in academic circles, but within the 
international trade union movement. The American trade union organisation, the AFL-CIO, gave 
strong financial support to the independent trade unions, which it saw as upright warriors in the 
anti-communist cause. It refused any help to the former official trade unions, except those in the 
former Czechoslovakia. which were incongruously deemed to be reformed - partly because no 
Czech or Slovak independent alternatives existed. The Scandinavian trade unions, meanwhile, 
were loath to support the independent trade unions: while they were prepared to acknowledge that 
were no doubt made up of very worthy individuals, they posed a threat to the unity of the official 
trade unions. With millions of workers, as they perceived it, on their doorstep, the priority of the 
Scandinavian unions was to have stable and numerically strong counterparts with whom they 
could work to prevent what they termed 'social dumping'. In their opinion this meant supporting 
the official trade unions and aiding their reform efforts. This debate, which was largely conducted 
within the framework of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), was very 
acrimonious. (Information gained from the author's own observations while working at the ICFTU 
between 1991 and 1993). 
'Struggles of the Russian workers' movement initially tended to be viewed in the light of 
developments in Poland. And in 1980 -1 only the most die-hard Stalinist would have argued that the 
official communist union, the CRZZ, could in any way dispute Solidarnosc's claim to be the more 
legitimate voice of Polish workers. 
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independent workers' movement still failed to take off, the inadequacies of this 
approach became increasingly apparent. 
This chapter dispenses with the Manichean version of trade union history and 
analyses why the independent trade union movement failed to take off. It focuses on 
the trade union movement in Russia, but also makes comparisons with Eastern 
Europe where the problems faced by the independent unions have been similar. The 
chapter argues that while the independent trade unions which have developed since 
the perestroika era initially appeared to be the antithesis of the former communist 
trade unions they sought to replace, what separates the two forms of union has 
become progressively less distinct. Although the independent trade unions 
consciously set out to create an alternative model of trade unionism they actually 
came close to reproducing precisely that form of unionism which they sought to 
supersede. Meanwhile, the former official trade unions may not have transformed 
themselves into organisations representing workers' interests, but they have 
managed to survive and retain their fmancial and institutional dominance, as well as 
a substantial proportion of their members. This analysis is what underlies the focus 
of later chapters on the former official trade unions: although they are confronted 
with similar structural constraints as the independent trade unions and have also 
proved unable to transform their mode of action in the post-communist environment, 
they have, nevertheless, proved durable and dominant in the face of the change. This 
chapter will first consider the rise and fall of the independent trade union movement, 
and will then turn to examine the response of the official unions to the challenge of 
reform. 
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Independent trade unions challenge the official unions' monopoly 
At the beginning of the Gorbachev era there was little sign of workers' organisation, 
aside from sporadic, small-scale and short-lived strikes. Political liberalisation was a 
gradual process. Initially Gorbachevian reformers had to coax liberals out of the 
closet: even such traditional liberty-loving groups as the creative intelligentsia took 
some time to adjust to the new environment. By 1989, however, Soviet politics had 
become polarised between so-called 'conservatives' and 'democrats', the latter camp 
favouring further political and economic reform, and the former attempting to 
defend of the 'achievements of the revolution'. Up until this point the workers were 
an unknown quality, and there was a great deal of speculation both in Russia and the 
West as to whether the workers would give their support to the conservatives, or 
whether they would, Cl la Solidarnosc, become a linch-pin of the reform movement.4 
It was in this environment that workers made their dramatic entrance onto the 
political stage in the form of the July 1989 miners' strike. This was the first 
industry-wide strike of the Soviet era: miners from the four main mining regions of 
Donbass in Ukraine, the Kuzbass in Western Siberia, Karaganda in Kazakhstan and 
the arctic coalfield of Vorkuta all participated. The strike has been extensively 
written about in English,S and need only be discussed briefly here. The miners were 
4Such speculation was only fuelled by the 1989 and 1991 miners' strikes. See, for example, 
Ashwin, 1991; Aves, 1990; Rutland, 1990 and Teague, 1990. 
STeague, 1989; Rutland, 1990; Friedgut and Siegelbaum, 1990; Mandel, 1990. By far the most 
comprehensive and sophisticated treatment of the strike is, however, that of Clarke et al., 1995: 17 
_ 80. What is particularly revealing about this analysis of the strike, which based is on a 
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largely protesting about the economic situation (many mining towns were facing 
shortages of basic goods such as soap, food and medical supplies) and against 
poor working conditions. The strike began at a mine level with miners elaborating 
long lists of detailed demands which expressed years of pent-up grievances, but 
negotiations with the authorities prompted the formation of city and later regional 
strike committees, a development which shifted the emphasis of the strike from 
local issues and took the initiative away from ordinary mineworkers. The 
government quickly moved to placate the miners, meeting their main demands, 
rushing supplies to the mining regions and raising miners' wages. The strike lasted 
no more than two weeks and did not spread to other industries. It did, however, 
dramatically demonstrate that it was possible for workers to achieve their aims by 
organising independently and by taking strike action. At this stage, although 
Gorbachev claimed that the strike represented 'perestroika from below' it was still 
unclear what kind of political force the new workers' movement would become. 
After the miners' strike the strike committees continued to exist in order to 
monitor the government's implementation of the miners' demands. At the same 
time, many of the strike leaders were elected to positions in the official trade union, 
and it was thought at this time that the presence of the workers' own representatives 
would ensure the reform of the official structures. In fact, however, the official 
miners' union continued to behave in exactly the same way as it always had (Clarke 
combination of interview material, press and eye-witness accounts, is its expose of the process 
through which the detailed, concrete demands which emanated from the mines were superseded by 
those emerging from managers ofthe industry. 
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et al., 1993: 140 - 142). In the light of this disappointment, activists from the strike 
committees decided to establish an alternative miners' union and at a congress in 
the autumn of 1990 the Independent Miners' Union (NPG) was founded. This 
differed from the official unions in that: it organised on a professional rather than 
a branch basis, uniting only underground miners and not the other workers in the 
coal industry; it did not allow managers to be members of the union and attempted 
to be independent from mine administrations; it had decentralised principles of 
organisation, and a strongly anti-communist political orientation. 
There was another miners' strike in spring 1991 which again spread to the 
Donbass, Kuzbass and Vorkuta coalfields. It was led by the strike committees: 
although the NPG supported the strike and claimed to be in control of it, the new 
union was not yet very organised in the mines and at most 4% of the miners 
belonged to the new union. The strike committee leaders put forward mainly anti-
communist political demands favouring further democratisation and economic 
reform, although the miners themselves were more concerned with economic 
demands: it was only with Pavlov's announcement of impending price increases 
on 10 March that the strike took off (Clarke et al., 1993: 164). Nevertheless, the 
strike sealed the emerging alliance between the leaders of the new workers' 
movement and the 'democratic camp' led by Yeltsin. Yeltsin offered miners' 
leaders a face-saving way out of the blind alley in which the government's refusal 
to meet their demands placed them through the formula of transferring the mines 
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from Soviet to Russianjurisdiction,6 while the miners' strike constituted a decisive 
boost to Yeltsin at a crucial moment in his struggle with Gorbachev. 
Outside mining regions there was less activism, however. In spite of gains which 
the miners so visibly made as a result of their independent organisation in 1989, 
other workers were slow to follow their example. In the overwhelming majority of 
industries the official trade unions retained their dominance. There were a few 
exceptions among workers in a strong bargaining position, most notably in the 
aviation industry. The air traffic controllers' union began with the establishment of 
a professional association within the official aviation trade union in 1989, which 
then separated into an independent trade union, FPAD, in 1990. Until May 1992 
they allowed 'dual membership' with the official trade union: in this way they 
ensured a large membership and managed to organise the vast majority of the air 
traffic controllers (an estimated 7,000 out of 8,000 in August 1992). The pilots 
also fonned an independent trade union, PALS, which again emerged out of the 
official aviation union. These organisations followed the miners' example in 
adopting a professional principle of trade union organisation, which allowed their 
members to take advantage of their relatively privileged position within the labour 
force. They also, like the NPG, proclaimed their 'independence', although they 
differed from the NPG in that they did not face the task of building new 
organisations from scratch. 
6-fhis meant that the mines would be granted financial autonomy and would then be free to satisfy 
the miners' economic demands. 
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Aside from the aviation UnIons, the most notable member of the ranks of 
independent trade unions was Sotsprof which was established as the Association 
of Socialist Trade Unions in 1989. This organisation united a small number of 
enterprise-based independent trade unions from a variety of different sectors, 
although its overall membership was very small. Alongside those affiliated to 
Sotsprof a few other small enterprise level organisations were established, in 
particular in the transport sector among elite groups of male workers such as bus 
drivers and seamen. The membership of such unions was, however, minuscule in 
comparison to that of the official trade unions. 
The problems of the independent trade unions 
Why did the independent workers' movement find it so difficult to expand? There 
were significant institutional barriers confronting the new unions, but the strategies 
that the unions adopted to get round the obstacles in their path were also highly 
damaging to their prospects. Their political stance of principled anti-communism, 
meanwhile, though it was appropriate to the late Gorbachev era, became 
progressively less relevant as reform progressed. 
As the previous chapter highlighted. enterprise directors had cosy and predictable 
relations with the official trade unions and they did not want these disrupted by new 
independent trade unions. They did their best. aided by the official unions. to 
discourage independent workers' organisation and leaders of new trade unions faced 
the danger of victimisation or dismissal. It thus proved very difficult for new unions 
to establish themselves in enterprises, let alone build up a mass membership. In the 
cases where the independent unions did manage to gain a foothold, they proved 
72 
unable to break the established pattern of relations within the enterprise and often 
ended up mimicking the behaviour of their counterparts, the official unions. The 
Russian sociologist Vladimir Ilyin has shown, for example, how, after its initial 
heroic period of frequent strike action, the NPG in Vorkuta was faced with the 
mundane question of how to prevent its members defecting back to the official 
unions. The NPG mine committees chose to do this through the distribution of barter 
goods, which in turn 'demanded that they normalise their relations with the 
administration since such distribution is in essence an honorary assignment to carry 
out administrative functions' (Ilyin, 1996: 72). That is, in order to survive, the 
supposedly 'independent' miners' union took the self-defeating step of co-operating 
with management. In other ways, too, the NPG ended up performing similar tasks to 
the former communist unions. For example, as the union's authority gradually 
declined in the mines' in Vorkuta, spontaneous strikes became more frequent. In this 
situation, management began to turn to the NPG mine leaders to resolve conflicts: 
'everywhere the representatives of the administration have come to recognise that 
the NPG has a positive role to play in social management' (Ilyin, 1996: 92). The 
form of 'social management' in which the new miners' union engaged, however, 
was typical of the official unions: they attempted to preserve order within the mines. 
In these circumstances it is no surprise that a gradual rapprochement occurred 
between the two types of union in Vorkuta (Ilyin, 1996.) 
The NPG's move into the distribution of barter underlines the fact that workers had 
very little incentive to join the new unions. In particular, they risked losing access to 
the social benefits provided by the official trade unions, even though they were 
legally entitled to these regardless of their union affiliation. The official unions made 
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no secret of their willingness to use their traditional functions to retain their 
members. For example, the (then) head of the property fund of the national 
confederation of the former communist trade unions, the Federation of Independent 
Trade Unions of Russia (FNPR), Vladimir Kuzmenok, in an interview in autumn 
1992,' said that the terms of access to trade union social facilities (such as sanatoria, 
sports centres and so on) depended entirely on the local trade union committee. 
Asked whether a person who left an FNPR-affiliated union would still be allowed 
access to the facilities it controlled, Kuzmenok conjectured, in a sarcastic fashion, 
that a worker who had worked loyally at the same enterprise for 25 years would 
probably retain the right to use FNPR amenities - the subtext being that a 'trouble 
maker' would not. Workers did risk a lot if they joined a new union: some workers 
at Taldym still occasionally remark that leaving the official union results in a loss of 
the right to sick pay, even though the president of the NPG of the mine has 
published articles in the mine newspaper which reassure workers about their 
entitlements when they relinquish membership of the official union. 
Such problems severely stunted and distorted the development of new unions: the 
strategies they developed in the face of such difficulties were without exception 
counter-productive. The most important of these were to engage in commerce as a 
means of establishing a financial base, and to seek support from political parties. 
The former was in many ways forced on the new unions by their need to compete 
with the financial muscle of the former official unions: however much workers 
71 conducted this interview in my capacity as research officer for the Central and East European 
department of the ICFTU. 
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complain about the supine stance of the traditional unions they also, as Chapter Five 
clearly illustrates, expect a union to provide them with social and financial 
assistance. But despite their good intentions, the unions' sortie into the commercial 
world had disastrous results. The leaderships of the independent trade unions 
became progressively more detached from their base, their unions degenerating into 
little more than commercial organisations exploiting their industrial and political 
contacts. For example, the supposed vanguard of the Russian workers' movement, 
the NPG in the Russian coalfield of Vorkuta, quickly became embroiled in a variety 
of commercial enterprises, some of them of dubious legality (Clarke et al., 1993: 
177 - 181). The Kuzbass organisation of the union similarly acquired a reputation 
for being a purely commercial organisation and it lost both members and influence 
as a result of this. The union is now very weak in the region, and its leadership 
almost entirely preoccupied with its commercial concerns. 
The independent unions also expended a lot of energy competing for the financial 
support available from the AFL-CIO. Such support, while intended to encourage 
the new trade unions, actually allowed the recipients of support to survive without 
their members. It also sowed the seeds of scandal and conflict: quarrels over fax 
machines and dollars divided union leaderships, as well as fatally distracting them 
from the concerns of organising workers (something of which they did very 
little ).8 
.Contact with the AFL-CIO did not appear to foster an appreciation of the need actively to 
organise workers. One AFL-educated NPG official, for example, when asked why the NPG had a 
presence at some South Kuzbass mines and not others, claimed that 'it depends on personalities 
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Meanwhile, the unions' bid for political support was scarcely less damaging. Given 
the institutional barriers to the organisation of independent unions at an enterprise 
level, they sought government support to ease their path. In particular they wanted 
to see: control of social security removed from the fonner official unions; a . 
government-promoted 're-registration' of trade union members so that workers 
would be forced to make an active choice over their trade union membership (on 
the assumption that this would result in a catastrophic decline in what the 
independent unions perceived as the paper membership of their traditional 
counterparts), and a division of the assets of the official trade unions to help 
endow new organisations. They also wanted reform of the law to give explicit 
legal recognition to trade union pluralism and protect the rights of minority 
unions. In pursuit of such ends the NPG developed close relations with Yeltsin, 
while Sotsprof cultivated ties with the Social Democratic party. All the independent 
trade unions became involved in an intense struggle with Moscow political 
factions to get legislation passed to remove control of social security from the 
official trade unions. Sotsprof, for example, directed all its energy into its alliances 
with the Social Democrats who in 1992 were in control of the Labour Ministry. 
The NPG, meanwhile, gave strong support to President Yeltsin, and at moments of 
and the collective. At some mines the collective may not think that they need anything more than 
the old official union. It depends of the level of the miners' consciousness ... really the collectives 
must decide for themselves. People must come to their own conclusions.' He did not appear to 
consider that the union should do anything to influence the formation of these conclusions. 
76 
political crisis would always issue declarations pledging the miners' support to the 
President. 
After the failed coup of August 1991 the 'democrats' became more secure in their 
position. While they had been pleased to have the support of the independent 
workers' movement in the increasingly conservative climate of spring 1991 -
Yeltsin declared that the strikes of that period were 'one of the main reasons why 
the offensive by reactionary forces was broken' (Central Television, May 4, 1991) 
_ the reformers felt no compunction to repay their 'debt' once in power. In fact, 
they became increasingly hostile to the independent trade unions: once they were 
in charge of the economy they saw strikes and demands for improved wages as a 
threat to economic reform rather than encouraging signs of burgeoning 
democracy. Meanwhile, the official unions were transformed in the eyes of the 
reformers from bastions of conservatism to a useful stabilising force. As 
Kuzmenok shrewdly put it in the interview referred to above, without the official 
unions the government knew it would 'stand face to face with a disorganised and 
angry crowd'. 
The most notable example of the new approach to trade unions occurred after an 
air traffic controllers' strike in August 1992, when the government mounted a 
campaign of victimisation and criminal prosecution of air traffic controllers' 
leaders which lasted until the end of the year. (For more details see Borisov et al., 
1994.) Moreover, in the same period most of the independent trade unions were 
removed from the tripartite commission. In this climate it is not surprising that the 
unions got nothing in return for their lobbying and support in terms of legislative 
changes designed to break the institutional dominance of the official trade unions. 
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The former official trade unions have retained their control of their social security 
empire to this day, their assets have been left untouched and there has been no re-
registration of membership. The Social Democrats did attempt to reform the trade 
union social security system, but they proved largely unable to do so and were 
eventually forced out of their base in the Labour Ministry in 1993. The 1992 Law 
on Collective Agreements, which Sotsprof leaders helped to draft, did give any 
representative group of workers the right to demand that the employer negotiate a 
collective agreement with them, but while new unions had some success in using 
such legislation in 1992-3, employers soon realised that the law compelled them 
only to negotiate, not to conclude, a collective agreement with such groups. 
But this lack of political support, though it obviously did not help the new unions, 
cannot fully explain their failure. Despite the independent unions' obsession with 
the injustice of the FNPR's financial and institutional dominance, far more 
damaging to their own prospects was their leaders' obsession with the national 
political games in which they engaged while their organisations at best atrophied 
and at worst degenerated into criminal commercial structures. This contention is 
supported by the experience of unions in Eastern Europe, which suggests that 
resources are not the crucial determinant of success. In a number of East European 
countries new independent trade unions have successfully run campaigns similar 
to those of the Russian trade unions to try to secure a more level playing field on 
which to organise. In several cases this has resulted in a redistribution of the assets 
of the former communist trade unions. Success, however, brings its own problems. 
Once the independent trade unions gain a share of the assets they also have to ensure 
the upkeep of the buildings and services they receive. Often their small secretariats 
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are overwhelmed by such duties. Most importantly, however, contrary to 
expectations of the new unions, the division of the assets has not led to any 
significant increase in their members. In Romania, for example, a large number of 
independent trade unions exist, many of them with tiny memberships. The assets 
were divided between the 'big three' - the official CNSLR and two independent 
trade unions, Fratia and the Alfa Cartel, after an agreement reached at the end of 
1991. (Other independent trade unions later contested the validity of this division.) 
This agreement did not, however, result in significant membership shifts, though it 
did lead to greater co-operation between the different types of union: in summer 
1993, Fratia and the CNSLR merged to form 'CNSLR-Fratia', In Bulgaria, the 
government nationalised the assets of the former official trade union, but then 
instead of distributing them among the unions, as was initially expected, the state 
authorities kept them. What is significant here, however, is that the removal of the 
advantages of the official trade unions did nothing to promote the growth of their 
independent rivals. In Poland, meanwhile, mechanisms for both the redistribution of 
the CRZZ assets, agreed to in principle in the early 1980s, and the return of 
Solidarnosc's property which was confiscated during the martial law period were 
put in place by legislation of 1990 and 1991, but the process has been hogged down 
by resistance from the CRZZ successor organisation, the OPZZ, Since Solidarnosc 
is still the strongest independent trade union in the region, these examples give 
reason to doubt that the financial dominance of the official trade unions is the key to 
the problems of the independent trade unions. 
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Political alliances of the independent trade unions 
The independent trade unions' alliances with political parties not only distracted 
them from the task of organisation, they also committed the unions to supporting 
policies which were scarcely attractive to potential members. In the early days of the 
reform era the support which the new workers' movement gave to the democrats 
was understandable: in the communist era workers could be shot or deported for 
striking or trying to organise independently. At first, the leaders of the independent 
trade unions saw no contradiction between their political aims and their 
representative functions since they argued that workers' rights could not be defended 
effectively within the communist system, and that the creation of a new economic 
and political system was essential to the improvement in living standards in the long 
run. The comprehensive reform of the old system was thus seen as both a raison 
d'etre of the new unions, and a precondition for their effective operation. Within this 
vision the official trade unions were seen as remnants of the past which would have 
no place in the bright capitalist future.9 
9-fhe major academic proponent of this view in the Russian context was Leonid Gordon. He 
advanced a mechanistic model in which 'the conception and gradual development of the labour 
market will lead to the creation of the same attributes in the post-socialist workers' movement, as 
exist in the "normal" workers' movement under capitalism. The role of the struggle for improved 
pay and working conditions in the movement will be strengthened .... Probably in the not too distant 
future, the main elements of the workers' movement will have the same construction here [in 
Russia] as in the West' (Gordon, 1993: 55). In this model the independent trade unions were very 
much identified with the market oriented future and the majority of the former official trade 
unions with the communist past (p. 47). 
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The contradictions in the position of the new unions gradually became more 
apparent, however. The extension of democracy was soon dropped as a goal of the 
reformers, who turned their attention instead to the 'transition to the market 
economy'. The structural adjustment policy adopted by the government in pursuit of 
this aim entailed a direct attack on workers' living standards. Most importantly, the 
programme involved reduction of subsidies to industrial enterprises which were to 
be privatised and left to sink or swim. Even the most optimistic neo-liberals 
anticipated that this would initially result in high unemployment. Along with this, 
structural adjustment also implied wage restraint for those who remained in work. 
Despite these implications, however, the independent unions pledged their support 
for economic reform, arguing that only with the creation of 'real employers' and a 
market economy would trade unions be able to 'defend workers interests' in the 
same way that they did in the West. 
The NPG in particular gave strong support to the government, dropping its stance of 
'constructive opposition' in November 1992 in favour of positive support for the 
government, at a time when the miners were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with 
reform.1o This only served to illustrate the gulf between the union and its members. 
Had the union been more in touch with the mood in the mines it is difficult to see 
how they could have continued to support President Yeltsin. In Poland, for example, 
the strong alliance between Solidamosc the trade union and the reform parties which 
grew out of it broke down in 1993 under pressure from union members suffering 
lo-rhey were under strong pressure from the AFL-CIO to do so. 
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under the strain of refonn. 11 The fact that Solidarnosc, after the strikes of 1993, 
inadvertently helped to propel the Communist Party back to power led to 
denunciations from liberal intellectuals,12 but the union's conflict with the 
government was actually a sign that its members had some influence within the 
union. 
By contrast, the politics of NPG activists were not infonned by the miners' 
concerns, and their ideas increasingly ran directly counter to the miners' interests. In 
IIThis occurred quite dramatically in May 1993 after a strike of the Solidamosc 'budget sector' • 
health and education· unions. The strike, which began on May 10, was in support of a pay claim for 
workers who have historically been some of the worst paid in communist society. The government of 
Hanna Suchocka claimed that it was unable to meet what it conceded were the legitimate demands of 
these workers since to do so would increase the budget deficit beyond the targets of the international 
fmancial institutions, and would lead only to the printing of 'empty money' and renewed inflation. 
The deadlock continued until May 28 when the representatives of the trade union Solidamosc 
initiated a vote of no-confidence in the government in the Sejm which the fragile coalition 
government lost. President Walesa then dissolved the parliament and called new elections, rather than 
accept Suchocka's resignation, in what he presented as an attempt to make parliamentary deputies 
behave more responsibly in future. The irony is that when the elections were held at the end of 
September 1993, the arch rivals of Solidamosc, the Democratic Left Alliance composed of former 
communists and its ally, the Polish Peasants' Party, won a working majority in both the Sejm and 
Senate and eventually formed a government (Vinton, 1993a and 1993b). 
12The (then) Labour Minister Jacek Kuron, an intellectual Solidamosc veteran, said 'one expects 
unionists to exercise greater self control' and went on to argue that Solidarnosc had failed to reconcile 
support for economic reform with defence of workers' interests (Vinton, 1993a: 27). Others 
concluded that 'in economic terms ... Solidarnosc has become a reactionary force' (Vinton, I 993b: 4). 
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particular, they supported the closure of 'unprofitable' mines (seemingly unaware 
that this essentially meant the closure of virtually all the deep mines in the Kuzbass), 
while in general they seemed to believe that to offer any resistance to market logic 
was just to be lured down another communist blind alley. For example, the president 
of the NPG Novokuznetsk town organisation when asked, in an interview in May 
1994, about his union's approach to the problem of late payment of wages, 
responded with a piece of reasoning typical within the union: 
We have protested against this at all levels. But we understand the problems of 
the government. They should just shut down all the unprofitable enterprises and 
have done with it. But the government's scared of doing this .... Probably they 
will eventually shut the unprofitable enterprises and get on with the conversion 
of the military industrial complex. There is tough opposition to this though. It's 
a question of time. 
And then you see if you pay everyone on time you create shortages again. Too 
much money chasing too few goods. At the moment not everyone's being paid 
but the shelves aren't empty. It's psychologically better to have full shelves even 
if things are expensive. So perhaps the government were right. 
But, by the way, trade unions shouldn't really deal with the government. They 
should deal with employers and the government should act as an arbiter. 
This unionist, well trained by the AFL-CIO in the principles of 'real' trade 
unionism and economics also proceeded, when asked about the union's attitude to 
the transfer of sotskul 'tbyt to the local authority, to read out approvingly a report 
about the attitude of the American Republican Party to questions of social security 
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and dependence. \3 He was far from alone in his sanguine approach to the question 
of restructuring. The vice president of the NPG in the Kuzbass, Yevgenii Lyakin, 
for example, opined wistfully in an infonnal chat in April 199414 that mine closures 
would have the positive effect of improving the environmental situation of the 
region. The World Bank experts, who were readily assisted by the NPG, could 
probably not believe their luck when they encountered such 'reasonable' trade 
unionists! 
The much-trumpeted 'independence' of the new unions was thus progressively 
compromised by their support for the government and the weakness of their 
membership.ls Indeed, by 1994 the NPG in the Kuzbass could only really be said to 
be 'independent' from the miners it was supposed to represent. For in the mining 
regions of the Kuzbass and Vorkuta, once seen as bastions of the refonn movement, 
J3Like many other NPG members he is a sincere and intelligent man. His experience of 
communism has, however, made him deeply suspicious of anything which smacks of socialism 
and highly receptive to 'market Bolshevism'. His contacts with the AFL-CIO and the American 
Coal Project had only encouraged him in such opinions. 
14He expressed similar, though slightly more guarded, opinions in a formal interview the same 
week conducted by Peter Fairbrother, Vadim Borisov and Vladimir Ilyin and attended by myself. 
ISThe myth that the new unions represent a more 'genuine' form of trade unionism persists, 
however. For example, a recent article on trade unions in Russia confidently asserted that 'new 
unions display more similarities to typical unions in the IMEs [industrialised market economies} .... 
New unions are defending their members' economic interests and rights' (Bamber and Peschanski, 
1996: 79). No concrete evidence of the way in which these unions operate or finance themselves 
was produced to support this claim. 
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support for the Communist Party and Nationalists had been growing since 1993: by 
the 1995 elections the Kuzbass had become renowned as a communist stronghold, 
while the polar coalfield of Vorkuta, with its strong anti-communist traditions 
derived from its gulag past, voted heavily for Zhirinovsky. The 'right versus might' 
rhetoric of the early 1990s has thus now lost all relevance. Since their status as 
'pure' anti-communists no longer marks the independent unions out as progressive 
radicals, what separates the two types of union, aside from the huge difference in 
membership levels, has become progressively less clear.16 
The response of the official trade unions: renewal and reform? 
With the advent of glasnost " the official trade unions urgently attempted to present 
a new face to the world. The All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (VTsSPS) 
asserted its independence from the Party in 1987, and was later replaced by a new 
General Confederation of Trade Unions (VKP) in October 1990, in which the 
branch and republican organisations had a greater degree of autonomy. Meanwhile, 
161n Eastern Europe too the distinction between the two types of union has become more blurred. 
As mentioned above, in Romania the CNSLR and Fratia merged, whilst in Bulgaria co-operation 
between the once staunchly anti-communist Podkrepa and the former official union ClTUB has 
increased, as it has done to a lesser extent between the different types of union in Hungary. This 
highlights the fact that all the unions now have other things on their minds, namely, in the words of 
podkrepa, 'recession and unemployment ... growth in the private sector (particularly small enterprises 
and illegal recruitment) ... general impoverishment and massive company and factory closures, 
[which] have all resulted in ... a significant drop in the level of trade union membership' (lCFTU-
Phare Democracy Programme, 1995). 
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from the spnng of 1990, the official branch organisations began to establish 
republican organisations, and at this time the Russian confederation, the FNPR, was 
established, again asserting its independence of the Party and state, but also fighting 
for greater independence from the VKP. Such refonn remained largely confined to 
the level of rhetoric, however. The official unions remained heavily dependent on 
the government not to confiscate their assets, not to force a re-registration of 
members, and not to remove social security from their control. So although they 
presented themselves as principled defenders of the working class against the rigours 
of reform, they were in practice careful not to alienate its perpetrators. 
Meanwhile, the branch unions initiated similar 'refonn' measures. For example, the 
official miners' union - which, because of competition from the NPG and the 
activism of the miners, is one of the most advanced of the former official unions -
'refonned' twice. First, the Soviet organisation was reconstituted as the 
Independent Trade Union of Workers in the Coal Mining Industry (NPRUP) at a 
purely bureaucratic congress that took place from 28 March to 1 April 1990 in 
Moscow. Then, in May 1991, the Russian, as opposed to Soviet, organisation was 
established.17 These 'reforms' were again largely cosmetic and left the mine and 
regional level organisations pretty much untouched. Their most important effect 
was to institute less authoritarian relations between the central and regional union 
organisations and the mine level unions. Indeed, after the abandonment of 
17This resulted in an elongation of the union's official acronym to RNPRUP, although it was still 
generally referred to as PRUP. Later, the union began to refer to itself as 'Rosugleprof' to avoid 
being confused with the NPG. 
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democratic centralism. the mine organisations were to a large extent allowed to go 
their own way. and now. certainly. the links between the various levels of the 
union are quite weak. At the mine level. however. there was a parallel process of 
change, initiated as a result of the 1989 miners' strikes in the aftermath of which 
many union committees were re-elected. 
The 'reform' of the union's structures, however, in many ways condemned it to 
the worst of both worlds: a top-down centralist ethos still dominates the union's 
approach to policy making, while at the same time it is unable to implement 
decisions taken democratically because the mine level unions, having been 
liberated from democratic centralism, do not feel themselves bound by the 
majority view in the union. IS The national leadership of the union now want to re-
introduce democratic centralism, but they have so far been unable to gain support 
for this, because one of the most important consequences of its abolition was the 
fact that the majority of union dues now remain at enterprise level - a situation 
which the mine level unions are keen to continue. 
While developments in the internal organisation of the unions are an important 
determinant of their political efficacy as campaigning organisations, however, 
such organisational issues should be separated from the main question regarding 
union reform: for whom is the union campaigning? Although the national union 
IBThis presents a particular problem in staging strike action: without democratic centralism it is 
virtually impossible to maintain a solid strike. For a more detailed examination of this question, 
and an example of the practical problems the union faces in mounting strike action see Borisov 
and Clarke, 1996. 
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organisation can attempt to steer the organisation towards a 'trade union' position, 
'reform' of the union requires a redefinition of the relationship between the union 
and its members, which can only come through a transformation of the role of the 
unions at an enterprise level. 
Official trade unions in the enterprise: old habits die hard 
So what do the claims of the official unions to be 'independent' mean at enterprise 
level? The new smooth-talking leaders of the re-named official unions are often 
prepared to admit that there are problems with reform at a lower level, but they 
usually explain this in terms of reform being obstructed by foot-dragging 
functionaries keen to retain their position. The explanation for the weakness of the 
enterprise organisations of the official trade unions and their dependence on 
management, however, does not lie in the personal failings of backward-looking 
bureaucrats. Rather, it is a result of the structural position of the official trade unions 
at the enterprise level. This was demonstrated early in the post-communist period 
when, in the period of optimism after the 1989 miners' strike in Russia and Ukraine, 
activists entered the official miners' union and attempted to transform it, but found 
themselves, in spite of their good intentions, unable to do so. The nature of the 
barriers to reform at an enterprise level are analysed in more detail in Chapter Five. 
First, the collapse of the power of the Communist Party and its expulsion from 
enterprises in 1991, though it liberated unions from their role as 'transmission belts', 
actually made them more dependent on management (Clarke et al., 1993: 93 - 4). In 
the absence of the Party, since they lacked the support of workers, the unions could 
only rely on management to tolerate their existence. 
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Secondly, although they are no longer expected to stimulate productivity gains and 
impose workplace discipline, the official trade unions still act as the social and 
welfare departments of enterprises. They administer sotskul'tbyt (where it has not 
been transferred to the local authority), sick pay, the housing waiting list, the 
distribution of allotments and potato plots to workers, as well as organising various 
work-connected celebrations, and help for 'veterans and invalids'. The structural 
position of the unions within the enterprise has thus changed very little: social 
provision is still their main raison d'e/re and this is what workers expect of them. 
Moreover, the right to administer sotskul'tbyt and distribute various goods within 
the enterprise is one granted by management and can be withdrawn from an errant 
union at any moment. 
The unions' position cannot simply be understood as one of craven dependence, 
however. Just as during the communist period the 'labour collective' formed a 
supplicatory unity with a common interest in securing maximum resources and 
manageable plan targets from higher authorities, so in the transition period the 
labour collective has a very substantial common interest in what is essentially a 
fight for the survival of the enterprise. As Vladimir Ilyin has argued on the basis 
of research in the coal, aviation, oil and gas and transport sectors, the 
'contradictions between the interests of workers and those of the [enterprise] 
administration, while they are very significant, nevertheless take second place to 
the contradiction between the labour collective of the enterprise and the external 
administrative, and now even market, environment' (Ilyin, 1996: 67). It is 
therefore not surprising that the former official unions 'often serve as an 
instrument of the struggle of labour collectives, headed by the directors, against 
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the destructive policies of the post-Communist government which have, whether 
deliberately or not, led to the collapse of production, the de-industrialisation of the 
country, unemployment and bankruptcy' (Ilyin, 1996: 68 - 9). The former 
President of the FNPR, Igor Klochkov, made exactly this point in an interview, 
saying, 'I admit that it is a bit strange to see the unions and the employers forming 
a common front. But don't forget that Russia is a bizarre country .... Today what is 
primary is the survival of our production. We have therefore concluded a pact with 
the employers' (Le Figaro, 27 January 1993).19 
The unions are thus constrained to represent the interests of their branch of 
production, or, at a lower level, the interests of their enterprise rather than the 
specific interests of workers. This is particularly the case in the coal industry, where 
an annual tariff agreement determines the level of the subsidies for wages, social and 
welfare provision (though these have mainly been phased out), new investment and 
operating losses. (In other industries which are no longer in receipt of direct 
subsidies, and where the branch ministries no longer exist, the branch tariff 
'
9This comment was made at a time when the FNPR was attempting to fonn a political bloc with the 
employers at a national level. In the summer of 1992 the FNPR formed an alliance with the 
industrialists' organisation, the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs headed by Arkadii 
Volsky, and allied itself with the 'centrist' Civic Union. They also set up an alternative to the Russian 
tripartite commission, the Russian Assembly of Social Partnership, on 10 July 1992, where the 
employers and official trade unions were to co-operate without the interference of the government 
and independent trade unions. Given the weakness of the national employers' organisations, however, 
such alliances have not really had much influence. The most significant co-operation between unions 
and employers occurs at the branch and enterprise levels. 
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agreements do little more than define a derisory minimum wage.) This means that in 
the coal industry, as in the 'budget sector' of health and education, the dominant 
form of union activity is the co-ordination of strikes and protests in order to extract 
resources from the government. As indicated above such action is often mounted 
with the support of management. This regular, ritual struggle20 provides a focus for 
union activity which is often lacking in other sectors. Even in other branches of 
industry, however, the same logic applies: the fate of enterprises does not depend on 
the ability of management to reduce costs, but their ability to secure outside 
assistance in the form of indirect subsidies, credits, investment funds and tax 
exemptions, to establish and defend monopoly powers, to secure lucrative state 
contracts and to avoid paying debts to suppliers and the tax authorities (Clarke, 
1996b). This means that such enterprises still constitute a supplicatory unity, even if 
their dependence on the government is less apparent than under the planning system 
20ne struggle is ritual in the sense that the action of the unions is often highly ineffective. For 
example, miners' 'strikes' organised by Rosugleprof usually do not involve a cessation of work, 
but only a refusal on the part of mines to deliver coal (which underlines the fact that managers are 
complicit in the organisation of strikes). This distinction is completely blurred by the Russian 
media, however, who report such strikes as if they were strikes in the usual sense of that term, 
which, perhaps not coincidentally, is useful to the government. It can eventually agree to hand out 
the subsidies, but only on the grounds that it is fearful of the consequences of a continuation of the 
deeply damaging 'strike': the whole process is political theatre designed to show other groups of 
workers and the international financial institutions that the government only hands out money 
under the pressure of extreme circumstances. 
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of the past. Moreover, a 'branch interest' in particular government policies (such as 
pricing policies, investment policies and so on) persists and the unions are often best 
placed to articulate this. Thus, even though the relations of the past are being 
transformed, there is still, for the moment, an objective basis for the co-operation of 
unions and management. How far this is changing is explored in Chapter Five. 
Conclusion 
The independent trade unions have not fulfilled their early promise and their 
membership remains small, while the membership of the former official trade 
unions is slowly declining. The former official trade unions give the appearance of 
having reformed at a central level, but have not managed to separate themselves 
from enterprise management at a lower level. Meanwhile, the 'independence' of the 
alternative unions has tended to be progressively compromised by their political 
alliances and commercial activities which were forced upon them by their initial 
vulnerability, while their membership and influence has gradually declined. Thus, in 
the vast majority of industries the official trade unions are the only representatives 
that workers have. Can these organisations be reformed 'from below'? Or will 
workers once again attempt to build their own organisations outside the official 
structures? These are the questions on which the case study ofTaldym will focus. 
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Chapter Three: Vishnovka 
Taldym mine is situated in the small mining settlement (poselok) of Vishnovka 
and is the heart of the settlement: the life of the community is inextricably bound 
up with that of the mine. To describe the community of Vishnovka is therefore to 
provide an essential introduction to the mine. The following chapter about 
everyday life in Vishnovka will focus on the role of the mine in the community, 
and will highlight particular features of workers' relationship to the enterprise, 
some of which are specific to the post-Soviet context, and some of which are 
specific to small post-Soviet mining communities. This chapter thus both 
contextualises the case study and provides an indication of how far conclusions 
drawn from the study of the mine can be generalised. As well as providing an 
introduction to the main issues which preoccupy the workers of Vishnovka, it also 
analyses the way the community has been affected by reform, an appreciation of 
which is crucial to understanding the prospects for union reform and worker 
organisation within the mine. 
Vishnovka 
Vishnovka has a population of 11,500, and is situated to the south of the city of 
Novokuznetsk. It began to grow in 1930 when the Kuznetzk (now Novokuznetsk) 
_ Tashtagol railway line was laid through the village. At this stage the main 
employment in the settlement was provided by small-scale domestic tool 
production and a wood processing plant which provided materials to the Kuznetsk 
construction organisation and the growing coal industry of the region. The 
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construction of the settlement's mme began in 1955, after a 1940 survey 
discovered large coal reserves in the area, and on 1 March 1957 the mine delivered 
its first tonne of coal. 
The settlement now has a working population of 5,000, and three main enterprises. 
The most important of these is Taldym mine, which employs approximately 3,000 
workers and is the main source of employment in the settlement. The other 
enterprises in the settlement comprise an open cast mine, which employs 
approximately 800 workers and a motor depot with a staff of approximately 700. 
There is still a wood processing plant on the outskirts of the settlement which is a 
subsidiary of a larger plant in Novokuznetsk, but this is on the verge of closure 
and now has very few workers left. 
The village has two schools, somewhat confusingly known as school number 19 
and school number 30, both of which take pupils from seven years old until school 
leaving age. Each has 1000 pupils, who are taught in two shifts, one in the 
morning and one in the afternoon. The other local services comprise: four 
kindergartens, three formerly controlled by the mine and one by the open cast 
mine, although the open cast mine has now transferred its kindergarten to the local 
authority, and in late 1996 the mine was planning to likewise divest itself of two 
of its establishments; two polyclinics, and a music school. The settlement used 
also to boast a dom tvorchestvo ('house of creativity'), which replaced the house 
of the Pioneers in the period of 'de-politicisation'. In its 'reformed' form, this 
establishment used to organise artistic activities for local children and exhibit the 
results, but it was closed in the first half of 1996 because of lack of funds. The 
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mine meanwhile runs a 'palace of culture' (dvorets kul'tury) , named 'Progress" 
which comprises a cinema, sports facilities and a hall mainly used for Sunday 
night discos and wedding receptions. As of 1996 this establishment was still 
running, although in the summer of this year it was deprived of electricity because 
its bills had not been paid. The mine also has a projiiaklorii (prophylactic care 
facility) attached to it where mineworkers can rest and receive therapies intended 
to inhibit the development of industrial diseases. Meanwhile, down river from the 
settlement the mine has a 'tourist base' (turbaza). The other local agencies are the 
heating authority, the housing administration department, the water and energy 
authorities and the funeral and repair services. The settlement has a railway station 
which connects it with Novokuznetsk in one direction and Tashtagol in the other. 
By the standards of the Kuzbass, Vishnovka is considered to be a 'good' 
settlement. It is sited in the valley of the river Kondoma and is surrounded by 
hills. On its east side, the landscape is severely scarred by the past activity of the 
open cast mine, which has not recultivated any of the land which it has mined, but 
on its other sides it is surrounded by woods and fields. At the bottom end of the 
village is Taldym mine, situated well away from residential areas. The centre of 
the village is up the hill from the mine and the railway station. This is the most 
developed section of the village, where the low-rise apartment blocks of the 
village are situated and the roads are tarmaced. Here, along the main street, are 
sited the settlement administration building, the two schools, DK 'Progress', the 
building of the former dom tvorchestvo and a stall large enough to accommodate 
IThis is referred to locally by its Russian abbreviation 'OK Progress', as it will be here. 
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about 10 market traders. A children's cafe, 'Forest Fairytale', also stood opposite 
the main village shop until it burnt down at the end of September 1994. The rest of 
the village, stretching down stream towards Novokuznetsk and away from the 
river bank towards the open cast mine, mainly consists of small painted wooden 
houses built by the workers themselves, which are known as the 'private sector'. 
These are surrounded by kitchen gardens and linked by dirt tracks, lanes and 
makeshift wooden bridges over streams and drainage ditches. Dotted around the 
, 
settlement are also what have now become a familiar feature of the Russian 
landscape: commercial kiosks, selling alcohol, imported chocolate and an odd 
assortment of other goods such as nail varnish and tights. 
Housing 
Housing in the settlement was in the past provided by the enterprises. To obtain a 
place to live workers had to register on a waiting list at their enterprise, which was 
administered by the official trade union. The building of 'private sector' housing 
was historically also funded by the enterprises in the form of 50% grants and 50% 
soft loans to workers for materials. There was no private housing market and no 
other sources of housing. As has already been noted in the introduction, the 
housing waiting list was one of the most potent means through which enterprise 
administrations and trade unions were able to control and motivate workers. The 
purpose of the following discussion is to give the background to the politics of 
housing in the settlement, to explain the variations in the type of housing on offer, 
and to stress the significance of the housing waiting list in the life of the 
community which has been the focus of the aspirations of generations of workers 
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and has played a decisive role in the fortunes (or misfortunes) of most local 
families. 
Approximately half the population live in what are known as flats 'with modem 
conveniences' (blagousfroennye), which means that they are not shared and have 
an internal bathroom and toilet. Just over a third live in the 'private sector' of self-
built housing. The mine trade union gave the following breakdown of its 
employees' housing situation: 
• Blagousfroennye flats - 45.7% 
• The private sector - 37. 1 % 
• Unregistered -7.7% 
• 'Dilapidated/tumble-down' (vetkhoe) dwellings (including barracks) - 6% 
• Obshchezhitie (hostels in which families are allocated one room in a shared 
flat) - 2% 
• Flats without modem conveniences - 1.4% 
22.8% of the mine's employees are on the housing waiting list, 13.7% for an 
improvement in their housing conditions and 9.1 % in order to receive a flat. This 
situation was broadly replicated at the open cast mine, although the trade union 
was unable to provide precise figures. 
The conditions of those who live in the flats 'with modem conveniences' are 
variable. The major variation is in size. The most modem flats are the most 
spacious. They have an 'improved lay-out' which means that they have three 
rooms and a reasonable sized kitchen. This, in Russian terms, is luxury for it 
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means that the parents do not have to sleep in the sitting room, which is the more 
usual arrangement. In the last few years the mine, open cast mine and motor depot 
have all built a number of high-quality brick 'cottages'. The open cast mine has 
built enough for 60 families and the motor depot enough for 30. These are located 
at the lower end of the village. The mine has built two separate streets of twelve 
cottages each in the centre of the village. These houses are by far the best in the 
village, although they were allocated to workers on the waiting list in the usual 
fashion. Most families, however, live in older, one- or two-roomed flats with 
cramped kitchens. Families with children in the one-roomed flats, of course, get 
no privacy at all. The two-roomed flats are only marginally better as it often 
necessary to walk through the main room to get to the second bedroom. 
Nevertheless, obtaining any kind of flat is a major triumph, especially for young 
families. 
The houses of the 'private sector' are usually far more spacious. The major 
drawback of a private sector house, however, is that it has only cold running water 
or no water at all, an outside toilet and a separate bath house (banya). The bath 
houses are heated by coal, which provides hot water and enough steam to allow 
nudity in the depths of the Siberian winter. Washing is accomplished on wooden 
benches. The families who live in the 'private sector' are accustomed to such 
inconveniences and most have no desire to move into flats. Their only complaint 
is that running a 'private sector' household is a full-time job in itself. A private 
sector house is heated by a coal boiler (pech J in winter. The mine or the open cast 
mine provides each family in the private sector with seven tonnes of coal a year 
free of charge. This method of heating keeps the houses warm, although since they 
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are of wooden construction, there is a high risk of fire. Locally it is claimed that at 
least one of the settlement's houses is lost in this way every winter. 
The ten per cent who live in dilapidated dwellings, hostels and flats without 
modem conveniences are obviously in the worst position. These would typically 
be young families (who constitute the majority of the occupants in the hostels) or 
workers in low-status jobs without the necessary connections to get priority status 
on the housing waiting list. 
The size of the waiting list masks the real level of dissatisfaction with housing 
provision. Many workers who wanted to improve their accommodation claimed 
that they had not put their names of the list because it was pointless: the list was 
too long. These, for example, were the comments made by miners in a group 
interview about their housing situations: 
Miner 1: I live in a wooden house in the private sector. It's not in good 
condition. I have waited 14 years for a flat. Now they've frozen all building, so 
now I'll never get one. And soon I will retire ... 
Miner 2: I live in a flat. I have a garage. I live in my mother-in-Iaw's flat. I 
haven't got my own flat. I've got a dacha, and in the summer I work there in the 
garden. 
How many rooms are there in your flat? 
Miner 2: Two. Five people live there: my mother-in-law, my wife and I and our 
two children. It is hard for us. It is a very small flat. I am 40 years old and I want 
to live in my own flat. I didn't even bother to put my name down on the housing 
waiting list, because I knew it would be hopeless. I'll never get my own flat. 
Such stories are continually encountered in Vishnovka. Dissatisfaction with 
cramped living conditions, problems with resident in-laws and lack of privacy are 
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all endemic. And so too, as will be seen later, is a burning sense of resentment 
about the way in which housing is distributed by the mine. 
The situation has now begun to change, although for the moment the housing 
waiting list is still in operation. In 1994 the government ended the housing subsidy 
to coal-mining enterprises. The end of the building subsidy means that the mine is 
no longer able to offer new housing for workers to rent, while local enterprises 
also claim that as a result of financial problems they are now unable to give loans 
and grants to young families wanting to build their own homes in the 'private 
sector'. All the accommodation that has been built since 1995 has been offered for 
sale rather than for rent. The cheapest one-roomed flat for sale in June 1995 cost 
28 million roubles - at a time when the best salary of a face worker at the mine 
was 2 million roubles, and the average women manual workers' wage at the mine 
was 400,000 a month. The ratio between prices and wages was similar in 1996, 
although whereas in 1995 the mine had not been offering credit, in 1996 it was 
offering workers the chance to buy properties over five years through a direct 
deduction from their pay. Although the properties were being offered for sale, the 
right to buy was only granted to those at the top of the housing waiting list, so for 
the moment access is still prior to money in the acquisition of housing in 
Vishnovka. 
The end of 'free' housing was a major scandal in the settlement. In the summer of 
1996 the trade union committee was besieged by workers overwhelmed by the 
injustice of change: 'But it's just not right, if I'd have reached the top of the list 
the year before last I could have got a cottage for nothing and now I have to pay 
millions for a one-roomed flat. How can that be fair?'. To this the trade union 
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president habitually replied, 'Fifty-two per cent voted for Yeltsin in Vishnovka. 
Live this life, you voted for it. Now live it'. For some individuals the pill was too 
bitter - they refused to exercise their 'right to buy' in protest. 
DomestiC food production 
Domestic food production is a crucial feature of the life of the settlement which 
shapes both workers' relations to the enterprise and their family lives. As 
mentioned in Chapter One, this was necessitated in the past not by a lack of 
money, but more by the shortage of food in the shops. Workers living in a 
settlement such as Vishnovka were obviously able to produce food on a larger 
scale than those who lived in large towns, and they needed to do so because 
supplies were far worse outside the large centres. It is, however, only in the scale 
of their domestic production that the workers ofVishnovka differ from their urban 
counterparts: weekend trips to dachas or allotments were also a vital fixture in the 
lives of the latter. 
Houses in Vishnovka's private sector all have substantial kitchen gardens, and the 
families who live in such houses often have allotments as well. In the private 
sector extended families often work together running what almost amount to small 
farms. As will be discussed later, in the past such production was largely intended 
for families' own consumption, although more recently it has become an 
important source of additional income. Such families not only grow a wide variety 
of vegetables, but often keep cows (for both their milk and their meat), pigs and 
chickens in pens and sties around their houses. When the ground is not covered in 
snoW, the cows are left to wander freely around the settlement during the day. 
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Animal husbandry involves a great deal of work for not only must the animals be 
looked after, they must also be fed. And, as would be expected in a non-monetary 
economy, workers do not buy hay - they make it themselves in their 'summer 
holidays'. In general workers who live in the private sector estimated that in the 
past they produced at least fifty per cent of food they consumed. 
Meanwhile, workers who live in flats almost without exception have allotments 
where they grow vegetables. These are pickled in the autumn and provide a vital 
source of vitamins in the winter months. The allotments are allocated by the trade 
unions and in this case there is no shortage. In addition to this, the mine rents large 
fields from local collective farms in order to allow workers to grow potatoes. The 
fields are divided up into family plots to which the enterprises lay on buses at 
planting and harvesting time. Potatoes are the mainstay of the Siberian diet, and 
both the mine and open cast trade union said that all their workers participated in 
the potato growing. The supply of potatoes to the shops is very unreliable, so in 
the words of one of the officials of the open cast mine trade union, failing to plant 
potatoes would be 'a catastrophe' for a family. This system is not only a feature of 
life at the mine, but of enterprises across Russia. 
Domestic production of food is considered to be crucial by workers, who 
universally claim that they could not survive without it. Thus, alongside the mine 
the household has always been an important unit of production. Nevertheless, the 
domestic and enterprise economies have always been closely intertwined. The 
mine organises potato production; the mine rents out the land on which workers 
grow their hay; the mine loans them the machinery required to produce the hay 
(albeit now at vastly increased prices); the mine clears, prepares and divides up the 
102 
land into allotments, while in the past it used to provide the money for 
construction in the private sector. 
Social life 
The centrality of the enterprise 
The 'mine is the centre of Vishnovka's social world - there is no alternative social 
focus in the settlement. DK Progress provides various forms of entertainment, but 
this is an institution run and paid for by the mine. Vishnovka has neither a bar nor 
a restaurant, while the fire at 'Forest Fairytale' deprived the settlement of its small 
cafe. Large scale events, such as funeral wakes, often take place in the mine 
stolovaya (canteen). Although there are bars and restaurants in Novokuznetsk and 
the nearby settlement of Osinniki workers very rarely travelled there in the past, 
while the prices are now prohibitive and local opinion is unanimous that such 
places are now patronised exclusively by Mafiosi and are too dangerous for 
ordinary workers. Thus, work provides the main form of public sociability within 
the settlement. This is not a unique feature of the life of small settlements. The 
Russian sociologist Sergei Alasheev has made exactly the same point about the 
centrality ofthe enterprise in workers' lives in the huge industrial city of Samara: 
there, too, workers complain that 'after work there is nowhere to go' and see work 
not just as a source of income but also as a meeting place (Alasheev, 1995b: 70 -
2). 
In terms of the themes of the thesis one of the most important consequences of the 
social centrality of the enterprise is that the mine is also the focus of workers' 
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discontent with the leisure facilities on offer. Access to the settlement leisure 
facilities can be an emotive issue, in particular access to the nearby tourist centre 
(turbaza) which is run by the mine administration. Various celebrations - such as 
the national 'days' which honour different professions - are held at the centre 
which is set in attractive surroundings and has a large dance hall. Work collectives 
are sometimes granted the right to celebrate events such as the retirement of well-
respected colleagues there, and occasionally the administration will throw a party 
for a brigade there as a reward for production achievements. Such rights are 
greatly coveted, and resentment is easily generated if it is noticed that one 
collective is granted more access to the turbaza than others.2 Meanwhile, 
discontent over the mine administration's use of the facility is always simmering, 
waiting to erupt at moments of tension: workers constantly complain that 
managers and trade union use the turbaza as their own private party venue where 
they drink alcohol paid for by the mine and eat meat provided by the mine's 
agricultural holdings. 
Sex segregation of social life 
Men and women inhabit separate social worlds in many different cultures, but 
mining settlements often preserve a strict sexual segregation of social life even 
when the wider society in which they are located is moving towards a more mixed 
2A collective's access to such facilities heavily depends on its line manager's effectiveness as an 
advocate. Certain co\lectives have managed to establish a tradition of annual celebrations at the 
turbaza, while others never go there together. 
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pattern of social interaction. The classic account of the life of a British pit village 
in the 1950s, 'Coal is our Life', placed a great deal of emphasis on this, arguing 
that relationships between work-mates were given priority over 'empty and 
uninspiring' marriages (Dennis et al., [1956] 1969: 183). Men in 'Ashton' spent 
their time in working men's clubs and pubs drinking and talking about work, 
while women were confined to the home: not only was it culturally proscribed for 
them to drink with men, they also, being economically dependent, often did not 
have the means to pursue independent social activity. Thus, women's main 
recreation was meeting for chats over tea with relatives and close friends. And this 
was not only a feature of the 1950s: in the 1980s mining villages were still 
reported to have 'a very male character. The social and cultural life is geared 
largely to those who toil beneath the soiL .. There are few places where women can 
meet so their social1ives revolve around the kitchen' (Taylor, 1986: 84).3 
Such relations are founded on rigid definitions of masculinity and femininity: to 
be a man is to work and to work hard, while a woman's prescribed role is to 
service and stand by her man. These gender identities are partly fostered by the 
nature of miners' work. Beynon and Austrin have shown, for example, how, in the 
hard and risky environment of the Durham coal mines in the late nineteenth and 
3This description comes from an article in edited collection about women's role in the 1984 
miners' strike (Seddon, 1986). Those essays in the collection which are written by 'miners' wives' 
who played an active role in supporting the strike tend to stress the social restriction of their lives 
before the strike: as one Welsh miner's wife put it, 'Looking back, I wonder what I did to fill my 
time' (Davis and James, 1986: 16). 
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early twentieth century, a masculine identity associated with ideas of hard work, 
strength and toughness was adopted partly as a survival strategy, but also acted as 
a vital disciplining agent: 'Miners ... taught their sons to endure pain and fear "like 
a man" .... Private enterprise coal mining could not have survived without the coal 
miners whose values, principles and attitudes came to form a central part of the 
system itself (Beynon and Austrin, 1994: 152 - 3). A notion of honourable 
manhood was vital in keeping the scared fourteen year old boys described by 
Beynon and Austrin down the pit and for ensuring their elders' exertion while on 
the job. What this analysis also shows, however, is that while mining is conducive 
to the forging of a particular masculine identity, the process is not determined, but 
occurs within a specific social context. Indeed, the neat association between 
masculinity and mining first required women to be excluded from underground 
work, something which occurred in Britain in the mid-nineteenth century. 
What is specific about the Soviet and post-Soviet social context in this regard is 
the high labour participation of women.4 Since 1970 the proportion of working-
age women in the Russian labour force has been close to the biological maximum 
4This is a significant way in which Vishnovka diverges from Bulmer's 'ideal type' of the mining 
community which identifies women's confinement in the home as one of the defining features of 
such occupational communities. It largely conforms to the other characterics he identifies: the 
physical isolation; the economic predominance of mining; the physically exacting, dangerous 
nature of the work; the social consequences of occupational homogeneity and isolation; and the 
close-knit nature of the community (Bulmer, 1975: 85 - 88). Meanwhile, political conflicts in 
Vishnovka also assume highly specific forms - the identification of which is the task of the 
foIlowing chapters. 
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(Shapiro, 1992: 15), and even though unemployment is now growing so far, 
contrary to expectations, women do not form the majority of the unemployed 
(Ashwin and Bowers, 1997). In the Soviet era mining areas were no exception to 
the national trend in female employment: women were employed in surface work 
in mining, while 'women's industries', such as garment manufacture, were 
specially subsidised to provide jobs for 'miners' wives,.5 The position of women 
in Russian mining settlements therefore differs considerably from that of their 
counterparts in Britain (or, to be more precise, Britain before its coal industry was 
destroyed). In Britain, miners' wives generally did not work, and, even where they 
did, it was not in manual work associated with mining such as coal sorting: the 
vast majority of the 'pit brow lasses' were excluded from the industry in the 1950s 
after a protracted struggle (John, 1980: 229). How does the fact that Vishnovkan 
women work at the mine influence the social life of the settlement? Does their 
status as workers mean that they are able to enter the social world of men? 
Vishnovka does not have working men's clubs or bars from which women are 
excluded: the nearest equivalent to a club is DK progress, and this is open to both 
men and women. But although women work there is a strict sexual division of 
labour at the mine and this carries over into social life. Work collectives often 
~Such enterprises are no longer subsidised and many of them have now closed. The percentage of 
women among the unemployed in Kemerovo oblast' is therefore higher than in many other 
regions of Russia, although so far the only group of women to be made redundant from the mines 
are those who work in sotskul'tbyt facilities which have been closed down after being transferred 
to the local authority. 
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socialise together, although male collectives tend to do so on a more regular basis 
than their female equivalents. While brigades of male workers will often gather 
informally after work to drink, or go fishing together in summer, women workers 
usually only meet socially with their collectives at specific events such as 
retirement parties.6 The frequency of the post-shift drinking sessions of men's 
collectives varies according to the culture of the collective in question, but they 
are a feature of the life of most brigades. Indeed, informal vodka-drinking 
gatherings are the preferred social activity of the men in the settlement. In 
common with the cultures described by the authors quoted above, such drinking is 
a strictly men-only affair. Groups of vodka-drinking men are generally excluded 
from the home and, as mentioned above, there are no bars in Vishnovka. So the 
men congregate in garages, which are located in clusters some distance from the 
relevant owners' flats. (In cities such as Kemerovo or Novokuznetsk it is often 
necessary for car owners to go by public transport to their garages).7 Here the 
drinkers set out their zakuski of gherkins, smoked pig fat (salo) and occasionally 
sausage on pieces of newspaper ready to follow up the swiftly-swallowed neat 
vodka. And then they drink, denounce the injustice of life that leaves them thus 
condemned to the garage and feel better until such time as they have to confront 
their wives. This is by no means seen to be an ideal arrangement and although the 
6Jnis distinction has also been noted by the Russian sociologist Marina Kiblitskaya at the Moscow 
enterprises at which she has conducted research. 
70ne of the advantages of a 'private sector' house is that a garage can be built alongside it. But the 
garage lots used by flat-dwellers are a much better site for male drinking sessions. 
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garage is a valued sphere of male autonomy it is recognised to be a rather 
demeaning one. As a miner commented in a group interview conducted during a 
drinking session after the night shift at work: 
It's painful that we live like this. It weighs heavily on our hearts. After work we 
are so stressed, so we go and drink together because it's the only way that we 
can relax. Often we drink in each other's garages .... You need to drink to get rid 
of all your bitterness. 
The claim that men drink 'to get rid of their bitterness' is a common one, and 
underlines the fact that although workers are used to the conditions that prevail in 
Vishnovka, they are in no way satisfied with them. 
A woman worker listening to the above tale of woe, herself married to an 
alcoholic, commented derisively, 'Stress! You lot don't know what stress is'. Her 
response was typical: not surprisingly the drinking culture causes a great deal of 
tension between men and women. The men say that what they want is 
understanding and argue that the 'good wife' is one that allows drinking in the 
house. This, for example, was the comment of a miner during the same drinking 
session which was (unusually) conducted in the tiny kitchen of a two-roomed flat: 
We haven't got anywhere to go. There aren't any bars here. If we don't get 
pennission from one of our wives to drink at home, then we drink outside. Lena, 
she's a good, understanding miner's wife. She's allowed us to be here today. 
Another wife, she'll shout and swear at us. A good wife understands that it is 
better for us to get drunk in someone's house than on the street. That way we're 
safe. Nothing is going to happen to us. She knows where we are. 
The wives, however, are under strong pressure to 'shout and swear', because that 
is what they are expected to do: a woman's role is to disapprove of the drinking 
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and do her best to keep her husband under control. Every good mother teaches her 
daughter that the biggest disaster likely to befall her in life is to marry a drunkard -
and there are plenty of examples to testify to the truth of this. So from their mid-
teens onwards conscientious girlfriends try to stand between men and their vodka, 
which only adds to the other cultural pressures which prevent men and women 
from socialising and drinking together. The result is that vodka becomes a 
woman's arch-rival and a man's forbidden fruit. This is a struggle with few 
winners, for what also comes across in the above quote is the paradoxical strength 
and weakness of both sides. The men are not going to stop drinking, but they will 
generally not invade a house against the will of an angry woman. They also 
candidly acknowledge their frailty while drunk and, though they complain about 
it, also accept that the women's criticism is just.8 Meanwhile, women may have 
the power to prevent drinking in the home, but they can only influence its 
BIt is a generaJly accepted fact that men have no control when it comes to vodka - men rarely 
complain that the attitude of women is patronising. For example, at a trade union committee 
meeting in August 1996, the trade union president reported on a plan of the mine administration to 
give each miner a bottle of vodka for Miners' Day (25 August) as some kind of compensation for 
the fact that they had not yet been paid May's wages. One of the female shop trade union 
presidents vigorously objected to this plan, saying 'They'll all get drunk the night before, they 
won't get home and then Miners' Day already won't be a holiday for their families.' This analysis 
was completely accepted by the (male dominated) meeting and the administration was requested 
not to go ahead with the plan. No one at the meeting suggested that the miners might be more 
restrained than their critic suggested: indeed, when the shop trade union president later reported 
what she had said at the meeting to her husband (a miner) he nodded in vigorous approval of his 
wife's analysis. 
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location. So although there are some occasions, such as holidays, celebrations and 
family gatherings, where men and women will drink together, the culturally 
accepted pattern is that men will drink with each other and leave women to worry 
at home. The model Vishnovkan husband will participate in such sessions only 
about once a month when there is something, such as a birthday of a workmate, to 
celebrate. Once a week is considered by women to be tiresome but tolerable. Any 
more frequently and the man concerned acquires the status of an a/kash (Russian 
slang for alcoholic). 
So does women's status as workers have no impact on the organisation of the 
settlement's social life? In some respects, the social life of Vishnovka's women 
certainly appears to be quite similar to that of their British counterparts described 
above. They often claim that Russian woman is like 'a cart horse' and has no time 
for relaxation. Women spend a high proportion of their non-working hours on 
their domestic duties, and while men share the work on the land and the care of 
animals, cooking, cleaning and child-care is still considered by most men to be 
babskaya rabota (women's work).9 Meanwhile, women do not gather in groups 
after work, and will instead generally have one or two very close female friends 
outside work with whom they spend free evenings chatting and drinking tea, or 
occasionally wine. (Women who live in flats tend to meet more often than those in 
the private sector, who spend more of their 'free' time with members of their 
extended family working within the household.) Alongside this kitchen-focused 
9As will be discussed in Chapter Eight, however, the women's shift pattern means that men are 
compelled to do some housework even if this only consists in heating up a pre-prepared meal. 
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conviviality, however, women also participate in the social life of the mine: they 
are not excluded from public life as they were in 'Ashton'. In the communist era 
women were often active members of the Party, served as shop trade union 
presidents, worked in the civil defence, or served on the social security 
delegations. Now many of the organisations in which they participated have been 
dissolved, though they still serve as shop trade union presidents. 
Such 'social work' gives women a certain standing in the community. The 
brigadier in the zaryadnoe, for example, was awarded a medal for her social work 
in the Party and shop trade union committee during the Gorbachev era. This was 
an enormous source of pride to her, and went a long way to compensate for the 
difficulties and slight social embarrassment of having an alcoholic husband: 
whatever he got up to everyone knew that she was a good and respected worker. lo 
Another woman who worked in the ventilation and technical safety shop, the bane 
of whose life was the fact that she lived in a one-roomed flat with her grown-up 
daughter, her second husband and stepson, similarly gained a sense of worth from 
her 'social work' and poured a great deal of energy into it - in spite of the fact that 
the mine had so abjectly failed to meet her housing needs. She reported cheerfully: 
IOBoth Beynon and Austrin and Dennis et al. note that a woman's fate in the mining communities 
they describe is largely detennined by whether or not she has a 'good' or 'family' man for a 
husband. This, as noted above, obviously has an important influence on a woman's quality of life 
in Vishnovka too, but to have a 'bad' husband is not the end of the world: two of the strongest, 
most popular and active women I knew in Vishnovka had alcoholic husbands. 
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I have always been involved in 'social work'. I like doing things for people. Old, 
young, they all come to me for help. I try to help them all. Before I was elected 
shop trade union president I was a member of the shop trade union committee. I 
have nearly always been active. We thought it was good that one of us women 
should participate in the life of the shop. 
Thus, while in Britain the social separation of men and women was underpinned 
by the fact that women were excluded from the mine and, at least until the 1984-5 
miners' strike, its politics, in the Russian mining settlement women can and do 
participate in the political life of the mine. Women often make outspoken 
contributions to meetings of the labour collective: it certainly cannot be said of 
Vishnovka, as Dennis et al. said of' Ashton' , that, 'one does not encounter women 
with ideas about general questions, or interested in cultural activities or the 
running of organisations' (p. 210). This comment about Ashton wives may well 
have been unfair, but this is not the point: it would be impossible for a sociologist 
to make such a judgement about the women of Vishnovka because their 
participation is so visible. Thus, although in some ways Russian mining 
settlements appear to be typical 'patriarchal' communities, the reality is more 
complex than this. t t 
llThis is true of Russian gender relations in general: men and women across the whole of society 
tend to adhere to essentialist notions of sexual difference, but at the same time Russian women 
have a self-confidence which is far rarer in country such as Britain. 
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Young people 
The young people of Vishnovka are probably no less well catered for than the 
teenagers of the typical British village: within DK Progress they have more 
facilities than would be provided by a village hall. The Sunday night discos at DK 
Progress are not a great source of diversion, however, since, as one young miner 
explained, the DJ is an old woman who 'only plays records that nobody likes'. 
The lights do not work properly and the record collection is severely out of date. 
Again the gender division persists. Both young men and women claimed that only 
'bad' girls went to the disco, although there was no stigma attached to boys who 
went there. Asked what defined these girls as 'bad', teenage girls said it was the 
fact that they drank and smoked, whilst the young miner quoted above said coyly, 
'they are the sort of girls who, if I took them home, would let me do whatever I 
wanted with them'. But girls can go to the cinema and use the sports facilities 
without their reputation being tarnished. In any case, the most popular pastimes 
have nothing to do with DK Progress: swimming or sunbathing by the river in 
summer; sledding or skiing in winter; chatting on benches or in kitchens; 
wandering the streets and going on the occasional expedition to the taiga in 
summer. 
'Nowhere to go' 
How do workers feel about Vishnovka's social life? The lack of 'somewhere to 
go' is not a major preoccupation because workers are used to the social constraints 
of the settlement. Nevertheless, as already indicated, the drinking culture of the 
village is much-lamented by women, and often blamed on the fact that Vishnovka 
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provides no other ways for men to relax. Men too express a sense of their relative 
deprivation, although only in occasional moments of laconic reflection. These, for 
example, were the comments of miners talking about how they spent their free 
time: 
Miner 1: I can survive, but I can't go out. I am a miner, and in fifteen years of 
marriage I have never once taken my wife out to a restaurant. Do you 
understand, not once? The way we live, it's not right. 
Miner 2: There's nowhere to go and relax. 
A complaint is that is made with far greater frequency is that there is no time for 
relaxation because such a large amount of time is spent on food production in 
spring, summer and autumn. The claims, 'I have no free time; the only free time I 
have is when I'm asleep' and 'winter is a holiday for us - we rest and eat the fruits 
of our labour' were very common. 
Having said this, in a settlement such as Vishnovka expectations are not high and 
workers certainly value some aspects of the mine's social provision. Indeed, what 
from the outside may seem small changes have in the past made a great deal of 
difference to the settlement. In the early 1980s the director of Taldym had been an 
energetic patemalist interested in raising the cultural level of the village. Under his 
directorship, the 'Vishnovka experience' became a model of good practice in the 
Kuzbass and received a lot of attention in the press. The achievements of this era 
are proudly remembered by Taldym's workers, who often bring him up in 
conversation. The following comment made by a woman worker at the mine was 
typical: 
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The mine once had a director Aleksandr Ivanovich Shundulidi. He was 
interested in improving the settlement. He was the first in Kemerovo oblast' to 
initiate the 'aesthetic days' when various artists would come to the schools in the 
settlement. He did lots of building. He built a fountain and asphalt roads in the 
village. Before he came to the settlement there was only one big shop. now 
there are three. There was also only one school in the settlement· he opened 
another one. 
Such innovations were greatly appreciated by the mineworkers for whom they 
represented a significant improvement in the quality of life. Seemingly minor 
developments, such as the building of a children's playground, were seen as major 
advances by local workers, as the following extract from an interview with a 
different female mineworker illustrates: 
When we had a different director· Shundulidi • he did a lot for the settlement. It 
was about eight years ago. Then we had a playground with two paddling pools, 
one for smaller children and one for bigger children and a fountain. There were 
lots of pretty wooden things to play on • a roundabout, a slide, little houses. Lots 
of children used to play there. Parents used to go there too. We could sit there on 
the benches and read a bit while the children played. It was very interesting 
there. Now it's been ruined. People don't go there any more. People who live 
nearby sometimes sit on the benches, but it's nothing like the crowds that used to 
go there. Before we used to gather and go there. The children used to ask to go 
there .... When the playground was built it was some kind of sensation for the 
settlement. 
Thus, the playground provided a valuable meeting place in the village and 
generated a lot of local excitement. Having attractive things such as a fountain in 
the village seemed to contribute significantly to local pride. What the quote also 
illustrates, of course, is that such achievements can be destroyed. Indeed, the sad 
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story of the playground could almost be a metaphor to describe the fate of 
Vishnovka itself during the reform period: local institutions have been 'ruined'; 
people no longer go to local meeting places; the excitement generated by past 
achievements has waned. Vishnovka was, of course, far from perfect in the 
communist period, but life in the settlement did have some positive features. It is 
precisely these features that local people feel have been destroyed by reform. 
'There's no joy any more': The experience of reform in Vishnovka 
'We don't live in hope of the future, but in fear of the future. We live from day 
to day and look at tomorrow with fear .... We don't sing any more because there's 
no joy any more .... The worst thing about present day life is that there's no 
hope'. (Worker, /ampovaya October 1994). 
This was a typical comment of a worker from Taldym asked to comment on how 
life had changed during the reform period. People say that they feel insecure, 
fearful and despondent. Of course, in posing questions about change, there is a 
danger that people will romanticise the past and feel overwhelmed by the 
problems of the present. The past is over and done with, so previous insecurity is 
likely to seem less pressing than present fears. And, obviously enough, people 
were always younger in the past. Even the consistency of complaints is not 
necessarily an indication of their veracity: the existence of collective nostalgia for 
a mythical golden age cannot be excluded. So any attempt to disentangle romance 
and reality in accounts of change must be cautious and depend on corroboration of 
oral evidence from other sources. The following section looks at the way in which 
life has changed in the settlement, in order to give a sense of the context in which 
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the research was carried out, as well as a general indication of what 'reform' 
means for ordinary people. 
Leaving aside the above caveats, what do Vishnovka's workers say about the 
effect of reform on their lives? The worker quoted above claimed that life had 
decidedly changed for the worst: people were now 'imprisoned in their own 
homes'; the country had descended into lawlessness; workers were forced to 
economise and buy only the basics; their savings have been destroyed by inflation 
and they were afraid of the mine closing. (This was despite the fact that she 
personally felt happier than ever before. She was now married to her third husband 
who was, she claimed, incomparably kinder than her previous partners.) Her 
account was almost universally endorsed: other portrayals differed only in their 
emphasis. The worker's immediate boss in the lampovaya, for example, assented 
vigorously to this catalogue of woe but in her account of the general degeneration 
she assigned a special explanatory role to the violent American films which were 
now broadcast on television and available on video. On different occasions she 
frequently returned to this theme; she couldn't understand why the government 
was allowing such pro-violence 'propaganda'. Others placed special emphasis on 
the fact that, with the establishment of the kiosks, it was now possible to buy 
vodka at any time of the day or night. The sense of disorientation is summed up by 
the Russian word that has become the favourite exclamation of the transition 
period, bespridel: no limits. The following section will attempt to separate out the 
various anxieties which make up this general sense of gloom and consider how far 
these are a response to real developments and threats to the community. 
118 
At the most general level, the inhabitants of Vishnovka are anxious that their 
previously close-knit community is breaking down. People are said to have 
become closed or reserved (zamknutye), and social life more restricted. 'Now 
everyone is enclosed in their own fortress' was how one woman worker put it. 
This was in stark contrast to the memory of a rich cornmunallife of the past: 
We all used to gather, someone would play an accordion, someone a balalaika 
and we would sing and dance, young and old people together. People were 
closer to each other then. We all gathered. Families and streets used to gather. 
We celebrated holidays together. Problems didn't exist. Neighbours helped each 
other. It was a good time. 
The same was true at work: 
Eight or nine years ago the collective was different; we were more organised. 
We socialised together, celebrated holidays and birthdays together. We even 
went to the circus together. Not now. People have become closed and 
aggressive. Before, if one of us had a baby we would all go along and see it. We 
would help out, if necessary. We went along if someone died. 
Such opinions were widely expressed. Many workers, for example, said that they 
had previously made regular trips to the cinema at DK Progress, but now they 
stayed at home to watch videos instead. Holidays, it was generally felt, 'were not 
the same any more'. Such comments obviously contain an element of nostalgia 
and are not necessarily based on an accurate memory of the social world of the 
past. But such a weakening of communal ties would be consistent with other 
trends occurring in the village. 
First, economic developments provide a possible basis for such a waning of 
community spirit. Mineworkers in Vishnovka have never been rich, but what 
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characterised their position before was a strong sense of security. The high level of 
saving necessitated by the shortages of the Brezhnev era meant that workers felt 
protected in the case of a rainy day. More importantly, once an individual had 
secured a position at the mine she would not be dismissed, even if she was no 
longer required; in this case she would simply be transferred to another section. 
Moreover, although the social safety net provided by the mine was far from 
adequate - in particular with regard to housing provision - a variety of 
discretionary payments or loans were available to those in need. For example, as 
well as giving soft loans and grants to those who wanted to build their own house 
in the private sector the mine would also guarantee the loans of its workers who 
needed to buy furniture from local suppliers. Such grants and loans allowed young 
couples set up home without being weighed down by financial worries. In short, 
the mine was the universal guarantor: it was an (extremely generous) mortgage 
company; a guarantor of its workers' loans and even an insurance company -
workers whose wooden houses burnt down were entitled, on the basis of a clause 
in the collective agreement, to compensation adequate to cover the cost of 
reconstruction. 
Now, although wages are not significantly lower than they were in the past, the 
mine can no longer provide the same kind of social safety net, while savings have 
been destroyed by inflation. A general sense of crisis has been created by the fact 
that workers are now habitually paid late. At Taldym they have until recently been 
paid only one month late on average, which is a good deal less tardy than at other 
less successful mines, but at times the arrears have been greater than this. In 
August 1996 wages had not been paid for three months and although management 
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was planning to pay May's wages in two instalments in September, the director 
did not anticipate being able to eliminate the backlog in the immediate future. 
Although workers are able physically to survive when wages are paid late, this 
requires planning and hard work. Meanwhile, holiday and sick pay are no longer 
paid automatically. In the summer of 1996, for example, workers wanting to take 
leave were requested to sign a document saying that they had agreed to do so in 
the knowledge that they would not receive their holiday pay in advance. In such 
situations, the mine trade union and the administration are unable to give concrete 
information: their answer to the inquiries of disgruntled workers is that they will 
be paid 'when Moscow sends the money'. That the payment of wages is revealed 
so starkly to be contingent on the whims of 'Moscow' obviously detracts from 
workers' sense of social protection. Insecurity also is exacerbated by fears of staff 
reductions: the assurances of management that they are going to try to avoid 
redundancies only alert workers to the fact that they are being considered as an 
option. Meanwhile, soft loans and grants are no longer easily attainable from the 
mine; employment at the mine no longer guarantees credit elsewhere, and the 
'insurance' offered by the collective agreement has been rendered meaningless by 
inflation. 
The cumulative result of all these developments is to make people feel 
dramatically less secure. It does seem that this has had some impact on the social 
life of the village. In the past, minimal economic differentiation and a strong sense 
of economic security formed the basis of a culture of open-handedness in which 
people shared what they had without anxiety as to what tomorrow would bring. 
This culture still exists, but it appears to be being eroded at the edges. A worker 
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from the open cast mine, for instance, in an attempt to substantiate his claim that 
'life was more cheerful [in the past], people smiled more' gave the following 
example. Previously, if you asked someone for a cigarette in the street, they would 
give you three or four. The next day you would do the same for them. Now, it had 
become 'somehow shameful' to ask for a cigarette in the street. He did not provide 
any explanation of why he felt that was the case. But it seems likely that this 
results from the fact that financial worries have become that bit more serious. In 
the past, if someone asked for a cigarette, it was assumed that it was merely 
because they had not had the opportunity to buy any, and at some point they 
would return the favour. Now it is 'somehow shameful' to ask for a cigarette, 
because the request might actually be an expression of genuine need. So whereas 
giving in the past could be relied on to be more or less reciprocal, now the 
prospect is arising of some people being perennially, or at least periodically, more 
needy and less able to give: something which has the potential to disrupt old 
support networks, rather than strengthen them. This provides some explanation for 
the widespread perception that people have become zamknutye (closed). At least 
part of the reaction to present insecurity has been for families to look inwards, 
grow more vegetables, and generally ensure that they are as protected as 
'bl 12 POSSl e. 
I2Some mineworkers reported that wage delays had also led to increasing strain within families. 
Whereas in the past those who lent money to relatives were relatively unconcerned about how long 
it would take for them to be paid back, this is becoming more of an issue in a period of inflation. 
Wage delays mean that workers are increasingly required to borrow money, in particular from 
parents in receipt of pensions, but lending now costs something if the money is not paid back 
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Another feature of the transition period which would account for a decline in 
community spirit is fear. Vishnovka is a small settlement where people tend to 
know each other, and yet they are terrified of going out on the streets after dark. 
This fear seems to be a major factor in explaining people's retreat into their own 
fortresses. This, for example, is the comment of a women worker from the 
zaryadnoe on the effect of fear on her social life: 
I used to go to the cinema. I used to hurry off to see films. Now I have calmed 
down. I don't go now. 
Why not? 
On Friday someone was killed. He was kicked to death at 8.00 in the evening. It 
is very dangerous to go out, especially in autumn. There's no snow yet, so it's 
the darkest time of year. Previously the streets of the private sector had street 
lights. Then they took them down. Electricity is expensive and none of the local 
enterprises want to pay for it. 
When did they stop lighting the streets? 
I'm not sure. In about 1985 when Gorbachev came to power, I think. Now we 
have to light our own house fronts. We have to light the door number until 11.00 
at night and if we don't we have to pay a fine. This gives off some kind of light 
onto the streets. 
The young have become aggressive. It is a result of the fact that there is no 
programme to give them training and then a job any more. It means that they 
have to ask their parents even for 500 roubles for a packet of cigarettes. They 
need money to go out with their friends. And so they begin to steal and so on. 
relatively quickly. The fact that generosity is a cultural imperative in Russia only increases the 
tension surrounding these issues. 
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Another worker, from the all female collective of the /ampovaya, described the 
same feeling although attributed it to a different cause: 
Before, J was not scared. We would go out at any time of night. Now at 7.00 in 
the evening when work is finished I feel nervous coming home if I have been 
paid ... J am scared. Perhaps we have made ourselves scared. But I won't go out 
late now, I'm better sitting at home, unless I'm with Volodya [her husband] ... 
Why have people suddenly become so scared? 
I don't know. Before the police [militsiya] were effective. There was more order. 
Now there is a Mafia, which this settlement has never known before. They have 
automatic guns - this was unheard of before. The children's cafe, near the 
school, burnt down, or was set on fire. Have you seen it? It was about two weeks 
ago. It was nice, you could eat ice cream there. It was very pretty - wooden and 
decorated inside .... We used to go there with the children. Adults used to go 
there too, because we didn't have anywhere else. Our settlement is small. No 
one knows why and how it burnt down. Perhaps it was to do with the 
kommersanty [traders] who supplied the chocolate and soft drinks there. I don't 
know .... We don't know if they will rebuild it. But it's in the centre of the village 
and it will look bad if there's an empty space there. 
It may well be the case that a comparatively small increase in the incidence of 
crime has had a disproportionate impact on the Vishnovkan psyche. The new fear 
could be in part an expression of shock at the emergence of crime as a problem in 
a society which, in the pre-Gorbachev era, was remarkably safe. But it is also a 
response to real changes. The lanes of the private sector, for example, have been 
deprived of street lights, although not because of the price of electricity. The lights 
themselves have gradually fallen into disrepair and the settlement council says that 
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it has no budget to repair them - previously responsibility for capital repair was 
shared between the local enterprises. 
Similarly, the position of young people really is changing. Officially, the mine is 
not taking on any new staff, and so the prospects of young people have become far 
less certain. In practice, the training of new staff has not ceased completely, and 
anxious parents who are long-standing and loyal employees of the mine usually 
manage to persuade management to squeeze their offspring in somewhere.13 
Nevertheless, there are ominous signs that a 'lost generation' is in the making. 
First, the neo-liberals who still hold sway over economic policy are candid about 
their plans for youth recruitment into the labour market. The 1994 World Bank 
report on 'Restructuring the Coal Industry' simply suggested that all recruitment 
of new workers to the coal industry should cease immediately. It was silent on the 
question of youth training and the fate of the generations thus condemned to a life 
without work. (Although the broad prescription of the report is migration away 
from mining regions - in a country with a chronic housing shortage and no 
housing market.) In nearby Osinniki, which is larger and the mines less successful, 
the results of this policy are already visible. Young people roam the streets, 
looking like Bolshevik commissars of the 1920s with their peak caps, leather 
13The worker who complained about the lack ofa youth training programme initially had problems 
finding a position for her son at the mine. But eventually the problem was resolved by a visit to the 
director: 'He (the director) said that he would take him, but as an unpaid worker - a dub/er. In the 
end he changed his mind and agreed to pay him. But in general he doesn't want to take on 
youngsters when he can take on experienced workers from Kapital'naya or Shustalepskaya' (local, 
less successful mines). 
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jackets and tough demeanour. The locals refer to them as 'the Mafia'. Although, 
there is no such threatening presence on the streets of Vishnovka, the older 
generations' attitude to young people is changing. Whereas before 'we would sing 
and dance, young and old people together', now young people are seen as an alien, 
hostile group; something to be feared. This, for example, was a comment made in 
a group interview of development workers (prokhodchiki), who, along with the 
face workers, are regarded as having the toughest and most prestigious profession 
in the area: 
Sometimes the buses just don't come: imagine a miner who Jives in Kaltan or 
Osinniki; he finishes the evening shift and there is no transport to get him home. 
Sometimes miners have to walk home. After the second shift, the miners who 
live in Kaltan don't get home until 2.00 in the morning. Those who live in 
Osinniki don't get home until 3.00. It's scary with these bandits and young 
people roaming the streets. They can attack a miner on his way home. 
Of course, the usual distinctions apply: the problem is not seen to lie with the 
older generations' own family or any young people whom they actually know, but 
with the 'alien' youths who inhabit the streets. Nevertheless, it is the creation of 
precisely this sense of separation that is causing the fear. A certain portion of 
young people are no longer being integrated into Vishnovka's moral universe of 
the labour collective and so they become outsiders and strangers: not 'that lad who 
works in the transport shop' but one of those 'bandits and young people roaming 
the streets'. 
As for the 'Mafia' mentioned by the /ampovaya worker quoted above, the 
emergence of criminal gangs, protection rackets and various kinds of unregulated 
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trading has been a major feature of the transition period.14 The public distaste for 
market traders and kiosk owners means that the label 'Mafia' is applied rather 
indiscriminately, but that protection rackets are rife is not open to serious 
challenge. Throughout Russia enterprise directors who fall foul of the local gangs 
are at risk: the director of one of the South Kuzbass coal enrichment plants was 
murdered in 1994, for example. The militsiya, meanwhile, is generally believed to 
be incapable of tackling the current crime wave. In the communist era the militsiya 
were very much the poor cousins of the KGB and army. The latter two forces kept 
society under control, and the militsiya was never required to deal with major 
problems of law enforcement. When interviewed, the head of Vishnovka 
settlement administration was candid about the problems. His comments gave 
some indication of why the local population have such a lack of confidence in 
their local police: 
There is a 1 % local tax to pay for the militsiya. But again, the money is sent to 
Osinniki and we never see it again. In 1992 we managed to buy them a car -
before that they didn't have a car. They don't even have a garage. We have no 
money. The telephones don't even work properly. The militsiya is not a 
prestigious profession. That's part of the problem. 
The only real capability of the police seemed to be - as elsewhere in Russia - in 
the sphere of road traffic offences, where the imposition of fines provides a useful 
14Jt is estimated that three quarters of commercial banks are paying substantial sums in protection 
money to organised crime, equivalent to half their profits. The murder rate in Moscow is ten times 
higher than that in the most violent Western European city and as high a murder rate as in New 
York. (The Guardian 29 April 1994. quoted in Rose, 1994.) 
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supplement to police officers' income. Given such problems, it is hardly 
surprising that feelings of insecurity have increased dramatically after the 
breakdown of communist control structures. And this, as can be seen in the quotes 
above, has a major influence on the social life of the Village. People stop going out 
and scarce local meeting places are destroyed. IS 
Local government 
In addition to this, local services which are part of the sotskul'tbyt complexes of 
the local enterprises face an uncertain future. According to the 1994 Privatisation 
Law, sotskul'tbyt is supposed to be handed over to the local authorities and many 
mines have now abandoned their social facilities. Taldym had not yet done so in 
August 1996, but both the trade union and the mine administration expected that 
two of the three mine kindergartens would be given over to the local authority 
before the end of the year. It was unclear whether either of the facilities would 
remain open after being transferred: the women who worked at them had been told 
that there was a chance their establishments would remain open, although at the 
same time members of the trade union committee were talking about renting out 
the building of one of them to be used as a telephone exchange. The threat to the 
kindergartens constitutes a real threat to the quality of life in Vishnovka. Quite 
apart from the fact that they facilitate the high labour participation of women, 
ISThe sight of burnt out cafes and restaurants is becoming a familiar one in the 'New Russia'. 
Business people who refuse to acquire 'a roor (protection) are particularly at risk, although 
'protected' premises can also become targets in conflicts over spheres of influence. 
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since children go to school at the age of seven, the first years of schooling also 
take place at the kindergartens. Moreover, a great deal of effort has gone into 
building up these institutions - from the tender care of the enthusiastic keeper of 
the 'botanical garden' at one of the kindergartens to the pride of the cooks in the 
high quality of the canteen food at the same establishment'6 - and the possible 
destruction of all this is a very demoralising prospect. Meanwhile, the mine's 
'pioneer camp' - a vital resource which used to liberate parents from their children 
for part of the growing season - has also been closed because the other mines 
which shared the expense of it were no longer able to bear their costs. 
Another disruptive development in the sphere of local service provision is the 
privatisation of the utilities. Each utility has now been constituted as a 
shareholders' society (aktsionernoe obshestvo, hereafter AO) which means that 
local government has lost its control over the provision of local services. Prices 
have increased and the provision has become patchy. Whereas under communism, 
for example, flat tenants could rely on a constant supply of hot water and heating 
in winter, now hot water is rationed and in Vishnovka is simply switched off in 
certain areas for a few hours or days. This is one of the results of the huge chain of 
inter-enterprise debt that plagues the Russian economy. Under financial pressure 
l6'fhe quality of stolovaya (canteen) food in Russia is generally abysmal. This is partly due to the 
poor quality supplies, but it also seems that workers in this extremely low-status profession are 
able to give graphic expression to their alienation in the form of their culinary creations. The high 
quality of the food at the mine's best kindergarten is therefore a tribute to the sense of common 
endeavour and pride that prevails in this particular labour collective. 
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the utilities will periodically simply cease supply. While in the past the 
management of such services would be accountable to the Party, now they are 
unaccountable. As Vishnovka's head of administration complained: 
We are used to communism. Previously people could go and complain to the 
gorkom [the town Party committee] if something wasn't done. Now we, as the 
municipal authority, don't have anything like the same power. All the services -
water, energy and so on • they are all ADs. We don't have any control over 
them. For example, people complain that the heating authorities don't provide 
them with hot water but demand payment anyway. I can't do anything about 
this. I have no rights vis a vis an AD. Water, the heating service, the repair 
service· they are all ADs. It is the same all over Russia. Trying to sort things out 
with the directors of the communal services is very difficult. There is some talk 
ofthese services being returned to the control of the municipality. 
People come here to me to swear when things go wrong, but there's nothing I 
can do about it. As they say 'God is a long way up ... ' 
Similarly, as mentioned above, in the past a variety of local services, such as street 
lighting, road building and maintenance were delegated to local enterprises. Now 
the enterprises, which themselves are under severe financial pressure, claim that 
they are no longer able to maintain the local fabric. Instead, they pay a local tax, 
but the head of Vishnovka's local administration claims that the portion of this 
that they receive is not enough to cover the cost of local services previously 
provided by the enterprises: 
When the Communist Party existed we divided up things between enterprises. 
you look after the street lighting, you mend the roads and so on. If the director of 
an enterprise didn't comply he was sacked from the Communist Party. Now we 
get our money from taxes. The enterprises pay taxes but we don't receive them 
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directly. We get our money in the form of a grant from OsinnikL17 In terms of 
production we don't look bad on a national level. We make money. But in our 
local budget we have hardly any money. Now we have problems. The 
enterprises pay their taxes and we still have to ask them for help. Sometimes 
they help, but not always. They are all AOs now ... 
In the past there was the stupid subbotnik [unpaid working Saturday]. Yes, I 
agree it was stupid, but it did mean that someone cleared up the dirt once in a 
while. Now no one does it. I'm not a supporter of the CPSU [Communist Party], 
but things aren't good now. 
The demise of the Communist Party has removed a central component from the 
old system and a new administrative coherence and modus vivendi is a long time 
coming. Meanwhile, the economic climate is hardly favourable. With a squeeze on 
public finance and practically all Russia's enterprises facing major problems as 
the government attempts to goad them towards real economic independence, 
Vishnovka's local administration will no doubt face major problems for some time 
to come. 
17This head of administration had plans for Vishnovka to declare its administrative independence 
from Osinniki, and to unite with the more prosperous local town of Kaltan. But the plan for 
independence was dropped after the head of administration in Osinniki, formerly a teacher at the 
Vishnovka music school and a client of the head of ob/ast' administration, Kislyuk, secured the 
appointment of a more conducive administrator in Vishnovka in 1995. 
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Political reforms 
What of new-found freedom and democracy? Most citizens of Vishnovka have not 
noticed a significant amount of improvement. Indeed, if anything the political 
system which confronts Vishnovka's citizens has become, in their view, even 
more opaque and unaccountable. A constant lament is that in the past people 
'knew where to complain', whereas now there is no one to appeal to. In the past, 
the party to some extent acted as a trouble shooter and intervened to prevent local 
tensions exploding into any kind of political conflict. For example, the Party and 
KGB intervened quickly in the case of strikes or other disturbances, often granting 
concessions and sacking the enterprise managers or local bureaucrats deemed to 
be responsible for the problem (Connor, 1991: 222).18 One worker from one of the 
transport shops at Taldym mine gave an example of the Party playing just such a 
18 An example of this occurred at a mine construction enterprise in Osinniki in February 1958. A 
strike was staged after the failure of the bus to arrive at the end of a shift obliged workers, in 
temperatures of minus forty degrees, to walk two kilometers back to the pithead. They arrived to 
find there was neither water nor heating in the changing rooms. Some time after the strike, the 
First Deputy Minister for Coal of the USSR responsible for mine construction arrived together 
with the secretaries of the Regional and City Party Committee, the head of the regional mine 
construction organisation, and KGB officers. The workers had to be coaxed to give their account 
of events, for fear of repression, and finally one older worker took responsibility for speaking. 
After what he heard, the Minister instructed the director to go to work as an ordinary miner, so that 
he might learn what it felt like. When he turned up to work, however, he was driven out by the 
other miners. He gradually clawed his way back into management elsewhere (Clarke et al., 1995: 
72). 
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positive role in his life. When he was young he lived in a communal hostel with 
his wife, accommodation provided by the motor depot where he worked as a 
driver. Six families shared the same kitchen and bathroom, among whom, he 
claimed, were 'loose women' and other undesirable types. One of his neighbours 
wrote a letter to Pravda complaining about workers' living conditions. The letter 
was published and an order came down from the Party to investigate. Within a 
week, someone from the Party came round to see the conditions he was living in 
and was deeply shocked, in particular by the state of the bathroom. The motor 
depot was compelled to do something about it and he was quickly given a one-
roomed flat. This worker's conclusion was precisely that in the past it was 
possible to complain to the Party and attain some improvement, whereas now such 
a possibility no longer existed. 19 Paradoxically, therefore, Vishnovka's citizens 
feel more powerless than they ever did. 
)9Such stories are very common. This, for example, was the comment of a worker from 
Erunakovskii Open Cast Mine who lives in Novokuznetsk: 'Before people could have an influence 
on decisions at a local level. For example, my mum lives in a Village. Under Brezhnev, they got up 
a petition for a bus to run between the village and Novokuznetsk. They got their bus. Now this 
would be absolutely impossible .... There's no accountability now. None. Before it was possible to 
complain. You could write letters and officials were afraid of getting too many complaints. Since 
Gorbachev came to power it's just got worse and worse'. A woman worker from Taldym gave a 
similar example: 'There was a case once when I was on a flight from Moscow to Novokuznetsk. 
Well, the plane landed at Novosibirsk and they said, "you can't go any further· we haven't got 
any more fuel· you'll have to make your own arrangements from here". Well, all the passengers 
got together. It was at the weekend. We wrote a telegram to the Central Committee of the Party 
and took it to the manager of the airport. Of course, he didn't send it to the Central Committee, but 
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This is not to say that the Communist Party was a benign force which protected 
workers against incompetent bureaucrats. But, unless they became involved in a 
strike or some other kind of protest, workers were unlikely to fall foul of the 
communist authorities. And because of its rhetorical commitment to the working 
class, the Party did find it necessary to intervene occasionally to remedy gross 
abuses. Certainly, it did not do so with the purest of motives. The occasional very 
public intervention to sort out a particular problem was good for its image: the 
workers of Vishnovka still remember such interventions. Timely action by the 
Party was also an important means of preventing rumbling discontent from turning 
into anything more menacing. 
Such mechanisms now simply do not exist. The Party has gone, but local 
democracy is non-existent: the head of the settlement's administration, like the 
head of oblast' administration, is an appointed official over whom local citizens 
have no control. They have no means of influencing local politics other than 
through organised protest, and even when this occurs it is often not reported by the 
local media. For example, in August 1996 the area was awash with a rumour that 
the head of administration in nearby Osinniki had been arrested at Novosibirsk 
airport with a suitcase full of money. Pensioners, who had not received their 
pensions for three months, held a demonstration outside his office, threatening to 
he sent it to the gorkom, and they found us a plane double quick and got us to Novokuznetsk. 
Because they knew that if that telegram got sent they'd be punished and punished hard. The Party 
didn't forgive things like that. Now there's no one to whom to complain. No one needs anything 
any more.' 
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string him up for, as they saw it, making off with their money. The town television 
station mentioned neither the rumour nor the demonstration, and eventually the 
said head of administration reappeared, without making any comment on the 
allegations. Whether they had any foundation or not, the incident illustrates the 
striking lack of glasnost' which characterises local politics. 
Although the arrival of some kind of democracy is more visible on the national 
stage, it is not universally viewed as an advance. Many workers are sickened by 
what they see as the venality of government officials and Duma deputies and are 
deeply disillusioned with President Yeltsin, who is often alleged to be 'just a big 
Mafia boss'. Although Yeltsin gained a majority in the second round of voting in 
the 1996 presidential election in Vishnovka, there are very few workers ready to 
say a good word about him: Lebed appears to be the most popular politician 
locally.20 Disillusionment with politicians and all brands of verkhushki (bosses) is 
strong, especially since political corruption is a good deal more visible in the post-
Communist era. The general opinion is that once politicians get their snouts into 
the kormushka (feeding trough) they forget all about the problems of ordinary 
people: a trend epitomised by the career of the un-elected Head of Administration 
in the Kuzbass, Mikhail Kislyuk. Having been Deputy President of the Regional 
Council of Workers' Committees, he is now seen to have well and truly deserted 
20nte trade union president and the mine director claimed that the election results which gave 
Yeltsin a majority in Vishnovka had been falsified, although they had no evidence of this other 
than the fact that they didn't know anyone who had voted for Yeltsin. I also encountered very few 
people who were prepared to admit that they had voted for Yeltsin. 
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the miners. His bland assertions that all was well with the coal industry in 1994 
have caused such anger that the mere mention of his name among workers at 
Taldym is enough to elicit the worst of Russian curses. Disillusionment is also 
born out of a strong sense that the government is not doing 'anything concrete' 
about the problems which are afflicting the country. Any satisfaction that workers 
derive from the fact that they are now able to vote for their political leaders is thus 
seriously compromised by the disappointment in the results of the policies 
implemented by the first democratically elected President and parliament, as well 
as disgust at the conduct of the verkhushki. 
Despite such disillusionment, the communist political system is not completely 
romanticised. Many workers do recognise that there was political repression in the 
past: indeed a high proportion of them are drawn from families who arrived in 
Siberia after being 'dekulakised'. But repression did not particularly affect 
workers who lived in the post-Stalin generation. The following extract from an 
interview. with a female worker in her 50s from the /ampovaya at Taldym. is a 
typical response to question about past repression: 
Was there any kind o/political repression in the past? 
Perhaps the older generation felt it. But I didn't feel anything. 
Could you say what you wanted? 
No. Now we can. We can speak more easily. But among the narod [people] 
repression didn't really exist. 
Well, what sort o/things couldn't you say? 
I don't know what I couldn't say. What could we say? We live in the back of 
beyond. 
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One of her colleagues expressed precisely the same sentiment when she said, 
'people weren't scared. They bought their bread and sausage, went to the cinema, 
and that was all.' Thus, workers had a vague consciousness of limits, but also a 
strong sense that they - ordinary workers from the back of beyond - were not 
particular objects of the regime's gaze. Although this speaker could not pin down 
the nature of past restrictions, however, one clear prohibition of the past was on 
strikes. As mentioned in Chapter One, as late as 1989 the miners who launched the 
first major industry-wide strike in the USSR's history, were aware of what had 
happened at Novocherkassk21 in 1962, and were afraid that force might be used 
against them. Nevertheless, given that ordinary workers in most circumstances 
were not particularly conscious of political restrictions, the lifting of these is not 
seen as much of a compensation for the problems of the reform era. The following 
comment of a thoughtful fitter again from the /ampovaya, whose grandparents had 
ended up in Siberia after being dekulakised, neatly captures this feeling: 
For people who work in TV, who write articles and that sort of thing life has of 
course got better. They can write what they like now. They are freer. But for me, 
for simple workers, life has got worse. Politics never touched us ... I know that 
people were in prison, I know it wasn't right. But I knew what to cook then. 
Now we can't buy any extras. 
So although among more thoughtful workers there is an understanding that the 
end of communism is bringing an end to a particular form of injustice, this does 
not cancel out the fact that the passing of state socialism has also meant for them a 
21For accounts of this strike, which ended with the army firing on protesters killing at least 70-80 
of them, see Haynes and Semyonova, 1979: 73 - 81. 
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loss of certainty which is hard to bear. Indeed, many argue that lifting of the 
controls of the communist era have simply unleashed a Hobbesian nightmare, a 
degeneration into a society of robber barons in which only those who can afford 
protection are safe. A forewoman from the kotel 'naya gave eloquent expression to 
this feeling: 
Perestroika was supposed to allow us to speak the truth to people's faces - try 
that now and they'll send you further away than the communists ever did, and 
that's if they don't just shoot you on the spot. Now we live without laws. You 
can't go to the militsiya: unless you're rich, you won't get anywhere. A friend of 
mine got burgled and went to them and they said 'So, what do you want? Look 
for them yourself. 
Thus, political change has done little to compensate for the economic hardship 
imposed by transition. This is not least because the 'democrats' have removed 
accountability to the Party, which constituted an albeit imperfect check on those in 
positions in power in the past, but have signally failed to institute either a 'law-
governed state' or democratic accountability at a local level. 
A community under threat 
The pervasive sense of insecurity and loss of community in Vishnovka therefore 
cannot be reduced to collective nostalgia for a mythical golden age. It has a real 
basis. It is partly attributable to the fact that the communist structures have broken 
down and new and workable structures have yet to emerge in their place. In case 
of local service provision, for example, utilities have been privatised, but are not 
subject to proper regulation, whilst sotskul'tbyt is under threat. Enterprises are no 
local obliged to carry out capital repair programmes on local infrastructure, but no 
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one else has the money to do it. The home building programme has been frozen. 
The KGB no longer breathes down the back of erring citizens (or at least has lost 
interest in 'economic' crimes), but the mililsiya is unable to stem the tide of 
lawlessness. 'Democracy' has been a huge disappointment. 
Above all, the uncertainty of the workers of Vishnovka reflects the uncertain 
position of the mine, which is the centre of the community. The mine no longer 
pays wages on time; it can no longer guarantee workers' loans; it is gradually 
ceasing to take on new workers; the threat of redundancy hangs in the air, while 
the future plans for the coal industry remain shrouded in secrecy. The mining 
industry is facing a long term demoralising crisis and so, by implication, is 
Vishnovka. Although the precise causes of the crisis may not be fully understood, 
workers in Vishnovka are increasingly aware that their community is under threat. 
This, for example, was the comment of one of the miners in the group interview 
quoted above: 
The government wants to shut all the mines. Can you imagine, in a place like 
this. Where will the people go? How will we live? There is no other work here. I 
don't know, there is some kind of struggle for power going on at the top. 
In the Far East they are all freezing. They can't import coal from Siberia because 
of the mad railway tariffs. They have begun to buy coal from China. You think 
that this doesn't get to us? It gets to us all right.22 The government isn't doing 
anything concrete. No one needs us up here. 
22The Russian used here was 'Chto, nam ne obidno? Obidno'; a powerful rhetorical question and 
answer conveying an intense feeling of injustice and pain, which is difficult to convey in English. 
The variant used above is not a literal translation. 
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These fears are by no means misplaced: although the World Bank has retreated 
somewhat from its ambitious plan of reducing employment in the Kuzbass coal 
industry by 70-75% before 1997 (The World Bank, 1994: 44), the Russian 
government, in its efforts to balance the budget, is itself detennined to cut the 
mining subsidy. Indeed, the World Bank is now reputed to be worried by the fact 
that the government has begun closing mines in the absence of any kind of social 
programme. 
The threat to their industry is a galling for mineworkers. There is an inevitable 
sense of rejection and frustration that coal production, which was previously 
deemed so crucial for the national interest that health and safety standards, social 
amenities and workers' living standards were all sacrificed to it, is now revealed to 
be somehow dispensable. What this induces, above all, is nihilism. The workers of 
Vishnovka are simply tired of what they see as meaningless sacrifices and are 
sickened by the idea of yet more unpleasant, supposedly beneficial medicine. The 
story of one fitter at Taldym neatly sums up this mood. His father had been a 
simple miner, an a/kash. He had drunk 'to get rid of his bitterness', but his 
generation had also made sacrifices in the hope that their children would live to 
see a happy future. They had not. 'So', the fitter concluded, 'when Mikhail 
Sergeevich [Gorbachev] said that we should all work hard so that our children 
would have a happy future, it was all I could do to stop myself kicking the 
television in'. 
But, however despairing they may feel at times, the workers of Vishnovka have a 
strong survival instinct: as they are fond of saying, 'hope is the last thing to die'. 
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So, in spite of themselves, they end up, as previous generations have done, 
working extremely hard in the attempt to secure some kind of future for 
themselves and their children. The following chapters will look in detail at how 
they are responding to transition both collectively and individually and consider 
the impact of their activity on the politics of the trade union, the enterprise, and, 
ultimately, the nation as a whole. They will also consider how the trade union has 
been affected by the changing environment described above, and how it is 
responding to its new situation. The last of these questions will be dealt with first, 
after a description of the mine and its history during the reform era. 
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Chapter Four: Taldym 
This chapter describes the structure and organisation of the mine, focusing on the 
institutional changes resulting from privatisation. Privatisation has defined the 
political context in which workers operate at the mine, and the analysis of its 
impact provided in this chapter is a crucial introduction to the arguments 
developed in later chapters. The main argument developed here is that 
privatisation itselfhas not been a driving force of change at the mine: privatisation 
to the labour collective has neither promoted restructuring, nor instituted any form 
of 'workers' control' at the mine. It has, however, resulted in changes in the form 
of politics at the mine and helped to stabilise a particular balance of power 
between workers and managers. 
Taldym currently employs 3,000 workers, and is one of the largest and most 
successful mines in the South Kuzbass Coal Concern, Kuznetskugol'. It has large 
coal reserves and enjoys good geological conditions. The construction of the mine 
began in October 1955, after a 1944 survey discovered large reserves of coking 
coal.) In February 1956 the first mine development workers arrived in Vishnovka, 
and Party, trade union and Komsomol organisations were established. At this 
stage the Party organisation had just five members (Dolzhenok and Sal'nikov, 
1982: 17). As already mentioned, the mine, then known as Vishnovskaya, 
produced its first tonne of coal on 1 March 1957, which is the official birthday of 
lA geological survey in 1856 had found no coal deposits. The more precise 1944 survey found 19 
seams, several of which were over 12 meters high (Dolzhenok and Sal'nikov, 1982: IS). 
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the mine. In 1960, the construction of a second mine, Taldymskaya, began nearby 
_ this is now the site of the main production activity at Taldym. Then in 1970 the 
two mines united to form Taldymskaya mine. In November 1991 the mine 
privatised to become AD Taldym. 
The mine is one of eighteen mines belonging to the concern Kuznetskugol', which 
was formally established in 1992 on the basis of the old South Kuzbass Production 
Association, Yuzhkuzbassugol'. The concern unites mines from Novokuznetsk, 
Mezhdurechensk and Dsinniki. The main role of the concern is to market the coal 
produced by the mines - although the mines are free to sell the coal directly if they 
wish - and to distribute the subsidies which they receive for the mines from the 
Russian Coal Company, Rosugol', the (privatised) successor to the Coal Ministry. 
The concern also monitors planning and production at the mines, and while it does 
not have recourse to the command-administrative levers which were at the 
disposal of the association in the past, its control of the subsidy gives it a very 
effective means of influencing the policy of mines - especially since so far both 
the concern and Rosugol', in typically post-Soviet style, have ignored the requests 
of mines and trade unions to produce a clear statement of the portion of the 
subsidy destined for individual mines. The element of discretion that this gives the 
concern is used to full effect. Nevertheless, the mines do have independent control 
over their budgets and day-to-day operation. Taldym has more than most because, 
as will be seen below, it opted for a closed form of privatisation, and therefore, in 
contrast to the situation at most other mines in the concern, neither Kuznetskugol' 
nor Rosugol' hold any shares in the mine. Nevertheless, the concern still markets 
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the majority of the mine's coal, monitors the mine's performance, and gives out 
the subsidies on which Taldym, like other mines, depends. 
As the previous chapter indicated, the mine is far more than a unit of production: it 
is a community. As the Russian sociologists Vladimir Ilyin and Marina Ilyina 
have argued, 'The stabilisation of society through compulsory employment and 
minimum payment of the lowest layers of society was one of the leading 
principles of social policy in state monopoly socialist society .... The key role in 
the realisation of this direction of social policy was played by enterprises. It was 
they which provided universal employment ... [as well as] the principal framework 
for the distribution of goods and services' (Ilyin and Ilyina, 1996: 382 - 3). In line 
with such principles, employment policies at the mine were directed towards 
ensuring social stability and integration, rather than efficiency. Thus, the mine 
provided a wide-range of employment possibilities to women, as well as a variety 
of (better paid) skilled and semi-skilled positions for men. Along with producing 
coal it also ran local services. For the moment the mine has not departed from 
such policies, and this is reflected in the balance between underground and surface 
workers in the labour collective. Approximately 1,200 workers are employed in 
coal production or development shops (including explosives and machinery 
installation teams): thus, almost two thirds of the mine's employees work in 
management and administration, auxiliary shops or in sotskut 'tbyt. Seven hundred 
of the mine's workers are women, who work mainly in auxiliary collectives, such 
as that responsible for coal improvement, in routine office jobs, and in 
sotskul'tbyt. 
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The mine is divided into 44 shops, ranging in size from 180 workers to fewer than 
ten; the average shop will contain between 50 and 100 workers. The hierarchy in 
different shops varies somewhat, but generally each shop is managed by a shop 
chief, and below the chief (in order of status) each shop will usually have a deputy 
shop chief, a mechanic and several foremen and women who manage the 
individual 'collectives' within the shop.2 Collectives are then in turn divided into 
brigades, which have either an elected or appointed brigadier. 
Privatisation of the mine 
Taldym was among the first mmes to privatise, beginning the process in 
November 1991. Privatisation was the culmination of the period of workers' 
activism at the mine which began with the 1989 miners' strike. Between the 1989 
and 1991 miners' strikes the strike committee was highly influential at the mine, 
and it played an important role in the privatisation process. The director of the 
mine was also in favour of privatisation, but the form of privatisation owed a great 
deal to the influence of the strike committee. The mine opted for a 'closed' form 
of privatisation in which all shares were held by employees. This distinguishes the 
mine both from other 'pioneers of privatisation' in the coal industry and those 
mines that privatised later. The mine director was not granted a controlling packet 
lAn auxiliary shop will typically be responsible for a range of related processes. For instance, there 
are three mine transport shops all responsible for different parts of the system. The shop is then 
divided into collectives: thus, for example, transport shop number three includes collectives such 
as the coal preparation facility and the collective responsible for the repair of conveyors in the 
mine. 
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of shares to hold 'on behalf of the collective', as occurred at some other 
enterprises,3 and neither were 'outsiders' given the right to obtain shares. 
According to those who were active in the strike movement, the mine was only 
able to secure its unique constitution because it acted quickly: 'We managed it just 
in time ... while the government was still in shock' (after the strikes, the coup, and 
so on). According to managers at the mine, it was members of the strike 
committee who pressed for the 'closed' form of privatisation, and secured a 
constitution which in principle gave worker-shareholders control of the mine's 
destiny: the shareholders' council which was established to represent shareholders 
initially acted as the successor to the strike committee. As one senior manager 
commented: 
Here the initiative came from below. The consequences of the strike urged us 
on. We created an AO. Those who had been active at the time of the strike went 
into the Shareholders' Council. [Then] the workers' interest dwindled. 'We 
elected you - now pay us'. They are not interested in anything except pay. 
This quote captures the history of the period quite well. Privatisation was 
initially seen as a major step forward in the workers' movement. But, as 
will be seen below, it did not have the effect that either workers or 
managers anticipated. 
3For an example of this in the mining industry see Clarke et al., 1994. In the case of the mine 
discussed by Clarke et al., also an early privatiser, the director retained a controlling interest of 
33% of the shares on behalf of the collective, which gave him a veto over the decisions of the 
Enterprise Council. 
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The composition of the AO 
In March 1992, shares in the mine were distributed free of charge, according to 
length of service (one share for every year of service). A ceiling of eighteen shares 
per person was set. No distinction was made between workers and pensioners who 
had previously worked at the mine. Workers who had been at the mine for less 
than a year at the time of privatisation were given the right to pay for shares. All 
the shares, whether paid for or free, count as voting shares. Only mine employees 
have the right to purchase shares. The mine has 3,700 shareholders, approximately 
3,000 of whom are still working at the mine (the number of pensioners is 
obviously gradually growing). 
In formal terms the highest authority of the AO is the Shareholders' Meeting 
which must be convened at least once a year. All shareholders have the right to 
vote at meetings and their votes are weighted according to the number of shares 
they possess. But since, as the clerk of the Shareholders' Council put it, the mine 
does not have a hall big enough to hold all the shareholders, worker shareholders 
elect delegates to represent them at meetings. The number of shareholders a 
delegate represents has varied between five and ten at different meetings. Each 
share counts for one vote and delegates hold a 'mandate' indicating how many 
shares they represent. Questions can be decided by a show of hands unless 
representatives of not less than ten per cent of the shares request a secret ballot. In 
practice, important questions are usually decided by secret ballot. 
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The election of delegates takes place within individual work collectives. Those 
elected tend to be the active and authoritative members of the collective - shop 
trade union presidents and brigadiers are often sent to the meeting as a matter of 
course. In general collectives do not hold discussions prior to the meeting as to 
how their delegate should vote. A trusted member of the collective is expected to 
have an implicit understanding of what 'the lads' or 'the girls' think. Although 
collectives have some interest in hearing the results of meetings, at such 
gatherings, which are generally informal, it is not usual for the delegate to be 
questioned as to how they voted on a given question. 
The Shareholders' Meeting elects both the Shareholders' Council (So vet 
aktsionerov, hereafter SA) and the mine president, who then chooses a 
management team. In addition to this, according to the statutes, only the 
Shareholders' Meeting is competent to : 
• Change the constitution and issued capital; 
• Recall the SA; 
• Recall the president; 
• Elect and recall the audit commission; 
• 'Define the basic direction of the association's activity'; 
• Establish the yearly plan; 
• Distribute profits; 
• Create or liquidate subsidiary (dochernye) enterprises or affiliates; 
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• Reorganise or liquidate the association; 
• Establish the yearly budget. 
(Shakhterskii trud, 4 September 1992: 1). 
In practice, however, the Shareholders' Meeting does not fulfil all of these 
functions. It does elect and dismiss the mine president and the SA: the mine has 
had four presidents since it privatised. It also elects the audit commission, 
although this body has tended to be formally judged satisfactory and re-elected 
every year. It has to decide on changes in the constitution, but in this case worker 
shareholders are very easily 'guided' by the management team. The same is true 
of all the other weighty issues over which the Shareholders' Meeting apparently 
has the right of decision. The character of the Shareholders' Meetings will be 
discussed in later chapters, but here it is sufficient to note that items such as the 
yearly budget are prepared by the relevant manager in advance, and then agreed to 
by the meeting in a formal vote. Occasionally an intelligent and inquiring worker 
might ask a hostile question, but such interventions are not generally welcomed by 
the mass of the participants. 
Extraordinary meetings of shareholders can be convened on the initiative of the 
president of the SA, at the request of the SA, the Audit Commission or by a group 
of shareholders holding between them over ten per cent of the shares. 
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The Shareholders' Council 
According to the statutes of the AO, 'in the periods between general meetings 
(meeting of representatives) the highest organ of the association [obshchestvo] is 
the Shareholders' Council' (Shakhterskii trud, 4 September 1992: 2). 
Its formal duties are: 
• Establishment of the social and economic development plan; 
• Consideration and establishment of the routine budget of the association; 
• Monitoring the work of the administration; 
• Examination of collective disputes and conflicts; 
• Examination of applications to obtain shares; 
• Deciding on the issue of additional stocks or shares; 
• Deciding on the establishment and liquidation of joint ventures and joining and 
leaving enterprise associations (concerns); 
• Approving the candidates for the administration and concluding their contracts; 
• Establishment of the staffing structure in accordance with the pay fund; 
• Defining the mine's future direction. 
The SA has eleven members, only one of whom (the president) is a permanent full 
time official. The rest of the members are occasionally given time off work to 
fulfil their duties in accordance with the needs of the council. 
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Although the SA is formally the 'highest organ' of the AD, on a day-to-day basis 
executive power at the mine is now firmly in the hands of the mine president and 
his team. The clerk to the Council gave a clear assessment of the role of the SA: 
In essence it should be the owner [khozyain). We privatised the mine and elected 
the SA which should run the mine, should conclude contracts and so on. But in 
reality it's not like that. Probably because we have always been used to having 
one boss. Now we are trying to administer things differently, but we don't know 
how. 
So really the president runs the mine? 
Yes, he's responsible for everything. The shareholders' council helps him, but 
he is the khozyain. 
As mentioned above, members of the workers' movement were initially influential 
on the council and at this stage the council did act as a counterweight to the mine 
administration.4 Gradually, however, as the influence of the workers' movement 
dwindled and workers, in the words of a former president of the strike committee, 
'calmed down', the character and composition of the SA changed. From being an 
(albeit imperfect) representative of workers, and a thorn in the side of the director, 
it became just another part of the mine administration. The vast majority of the 
members of the SA are now ITR (engineering-technical workers): in the period 
1995 - 6 only two of its members were workers. 
4The strike committee itself had close links with the Council of the Labour Collective (STK) at the 
mine - many of the leading figures on the strike committee were members of the STK. This 
continuity was not broken by the establishment of the SA: now the formal and actual functions 
(which are two different things) of the SA and those of the former STK are very similar. 
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Its members still claim that their role is the monitoring of the administration on 
behalf of the shareholders: as one of them put it, 'Our basic function is one of 
monitoring [kontrolT. In fact, however, when the SA exerts some kind of check 
on the administration, it now does so in the capacity of a management faction. 
And generally the president of the SA and the mine president have begun to work 
as a team. The mine president who was voted out of office at the end of 1995 
reached an accommodation with his counterpart in the SA, while the present mine 
director has had good relations with the SA president from the outset. The current 
president of the SA was Party secretary at the mine between 1980 - 4, while the 
mine president is a former Communist mayor of Osinniki. The two former 
comrades work closely together: as one worker put it, 'Our SA here is the old 
Party organisation of the mine'. In the partnership between these two presidents, 
however, the president of the SA is definitely the junior partner. 
Thus, worker-shareholders now exert virtually no influence over the work of the 
administration through the SA. Indeed, in common with the trade union, the most 
important function of the SA as far as workers are concerned is the provision of 
financial help. While the shop trade union committees and the trade union give out 
small grants to those in need, the SA is able to provide much larger sums. For 
example, while it was always necessary to bribe Soviet doctors in the past, 
workers could usually afford the sums required, or were able to secure them by 
borrowing from relatives. Now it is formally necessary to pay for hospital care and 
the sums in question are far more significant: an operation can cost several million 
roubles (several times a miners' monthly wage). In addition, many medical 
practitioners still expect a bribe on top of the formal payment. In conditions where 
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workers' savings have been wiped out by economic reform and wages are 
habitually paid late, workers have to rely on the enterprise to help them in such 
circumstances. It is the SA which deals with such requests, providing either grants 
or loans to those in need on a discretionary basis. The 1995 collective agreement 
laid down that workers and pensioners should all receive the same amount -
250,000 roubles - in financial help every year from the SA, although in practice 
the individual requests for aid have continued, and the SA continues to consider 
them. 
The mine president 
The mine president is elected for a two year term, and can be recalled before this 
by a majority vote of the shareholders. (This was reduced from two thirds in July 
1995). To recall a director, a Shareholders' Meeting must first vote to hold an 
election, and then a secret ballot is convened in which all shareholders are entitled 
to vote. So far no president has succeeded in being elected for a second term. 
An in-coming director is entitled to chose his own administration. The 
administration currently consists of ten posts: the chief engineer; the chief 
economist; the chief accountant; the chief mechanic; the deputy director for capital 
works; the deputy production director; the deputy director for development work 
(preparation of coal faces); the deputy director for social questions; the deputy 
marketing director, and the deputy commercial director. In his manifesto the 
current director promised to liquidate the mine commercial service, which no 
longer has a clear role now the foreign barter business has dried up, but so far he 
has not done so. Although every candidate for mine president promises to renew 
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the administration and bring in new, competent people, the mine administration is 
actually becoming more stable. For example, although the current president was 
disdainful about the record of his predecessor, he still chose to keep the same chief 
economist and accountant in his team. 
The president holds executive power at the mine. He (not surprisingly there have 
been no female presidents so far) represents the enterprise to the outside world; 
controls the mine's bank accounts; concludes the collective agreement with the 
trade union and dishes out orders (prikazy) which 'all workers are obliged to 
follow' . He, meanwhile, is obliged to implement the decisions of the 
Shareholders' Meeting; give a monthly report on the mine's financial position to 
the SA; ensure the fulfilment of the production plan (which, in formal terms, is set 
by the Shareholders' Meeting) and 'further the retention of qualified staff by the 
association' (Shakhterskii trud, 4 September 1992: 2). 
The impact of privatisation 
Privatisation was a key plank of the neo-liberal reform package for Russia, as it 
was in the rest of the former Soviet bloc. But was it a significant turning point at 
Taldym? The following sections consider this question by looking in turn at 
managers' and workers' views of privatisation, arguing that it failed to live up to 
the hopes of either group. What these sections also demonstrate is that 
privatisation did not of itself set in train a transformation of the mine: the 
restructuring that has occurred - and this is minimal - has been prompted by other 
elements of the reform programme, most notably the government's attempts to 
control the budget deficit (and hence subsidies). Privatisation was not without 
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consequences, however. It did institutionalise a particular balance of power 
between workers and managers at the mine, defining the confines within which 
management has responded to the challenges of the post-perestroika environment. 
Indeed, the closed form of privatisation, although it can in no sense be said to have 
instituted 'workers' control', has, if anything, acted as a brake on restructuring at 
the mine. 
Managers and privatisation: 'Activating the human factor' 
Managers at the mine had no appetite for the rapid restructuring and drastic 
'downsizing' of the neo-liberal imagination, but they did hope that the mine would 
become more productive and prosperous as a result of privatisation. In order to 
understand their aspirations it is important to stress that Soviet ideas of 
'efficiency' are very different from those in the West. Soviet managers and 
engineers in the past had a concern for production, rather than for profit. They 
were frustrated by inefficiency, waste, bottle-necks, poor quality goods and so on, 
but 'efficiency' in terms of ability to make a profit did not concern them: they 
were concerned to meet the plan and to secure the inputs they required to do so. 
Moreover, they also tended be firm believers in the paternalist ethic of the 
traditional Soviet enterprise.s They saw privatisation as a means to realise their 
SEven those who support the policies of neo-Iiberal reformers tend at the same time to adhere to 
traditional patemalistvalues.This applies, for example, to the director of the nearby mine of 
Abashevskaya who is a strong supporter of 'Russia's Choice', but at the same time wants his mine 
to retain sotskul'tbyt, something which is anathema to true believers. His vision of a productive 
and successful mine providing a high standard of living and social protection to a hardworking 
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desire for improvements which had been frustrated within the old system, but at 
the same time their aspirations were conceived firmly within the logic of the very 
system which they felt had constrained them in the past. 
In their reflections on privatisation the managers at Taldym tend to oscillate 
between two visions of reform: on the one hand, the idea that privatisation, by 
giving worker-shareholders an interest in their enterprise, could 'activate the 
human factor' at the mine, and on the other, the idea that a concentration of 
shareholding could institute 'real ownership' at the mine, itself a dualistic concept 
of stewardship encompassing ideas of both discipline and paternalistic care. Thus, 
something very close to the dilemma of Gorbachev's perestroika was reproduced 
at the mine in the post-privatisation era: how to grant 'the people' involvement 
and 'an interest' while at the same time keeping them under firm managerial 
control. 
The emancipatory vision of privatisation was based on the idea that waste and 
inefficiency would be reduced by the sense of common endeavour fostered by 
employee share-ownership. One of the traditional complaints of Soviet managers 
was that their enterprises were like collective farms: common ownership led to 
common indifference. Managers at the mine had hoped that once the workers felt 
they owned the mine they would have an interest in its success and labour 
workforce is very similar to that of the present director of Taldym. even though the latter is a firm 
supporter of the Communist Party. 
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discipline and productivity would improve.6 At the same time, however, their 
ideas about the evils of common ownership led them to hanker for 'real 
ownership' not on the part of workers but of a khozyain. It is again important to 
stress that the ideal of the khozyain has little in common with Western ideas about 
sound management, corporate governance, and still less profit. After seventy years 
of state ownership, the idea of the khozyain has acquired almost mythical 
properties in Russia. In the light of persistent disappointment with Soviet 
paternalists, many Russians have deduced that ownership is the vital added 
ingredient required to secure perfect performance. A real owner is a paternalist of 
god-like beneficence, who has not only an interest in profit, but also in 
stewardship: he (the khozyain of the popular imagination is undoubtedly 
masculine) looks after his workers and they in turn look after his enterprise. He is 
61t is true that the intensity and productivity of work at the mine has not increased as a result of 
privatisation. But the complaints of managers should not be taken at face value. Although they do 
demonstrate the negligible impact of privatisation, some of the premises on which they are based 
are rather dubious. It is certainly true that there are workers at the mine, especially certain brigades 
of male surface workers, who work at what the Russians would caU 'half strength'. But at the 
same time, the vast majority of production and development workers work very hard. and often 
take major risks in order to meet plan targets (and to get bonuses) such as ignoring low levels of 
methane, and, in the case of development workers, using fewer roof supports than the regulations 
prescribe when they judge that the rock is suitable. Similarly, while it is true to say that 
privatisation has not transformed workers' attitude to the enterprise, managers' characterisation of 
workers' pre-privatisation position is one-sided. As wi\l be shown in later chapters, workers' 
relationship to the enterprise is complex and contradictory: it is certainly not accurate to claim that 
they 'simply couldn't care less'. 
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also, however, in control, strict, 'firm but fair': he embodies the tension between 
co-operative and coercive principles. Of course, while a khozyain might well be 
strict and interested in profit, the idea that he would necessarily also ensure the 
well being of workers, the local community and the environment is a Soviet 
fantasy which has far more to with the communist era ideal of the paternalist 
director than the reality of ownership. This highlights the traditional framework 
within which managerial aspirations for privatisation were conceived: the fact that 
the passing of the old system and state ownership means that past collectivist 
imperatives will cease to operate is something which has only recently begun to be 
appreciated. 
The two themes of worker involvement and the good khozyain can be seen clearly 
in managers' assessments of the impact of privatisation. What their comments also 
reveal is that neither of their visions even came close to being realised. First, 
although privatisation apparently handed ownership of the mine to the workers, no 
'psychological revolution' occurred as a result of this. As one of the chief 
specialists lamented in a group interview in February 1993:7 
Nothing has changed here as a result of privatisation. Except that the president 
[director] has become a bit more capable - in financial matters. But the 
psychology of people has not changed at all - [the mine] was a kolkhoz 
[coIlective farm], and that's what it's remained. 
'The extracts which follow from interviews with managers in 1993 were conducted by the Russian 
sociologists Olga Pulyaeva and Konstantin Bumyshev. Similar views have since been expressed to 
me by managers at all levels, but the 'focus groups' conducted by Pulyaeva and Bumyshev soon 
after the mine privatised produced particularly vivid responses. 
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Shop chiefs at the mine, interviewed in the same month, concurred with this 
opinion. Asked what changes had occurred at the mine as a result of privatisation 
they affirmed that there had been: 
Practically no changes ... 
Discipline has declined, output has declined - but that is not a result of 
privatisation. If we are talking of privatisation, then there have been no big 
changes, no major [changes] .... 
People have not understood that they are the owners. And if there have been 
some improvements it's only those dictated by life ... 
Lower down the enterprise hierarchy, mine foremen, asked whether there had been 
any changes in the mine administration, had the same opinion: 
Absolutely none ... 
There are no changes. There was euphoria, expectation. But expectations of a 
feeling of ownership were not fulfilled. Freedom is necessary • but that is 
understood as complete irresponsibility in everything .... Not feeling any sense of 
ownership, we are very frightened of civil and cultured responsibility ... 
Our tragedy is our psychology which shows itself in everything. 
Thus, managers were united in the belief that privatisation had had very little 
impact on the mine. It was precisely what they saw as the destructive 'collective 
farm' mentality that 'something that belongs to everyone belongs to no one' 
which the form of privatisation they had opted for preserved: as one of the chief 
specialists asserted, 'A closed AO is in essence a kolkhoz' . Workers, one of the 
shop chiefs argued, had not developed a sense of responsibility for the mine 
because they had been given shares gratis: 
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Nobody knows the real value - what that share costs. The people [narod] have 
given practically nothing ... 
When he [the worker] gives some kind of money for it [the share] he will 
already begin to try .... But there is nothing of that in our collective. And there 
won't be for the moment. Because no one has given anything as an investment 
in the future. That is to say, the mine was common - 'ours' - and that's how it's 
remained. We have not changed our consciousness. It has rightly been said that 
this wiII take decades of new generations - or an owner [khozyain]. 
Here the other dream of managers is apparent: the idea of the khozyain as a 
universal panacea, a driving force which could substitute for the years of 
maturation required for the development of a 'new consciousness'. Sometimes 
'real ownership' is seen as a group affair, although more commonly it is seen as 
something akin to Soviet style 'one-man management' (with the magic added 
ingredient of the 'interest' provided by property rights). Such ideas constituted the 
other main theme running through the focus groups on privatisation. The chief 
specialists, for example, mused: 
We could get fifty people to buy up the majority of shares: ... 'For every share I 
will give you ten bottles of vodka'. I'm putting it crudely, but for that money 
people would sell. That's what we need to do. Then the people who were 
actually interested in the association would manage it. 
Namely there should be a caucus [kuchka]. And to create one would not just 
benefit the kuchka, but the whole people. 
The ideal of the khozyain, however, overshadowed that of the public-spirited 
kuchka. As another of the chief specialists incontrovertibly put it, 'I know that in a 
car there should only be one driver'. Another cited with approval the approach of 
the director at a neighbouring 'pioneer of privatisation', Vakhrusheva mine: 
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At Vakhrusheva the main difference is the system of management. There one 
person is in control. He has got an administration and a council [of shareholders] 
but he decides and he takes responsibility. He immediately put the council in its 
place. He said 'Lads you are good people, but what can you do? Being a good 
person is not a profession. You can still check up [on me]. You can measure the 
suit, but you can't sew it. So look, get on with your measuring and don't 
interfere'. That's what he did. And that's what we need to do. 
In such formulations the Soviet idea of 'one-man management' clearly comes 
across: in this variant privatisation is a means to strengthen managerial authority. 
As the alternately regretful and wistful tone of the above comments indicates, 
however, all these dreams came to nothing. No kuchka emerged, and the much-
lamented 'collective' form of ownership remained in place. 
The structure of ownership at the mine is not, however, the main reason for the 
failure of privatisation. The contradictory character of the privatisation project as 
conceived by managers was in itself problematic,8 but the main reason why 
privatisation failed to live up to expectations lay outside the mine. The managerial 
'The contradictions involved in running an enterprise such as Taldym were well captured by a 
maverick member of middle management. He felt that nothing would improve at the mine until the 
worker understood that 'the shovel he is holding is his shovel, that he is working for himself.' But 
in the meantime the mine had to produce coal, and since workers had not yet understood why they 
should exert themselves the director had resorted to a discipline drive. This, however, in the eyes 
of the disillusioned mechanic, would do no good either: 'How can the boss get tough with the 
owners? It doesn't add up. Things will not get better through discipline'. This tension between 
discipline and involvement constantly crops up as an unresolved dilemma when managers discuss 
worker motivation. 
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image of the khozyain implicitly situated him in a climate of plenty, a Soviet 
world of planned provision (only without the shortages), whereas the post-
privatisation directors have actually been running the mine hand-to-mouth in a 
climate of uncertainty. The mine has been operating in a steadily worsening 
environment, and thus even had the true khozyain of the Soviet imagination 
acceded to the directorship he would have found himself unable to act in a 
khozyain-like fashion.9 For, leaving aside the complaints about shiftless workers, 
one of the major disappointments of privatisation, especially for the lowest level 
of line managers, is that it has not given them the 'freedom' (in reality, finances) 
to secure the workers and supplies they feel they need. As one of the forewomen 
from the kotel 'naya put it in the summer of 1996: 
They say we're shareholders here. But it means nothing. For example, we 
haven't got enough fitters here. I go and ask them for more workers and they 
say, no, according to the norms and rules you've got enough. I say, what norms 
and rules? We're shareholders now, can't we decide what we need? 
And now the concern says we should cut 400 workers - well what sort of 
shareholders are we then, if they can tell us what to do? We're not. We still have 
the plan just as before. 
9Indeed, the present director of the mine has very khozyain-Iike ambitions: he is a traditional 
paternalist, 'firm, but fair' who would like to institute a virtuous circle in which both mine and 
workers prosper. Leaving aside the intrinsic problems with this vision - the contradictions of 
paternalism will be discussed in later chapters - the immediate barrier to its realisation is lack of 
money. As one of the shop chiefs succinctly put it, 'Under communism the director was more like 
a khozyain. He had something to give, so he could demand things. Now he's got nothing to give so 
he can't demand anything either.' 
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Privatisation has not allowed line managers to run their shops or collectives as 
they would like to because the mine remains dependent on (now steadily 
shrinking) state support. 
Indeed, among senior managers at the mine privatisation is now viewed as largely· 
irrelevant: what is seen as primary is their struggle for survival as subsidies are 
gradually reduced. As the mine's chief economist put it in 1996: 
The khozyain here is the state. We can't survive without the state. We spend our 
time trying to get money out of them, but they don't give us anything. 
This underlines the important point that what the World Bank would term 'getting 
property rights right' (The World Bank, 1996: 6) is far from being a major 
determinant of an enterprise's success. \0 Formal transfer of ownership does not of 
itself cause assets to be transformed into capital: in the West the restructuring of 
unprofitable public corporations into profit making concerns is a precondition, not 
toWhile a World Bank consultant would no doubt argue that 'getting property rights right' is 
precisely what the architects of the constitution of the AD at Taldym failed to do, the Bank has, 
nonetheless, begun to place less emphasis on the importance of privatisation. Although the latest 
World Bank 'World Development Report' still intones the mantra, 'decentralising ownership will 
be the best way to increase competition and improve performance', it places more emphasis on 
fmancial discipline as a stimulus to reform and concedes that 'slower privatisation is viable ... if 
the government or workers are themselves strong enough to keep control over enterprises and 
prevent managers from divesting assets, and if savings and growth in the non-state sector are high' 
(The World Bank, 1996: 6). This admission is in part prompted by the embarrassing fact that 
China, which has not had the dubious benefit of a mass fast-track privatisation programme, is 
actually growing faster than those post-communist countries which have. 
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a consequence, of privatisation (Clarke ed., 1996: 39). In Russia most of the 
enterprises which were privatised 'to the labour collective' were valueless as 
capital: they were mainly liabilities. This is certainly the case with the 
overwhelming majority of deep coal mines, including Taldym, despite the fact that 
it belongs to the group of mines considered by the coal concerns to have a future. 
The mine is heavily dependent on state subsidies and privatisation has done 
nothing to change this. 
Neither has it, as the discussion above illustrates, prompted significant internal 
restructuring aimed at making the mine profitable. What is now beginning to 
promote change at the mine is the alteration in the environment in which it is 
operating. The periodic budgetary crises which afflict the government mean that 
subsidies are often not paid on time and have to be extracted by strikes co-
ordinated by trade unions and mine directors. Meanwhile, although the 
government has not formally endorsed World Bank proposals for restructuring the 
coal industry, which initially recommended that employment be reduced in the 
Kuzbass coal industry by over 70% by 1997 (The World Bank, 1994: 44), cutting 
the coal subsidy is a key part of the government strategy to reduce the budget 
deficit. In addition to this, mines have had to contend with a vast increase in 
railway tariffs which has limited the potential for the export of subsidised coal 
aboard, as well as with the problems which afflict all branches of Russian industry 
such as non-payment on the part of customers, increases in the price of electricity, 
and the disruption of supply networks in the Former Soviet Union. All mines are 
therefore under financial pressure and Taldym faced a serious problem of 
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mounting debts in 1995, which eventually led to a vote of no-confidence in the 
mine director being passed at the end of the year. 
While privatisation did nothing to encourage the sort of pruning of which neo-
liberals are so fond, these financial problems have led the new director to embark 
on a programme of staff reductions to cut production costs. In 1996 it was costing 
the mine 147,000 roubles to produce a tonne of coal, while the selling price was 
110,000: the mine was losing 37,000 on every tonne (Shakhterskii trud. 7 August, 
1996: 1). So far the director's ambitions are modest. His immediate aims are to 
force all those working pensioners over sixty to retire, tighten up the 
administration of sick pay to cut down on the number of fraudulent claims, 
reorganise the work of the machine and electrical shops, as well as obtain two new 
complexes for the production shops and a new combine for the development 
shops. This is hardly restructuring on a grand scale, and the director was clear 
about the fact that 'without a change in government policy' his plan could not 
solve the mine's problems. Since such a change is unlikely in the near future more 
painful measures will probably need to be taken. This, however, is something 
which the form of privatisation at Taldym hinders rather than encourages. 
Workers and privatisation: 'The usual deception' 
Ask a worker at Taldym what they think of the privatisation of the mine and they 
are likely to reply that it was an 'ocherednoi obman': 'the usual deception'. 
Contrary to their hopes that the privatisation of the mine might usher in a period of 
prosperity in which their work and worth would finally be recognised, they have 
in fact only experienced increasing hardship. The tide of workers' activism of 
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1989 - 91 has receded, and workers have proved unable to realise the potential for 
greater control over their working lives which privatisation seemed to offer. 
Nevertheless, although workers have not used their status as shareholders to 
initiate changes at the mine, it has allowed them to defend their existing position: 
competition within management means that any director who attempts to make 
changes which workers perceive to run counter to their interests is very vulnerable 
to competitors who can appeal to the shareholders against him. The following 
section will first discuss workers' assessments of privatisation, and will conclude 
by describing the balance of power institutionalised by the form of privatisation 
pursued at Taldym. The more complex question of why workers were unable to 
realise the apparently emancipatory potential inherent in the closed form of 
privatisation at Taldym is discussed in detail in later chapters, which consider the 
barriers to collective organisation and action among workers in the post-Soviet 
enterprise. 
Workers' expectations of privatisation were, it must be said, rather hazy. Mainly, 
workers hoped that they might receive dividends and higher pay, although they 
did also have ill-defined hopes that they might gain a 'sense of ownership'. 
Workers from the technical complex, for example, said, 'We thought that things 
would get better, that we'd get some dividends', while those from the kotel'naya 
had hoped for: 
Something better, but everything's the same as it was before. It's probably 
because of the situation in the country as a whole. We thought that we'd get 
higher pay, but everything's the same. Perhaps ifthe situation in the country was 
better we would have noticed the change. 
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You don 'tfeel that you are the owners of the mine? 
Of course not. The mine can't even give us what we need to carry out our work· 
it can't give us the materials we need for the repair of our furnaces. 
Privatisation had proved to be a disappointment; 'the usual deception'. Not 
surprisingly, given the problems of the coal industry, workers receive no 
dividends. Pay at the mine is actually quite high compared to other mines, and this 
can in part be attributed to the president's need to please his electorate. Workers, 
however, do not generally feel well paid, mainly because of wage delays. 
They also do not feel that privatisation has given them more influence over the 
mine administration. One of the brigadiers from the lampovaya, when asked what 
she expected from privatisation, put it like this: 
Probably nothing. When it began there was a lot of talk. They said that the mine 
would be in our hands, that the collective would be able to make some decisions, 
but the collective can decide nothing and do nothing. Because in the 
administration and council of the labour collective, everywhere, there's one 
leadership· namely all the people who are ITR .... Those people are united. It is 
impossible to stand up against that structure. Everything is in the hands of the 
ITR - they decide whom to pay, whom not to pay. They hold the majority of 
shares; they can do what they like. The shares and votes that workers have don't 
count for anything· they are just for show. The simple workers don't participate 
in anything. 
While it is not actually the case that the ITR hold the majority of the shares, it is 
true that, as argued above, management is still firmly in control of the mine. Even 
though there are competing management factions, workers play a passive role in 
the struggles between them: they are occasionally appealed to by the competitors, 
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but no initiatives emerge 'from below'. For example, the SA is not a mechanism 
through which workers have been able to resolve the day-to-day issues which 
preoccupy them at the enterprise. Nor do they feel it represents their interests. A 
group of skilled male workers from the face machinery repair shop, for example, 
were very clear that the SA did not serve their needs. In their opinion it was 'just a 
piece of paper. They don't do anything. They just look after themselves'. The 
brigadier from the lampovaya quoted above was equally categorical: 
They do nothing. They get money and that's all.... A structure like the 
shareholders' council at the mine is not necessary. One person could do the job 
they do. 
The shareholders' council doesn't represent shareholders' interests? 
No. 
Workers also feel that the SA does not function as an effective check on the 
administration. For example, it is clear to workers that neither they - the 
shareholders - nor the SA have much control over the administration's financial 
dealings. As one miner put it: 
We don't really participate in financial questions. We don't know what the 
economic service does; what's happening with our shares .... The Shareholders' 
Council is not really competent in financial questions, they can only give advice. 
We can only ask, where are our dividends? We're shareholders, we privatised 
the mine. The economic department gives us infonnation, [tells us] that there 
aren't any dividends. We haven't got any profits, or we have somewhere but , 
they've all been spent on machinery. And what they explain to us at meetings 
we don't understand: we don't have a specialised education. 
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Thus, there is clearly no sense among workers that the SA is a channel through 
which they can influence the administration: it is at best seen as incompetent and 
at worst self-serving. 
Workers similarly claimed that the right to elect the director of the mine made no 
difference to them. A male worker from the kotel 'naya, for example, was of the 
opinion that, 'It means nothing. We change the director every year and nothing 
changes.' Workers from the face machinery repair shop were equally unimpressed 
by 'democracy' at the mine, claiming, 'It doesn't help. They [the directors] all just 
grabbed what they could [nakhape/i]'. Nevertheless, while it is certainly the case 
that workers have so far been disappointed in all the post-privatisation directors of 
the mine, they have, contrary to what the above quotes would indicate, derived 
some benefits from in-mine democracy. 
Most importantly, workers have been given a new channel through which to 
express their dissatisfaction and this has sometimes allowed them, as will be seen 
below, to exert an influence over questions vital to their quality of life. 
Privatisation has increased the potential for managerial factionalism at the mine 
and at any given moment there is a shadow administration waiting in the wings, 
ready to exploit any simmering discontent. Workers are the constituency to whom 
the different factions appeal, and the administration is thus careful not to pursue 
policies which risk uniting different groups of workers against them. Therefore, 
while workers constantly feel cheated by directors who do not keep their 
promises, privatisation has strengthened their 'negative control' over the 
administration. 
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A good example of such control is the fact that Taldym's miners have been able to 
retain a shift system (grafik) which suits them, but which is highly unpopular with 
managers both of the mine and the concern. Most mines within the concern 
operate a six-hour shift system for underground workers. (The length of the shift 
does not include the time taken travelling to the face - which can be up to one and 
a half hours.) Managers consider the six-hour grafik to be the most productive; 
they claim that miners are unable to work effectively for a longer period. Miners, 
however, favour a longer shift, because, given the regulations concerning 
maximum monthly hours, a longer working day means fewer days a month spent 
down the pit. Given what has been said about the workers' 'second shift' on the 
land in the previous chapter, this is obviously an issue which greatly concerns 
them. One of the gains of the 1989 and 1991 strike waves was that some of the 
mines had moved over to a seven-hour shift system. This was, however, 
particularly unpopular with managers as it involved an hour hand-over at the face, 
during which time, they claimed, very little work was accomplished. At Taldym, 
the miners were able to secure an eight-hour shift system, which has the merit of 
dividing neatly into three daily shifts. This meant that miners worked sixteen days 
a month, as opposed to twenty-three. In the summer of 1994, the concern began a 
campaign to restore the six-hour shift system in the South Kuzbass mines, and 
though there were protests, most mines eventually succumbed. Taldym was an 
exception. 
This can be directly attributed to 'democracy' at the mine: any director who 
proposed a change in grafik would run a great risk of being ousted. One miner, 
asked about the benefits of privatisation, immediately mentioned the retention of 
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the eight-hour grajik, which he claimed was the only gain workers had made as a 
result of privatisation: 
Our management want to go back to the six-hour working day, and if the mine 
was still in state hands, they'd have managed it long ago .... When we worked 
like that before, we were practically never at home - you'd just come in, eat, 
sleep, and then it would be time to go to work again. Our president and all the 
administration are trying to persuade us to go over to the six-hour graftk. But 
now the narod is the khozyain at the mine, and we prefer the eight-hour graftk. 
The mine is meeting the plan .... On the eight-hour grafik I know that I work two 
days, and then I've got two days at home to rest.. .. In comparison to how we 
worked on the six-hour grafik, it's great.. .. This is the one result that we've got 
from privatisation: ". an eight-hour graftk and we're pleased with that. 
This was an assessment supported by the trade union president, and one backed up 
by election results at the mine. For example, in the most recent mine elections, one 
of the presidential candidates, a former director of the mine, stood on a platform of 
'realism' which according to him entailed, among other things, a return to a six-
hour grafik. He received virtually no support. Thus, while privatisation has not 
even come close to instituting any form of 'workers' control' at the mine, it has 
allowed them better to defend their established position. 
In this sense, rather than being a motor for change, privatisation at Taldym has in 
fact made radical restructuring more difficult since the views of worker-
shareholders have to be taken into account in the formulation of any reform 
programme. This is certainly a concern of the current director. Despite the 
tentative nature of his cost-cutting drive, he confessed to being worried about the 
possible fall-out from his plan for the compulsory retirement of working 
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pensioners over sixty, and predicted that he might lose office before his 
programme was completed: 'The problem is that they [the pensioners] are the ones 
with the most shares. They'll get upset and might not vote for me again. You see 
the problem ... ' Having said this, if the mine administration united over the 
necessity of tough measures at the mine, the workers would be in a very 
vulnerable position. So far they have only proved able to defend gains such as the 
grafik by exploiting divisions within the administration. Contenders for the 
directorship have always been ready in the past to make concessions to workers in 
order to secure their path to power, but the worsening financial position of the 
mine may preclude such populism in the future. At the time the research for this 
thesis was conducted, however, privatisation had institutionalised an effective 
stand-off between workers and managers amid the turbulence of transition. The 
durability of this arrangement is yet to be tested. 
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Chapter Five: 'We Always Lead the Way': The 
Taldym Trade Union Committee in Transition 
This chapter provides a case study of the attempts of the Taldym union committee 
to adapt to its changing environment. The analysis of the union at Taldym 
exemplifies the dilemmas faced by the enterprise committees of the former official 
unions in the transition period, and highlights the contradictions of their position 
after the demise of the Communist Party within enterprises. Since, as argued 
earlier, the trade union president at Taldym is one of the most radical and 
outspoken in Rosugleprof, the limits of union reform at the mine cannot simply be 
explained voluntaristically, by reference to his individual failings. Thus Taldym is 
an ideal site to examine how far the constraints on union reform are structural, and 
how far they are the product of ingrained behaviour and perceptions on the part of 
both trade union officers, the mine administration and workers. 
The president of the trade union committee at Taldym claims that his union has 
been completely transformed since he was first elected president in 1991. He 
argued that the union had become far less hierarchical since the 1991 reform, and 
whereas before the mine unions had been under the thumb of the territorial 
committee, they were now free to organise their work as they chose. Thus, the 
Taldym union committee had been able to concentrate on trade union issues: he 
claimed that, in contrast to the past, he now spent most of his time dealing with 
pay-related disputes; attempting to 'preserve social guarantees'; monitoring the 
implementation of the collective agreement and preparing for its annual re-
negotiation, and dealing with issues related to health and safety. The next section 
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will test the accuracy of these claims by analysing the union's work load. The 
chapter will then analyse the union's relationship with the mine administration, 
and consider how far the conditions promoting the union's co-operation with 
management still prevail. Finally, it will examine the relationship between the 
union and the workers, and workers' response to the union's attempts to reform. 
Traditional trade unionism 
The union at Taldym, like its counterparts at other mines, continues to fulfil the 
traditional function of administering sotskul'tbyt. It is currently responsible for: 
controlling the housing waiting list; administering sick pay; running the 
projilaktorii; distributing vouchers for the kindergartens, and monitoring the 
administration of these organisations;1 organising the mine workers' holidays, and 
running the resort 'Hot Spring'; participating in the administration of DK 
Progress; organising the preparation and distribution of allotments; paying funeral 
expenses; giving small grants to workers and pensioners in financial trouble; 
organising the celebration of Miners' Day, and the other professional 'days', such 
as that of medical workers, and acquiring and distributing new year's presents to 
workers. In the era 1991 - 4, the trade union was also responsible for the 
distribution of the imported 'barter' goods such as cars, fridges, freezers and 
washing machines which management acquired in return for coal. In addition to 
this members of the trade union committee also participate in: the social security 
I As mentioned earlier, two of the kindergartens are due to be either transferred to the local 
authority or closed by the end of 1996. 
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commission (the trade union president is president of this); the pay commission; 
the labour conflicts committee; the health and safety committee; the zhilishchno-
bytovaya (housing and everyday life) committee, and the food control commission 
which monitors the quality of food in the mine buffet, stolovaya and the dining 
room at the projilaktorii. This volume of work is by no means exceptional, 
although, as will be discussed below, the 'social sphere' is gradually contracting at 
most enterprises. Each mine has its own specificity - for example, at most other 
mines the trade union is responsible for the distribution of potato plots whereas at 
Taldym it is not - but generally the amount of time spent on sotskul'tbyt and 
related issues is very similar. 
The first thing that should be clear from this traditional list of duties is that they 
take up an enormous amount of time. The trade union committee consists of 
fifteen elected members and has a seven-strong presidium but only three of them 
work full-time for the union: the president, the vice-president and the secretary 
(the only woman on the trade union committee). These officials are kept very busy 
because many of the union's obligations are highly labour intensive. For example, 
the secretary spends an enormous amount of time on the paper work associated 
with the administration of the sick list. The president, meanwhile, is graced with a 
constant stream of visitors. And although some of them come with queries about 
their pay slips or to discuss a difficulty they are experiencing with management, 
the vast majority of enquiries concern social issues. The most common visitors are 
workers asking for financial help, or enquiring about housing, holidays, 
kindergarten places or allotments. The union officials also regularly receive 
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pensioners who demand a lot of attention: the women often weep,2 while the men 
are prone to deliver long speeches denouncing the iniquity which has led them to 
the door of the trade union office. 
Meanwhile, in summer the union committee is laden down with the work of 
organising holidays. The secretary administers the waiting lists for the various 
resorts (at present the two main alternatives are 'Hot Spring' - a resort deep in the 
Taiga and only accessible by helicopter, consisting of a cluster of huts around a 
spring supposed to have healing propertiesl - and a lake-side resort in Khirghizia). 
Every fifteen days one member of the trade union committee has to accompany a 
2The trade union president is often visibly moved by such applications for help and usually does 
what he can to help. Three examples will suffice to give an idea of the types of tragedy that are 
regularly brought to the attention of the trade union committee. Many are housing related. One 
seventy year old, for instance, came to the union after noticing a free room in her neighbouring 
barrack, which had the advantage of an inside toilet - she wanted a transfer because she could no 
longer manage to help her ninety year old mother to the outside toilet of her own barrack. In a 
similar case, a pensioner tearfully pleaded with the union to find her a flat because her 
(unemployed) grandchildren, with whom she was living, were stealing her pension and eating all 
the food she grew. Meanwhile, financial problems are also brought to the union: one widow, for 
example, arrived weeping because she 'owed money to half ofVishnovka' after having given her 
husband what she described as 'just a decent funeral, worthy of a human being'. 
3The trade union president had built this resort up himself. He is incredibly proud of it, and, once 
on the subject, can expatiate for hours on the virtues of Siberia's 'second Switzerland'. It must be 
said that though the resort can only cater for fifteen people at a time - the helicopter cannot carry 
more - those who visit it tend to come back as enthusiastic as the trade union president (if not 
always quite so eloquent). 
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party on the twelve hour route to 'Hot Spring', a task which sometimes involves 
spending several nights in the airport when the weather conditions are not suitable 
for the helicopter.4 Meanwhile, the president has to: negotiate the contracts with 
the other resorts; ensure that the mine administration pays the right amount, at the 
right time, to the holiday-makers and the trade union committee; see off holiday-
makers, and, since the closure of the pioneer camp, organise a summer programme 
for children at the profilaktorii. 
Another summer duty is the increasingly difficult job of organising the 'Miners' 
Day' celebration on 25 August. This is an event of great symbolic significance in 
the community, and it is important that the union gets it right. The current 
president has begun a tradition of organising a large concert of popular music in 
the main square of the settlement, but this has now become a major struggle: the 
most popular groups have all put their prices up and have begun to demand 'luxe' 
accommodation and chauffeur-driven limousines, at a time when the mine faces 
increasing financial problems. In August 1996 the trade union was on the phone to 
music industry managers every day trying to organise a 'decent' concert, at the 
same time as running round attempting to ensure that the miners would be paid at 
least part of May's wages before the big day. Although he was also in the middle 
of planning a strike (of which more later), he seemed to be as worried, if not more 
4This is a task usually perfonned by the most active lay member of the trade union committee. He 
is a combine operator (MGVM). the highest skilled category of underground worker. He still 
works at the face and leads the parties to Hot Spring in his own time: he says that he gets pleasure 
from helping people. 
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so, about ensuring that Miners' Day was not a flop. S This underlines the fact that a 
crucial determinant of the union's standing is its success in the organisation of 
such traditional rituals. As will be seen below, the acquisition of high quality new 
year's presents is also a union priority. This is a situation replicated at other 
mines: supplying poor quality new year's presents has been known to lead to the 
downfall of senior mine managers.6 
SThe concert, much to his relief, did go ahead, but the line-up was only finalised the evening 
before. Unfortunately, because of the mine's limited purchasing power, it was a rather lack-lustre 
affair. The workers complained that it was 'boring' and they also resented the fact that 20,000 
roubles was deducted from their wages to pay for the event, unlike previous years when the 
administration had funded it. Thus, the president's heroic efforts did not do him much good in the 
eyes of workers who felt that they had been yet again been cheated by the union and mine 
administration - although in this particular case their complaints were ill-founded. 
6This occurred at Lenina mine. In an interview in summer 1994, the trade union president gave an 
emotional description of the humiliation endured by his members when the administration only 
offered their children 'a thin slab of bitter chocolate' at New Year. 'The whole town was laughing 
at us', he claimed. This was recorded in the mine newspaper, Tomusinskii gornyak, in the 14 
January 1994 issue which presented a question and answer session with the mine director. The 
trade union president concentrated on this issue and threatened that such parsimony could cause 
half the labour collective to leave. In the wake of this scandal the mine's chief accountant was 
forced to resign at a meeting organised by Rosugleprof and NPG at the mine, since one of her 
mistakes was deemed to be the cause of the cash flow crisis at the time the presents were acquired. 
This story clearly illustrates the significance invested in traditional paternalistic gestures by both 
workers and union officials. 
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Thus, whatever the trade union president may claim, days spent observing events 
in the trade union office revealed that union officers unquestionably spend most of 
their time dealing with sotskul'tbyt or related issues. The union president is deeply 
committed to the principle of enterprise social provision, and expends a great deal 
of effort attempting to preserve it. Although he commented that the Stalinist 
method of neutralising trade unions was to over-load them with work, so as to 
prevent them from defending workers, he nevertheless sees 'preserving social 
guarantees' through involvement in social administration as a key trade union 
function in the transition period. Moreover, workers still feel that this is the main 
role of the union. The views expressed by a group of male and female workers 
from the kotel 'naya were typical: 
Worker 1: Our trade union is weak and doesn't really decide anything. You 
would go to the trade union if you needed medical help, if your house burnt 
down or something like that. 
Worker 2: They don't do the work they should. They give out vouchers and 
financial help. 
Haven't you noticed any change in the union? 
Worker 2: No. It doesn't resolve anything. 
Manager: It is, as it used to be, part of the administration. 
It is clear from this quotation that the union's other activities have not yet made an 
impression on workers. Why this is the case is explored in more detail below, but 
the main reason is simply because social administration is still one of the union's 
chief activities. 
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As discussed in Chapter Three, however, mines, like other enterprises, are 
gradually divesting themselves of sotskul'tbyt. Taldym is in fact atypical in having 
managed to retain so much of its social infrastructure for so long. For example, of 
the sixty-nine kindergartens run by mines in the Kuznetskugol' concern, forty-six 
had been given over to the local authorities by the summer of 1996. The concern 
has seven prophylactic care facilities and nine palaces of culture left on its books 
(Bumyshev and Pulyaeva, 1996): Taldym is unusual in having both types of 
facility. The divestiture of sotskul'tbyt does not completely deprive the unions of 
their 'social' role - at mines where this has occurred the unions usually continue to 
administer sick pay, the potato plots, the allotments, and so on - but it does scale it 
down. 
This raises questions about the future of the enterprise trade unions: the end of 
state funding for sotskul'tbyt does mean that a union's position as the social 
welfare department of the administration becomes less secure. In the longer term it 
potentially leaves many enterprise unions without a raison d'etre. It also renders 
them even more dependent on management: under the communist system of state 
paternalism the role of the union was guaranteed, but now the form and 
administration of paternalist policies are a matter for the director's discretion. 
Even if the director does opt for a strong form of 'enterprise paternalism', the role 
of the union is not secure: he may choose to distribute benefits himself in order to 
bolster his own authority.' This represents a major threat to the unions because, as 
'Exactly this process occurred at Abashevskaya mine. There the director opted for a strong 
patemalist policy, but he did not choose to administer the benefits of his largesse through the 
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already indicated above, they are partially judged on their ability to provide 
traditional benefits. Although the social sphere at Taldym is stronger than it is at 
many other mines and is still under the union's control, the union president is well 
aware of the danger. He has attempted to carve out a new role for the mine union 
committee alongside its traditional activities. The following analysis of his success 
in doing so highlights difficulties that all enterprise unions face in attempting to 
transform themselves.8 
union. He openly said that he wanted to control the social 'rewards' on offer at the mine himself, 
so that he could reward the 'right' people. He completely side-lined the union, as was ilIustrated 
fairly dramatically at the collective agreement half-yearly report and amendment meeting at the 
end of June 1994. Throughout the meeting, proposals and questions which had a vital bearing on 
workers' interests were allowed to pass without comment by the Rosugleprof and the NPG 
organisations at the mine. Given such incompetence, at one point in the meeting the director of the 
mine felt the need to point out to the trade unions that he was supposed to be 'the bastard 
employer' and they were supposed to defend the workers. At some points there really did seem to 
be some confusion of roles: whilst the trade union lawyer made very few objections to proposals 
supported by the director, the mine lawyer was vociferous in her objection to unlawful proposals 
favourable to her employer! Since then the decline of the union has only continued. Although this 
Rosugleprof committee was particularly traditional - there was no process of 'renewal' in the 
union during the period 1989 - 91 and the same 'old communist' remained as president. it does 
illustrate the vulnerability of unions in the face of 'cunning and innovative' directors. 
'Sotskul'tbyt is a dilemma for most mine trade unions. Most of them recognise that it is not a trade 
union function, but they cling on to it for two reasons. First, as argued above, giving it up would 
leave them without a clear role. But many of them, like the union at Taldym, have a strong 
emotional and ideological attachment to the ethos of social provision within the enterprise. The 
vice president of the union committee at Kapital'naya mine emphasized this point. He said that if 
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Trade unions and management: social partnership? 
Despite the burden of social administration, the union at Taldym does also deal 
with issues such as pay and working conditions. The purpose of this section is to 
consider how far this activity constitutes a break from past practices. The first 
issue to be examined in this connection, before the activity itself is considered, is 
the union's relationship with mine management. Is it, as the manager quoted 
above claimed, still part of the administration? Or is the relationship more strained 
and complex than this? Is union 'independence' actually possible in contemporary 
Russian conditions? 
As argued in Chapter Two, the immediate effect of the demise of the Communist 
Party was to render the enterprise trade unions even more dependent on 
management. However, the alliance of managers and unions was not simply an 
expression of craven dependence on the part of the unions: the two parties did 
have a common interest in the survival of their enterprises. Before examining the 
attempt of the union to move into new territory, it is important to stress that, 
notwithstanding the trade union president's activism, this form of politics is alive 
and well at Taldym. This is not surprising. The mine still constitutes a 
the best British trade unionist was put in his place, he (sic) would find that, whatever his 
intentions, he would end up spending most of his time dealing with the housing waiting list and 
the provision of buses for veterans' days out and so on. (During the interview he had received a 
call asking him to organise a bus for the veterans). He said that if he didn't organise such matters 
nobody would. In addition to this sense of duty, many trade union officers derive a high degree of 
satisfaction from their social work, even while they acknowledge that they should not be doing it. 
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supplicatory unity in the face of the concern, Rosugol' and the govemment.9 Jt is 
fighting for a future, and the trade union president is as concerned that the labour 
collective survives as anyone else. This sometimes leads him to oppose the mine 
administration, but only within a 'one enterprise' framework. 
This can be clearly illustrated through an analysis of the nature of the union's 
conflict with the previous mine director. As discussed in the previous chapter, the 
form of privatisation opted for at Taldym creates enormous potential for 
managerial in-fighting at the mine. This allows the union to duck and dive amid 
the management factions and certainly increases its influence. The trade union 
9The fact that members of the mine administration still belong to the union at the mine is one 
expression of this fact. This is not unique to Taldym. In 1994, the Novokuznetsk territorial 
committee of Rosugleprof estimated that approximately fifty per cent of mine directors were 
members of the union, while a survey conducted by Tat'yana Chetvemina across a range of 
industries found that two thirds of trade union presidents and the same number of enterprise 
directors think that it is normal for the managers to be a member of the same trade union as this 
helps to avoid conflict (cited in Clarke, 1996b). Although there have been discussions about 
excluding managers from the union at a national level, at a local level it is usually argued that 
managers are not 'proper employers', but only 'hired workers like anyone else'. This view 
obviously ignores the significant ways in which the interests of managers and workers do diverge, 
but nevertheless it does have an objective basis. The trade union president at Taldym is aware of 
this complexity. One day in August 1996 when I was in the trade union office, some of the mine 
managers phoned up drunk from the turbaza. They became involved in friendly banter with the 
president (over the speaker phone), and said that they had just taken a decision to resign from the 
union en masse. The trade union president's response to this was: 'Go ahead, I really don't mind, 
it would only increase the union's authority if you lot left' . 
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president is a key player in the mine's internal politics and was the recently-
deposed director's harshest critic. This does not mean, however, that he sees the 
interests of the union and the administration as being opposed: in the case of the 
former director, he felt that the latter's policies were detrimental to the labour 
collective as a whole. That is, his criticism was conceived within a framework in 
which the interests of workers were identified with the interests of the enterprise. 
This can be seen clearly in the following denunciation of the deposed director 
(made while he was still in power). The trade union president felt he was leading 
the mine to disaster: 
He lives for the day. For him it's just an enterprise, it's not his own. What he 
needs, he takes and the rest doesn't worry him. If he'd worried about it, there'd 
have been order at the mine long ago. He doesn't want to do anything. 
What the mine needed was a 'man of the people' paternalist, who fulfilled his 
duties as protector of the labour collective. It needed 
someone who cares about the place - they live here and their children live here. 
It'll not be a person from outside, but our [person]. That's how it should be .... 
We've got to have a person in the driving seat who worries about people and the 
enterprise. 
These comments make it abundantly clear that the president perceIves the 
enterprise as a unity: when the interests of workers and managers diverge it is a 
consequence of bad management. 
Now the mine has a new director and harmony has been restored: the union is in 
the familiar position of partnership with the administration. The union actively 
campaigned for the election of the communist director, and in turn the mine 
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director endorsed the union president when he came up for re-election in 1996. 
The two now work very closely together, firmly united in their desire to keep the 
mine in business. This unity of purpose could be seen very clearly in August 1996, 
when Rosugleprof was supposed to be staging a national strike in protest at the 
government's policy towards the coal industry. The national leadership called off 
the strike at the last minute, although Taldym did stage a short strike. The 
preparations for the strike at Taldym were marked by complete co-operation 
between the director and the union. The trade union president kept the mine 
director informed about the progress of discussions within the union, and the 
director gave his full backing to all the president's proposals. 1O The president, in 
turn, put the interests of the mine first. Thus, the strike would not involve any 
workers stopping work. Instead, the mine would simply cease supply: 'we'll 
strike, but we'll strike in our own way', the president explained. The union also 
planned to blockade the railway to prevent the nearby open cast mine from 
profiting from the strike as it had reportedly done the last time the mine had gone 
on strike. At the shift meetings called to announce the strike, the president and the 
director firmly supported each other, both identifying the 'real enemy' as the 
government. Moreover, both emphasised the need for workers to 'be reasonable' 
even though they had not been paid for over three months. The mine director 
underlined the dangers of ceasing work, saying, 'We must work .... If we stop work 
IOAt one point, when it appeared the strike was going ahead, the director visited the trade union 
office, 'what's happening?', he asked. 'We're going ahead with an unlimited national strike'. the 
trade union president replied. The director smiled broadly, 'Excellent', he said. 
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we won't survive. The government will just rejoice.' The trade union president 
took exactly the same line at the meeting at which the trade union committee 
planned the strike: 'We have got to prepare for winter - if we don't get faces ready 
then we won't produce any coal this winter. We've got to be reasonable - not like 
Baidaevskaya where they flooded their own mine'. (This occurred during a strike 
over wage delays). He repeated the warning about Baidaevskaya mine at the shift 
meetings: his emphasis throughout was on the long-term interests of the mine. 
The present partnership between the trade union and the administration is 
perfectly logical. At the moment, the trade union president and the mine director 
are committed to the same vision. Both are passionately concerned that the mine 
survive. The director constantly reiterates that he is involved in a battle for the 
mine's future, into which he is putting all his (considerable) energy. Meanwhile, 
the trade union president makes similar impassioned speeches whenever he has an 
audience: as he put it at a trade union committee in August 1996, 'I live in 
Vishnovka and I care about it. If the mine goes down we all go down with it.' 
Moreover, in this case the trade union president and the director agree about the 
best means to secure survival. Both are prepared to accept some cost-cutting, but 
they are also attached to the paternalist ethic of the traditional Soviet enterprise. 
This could be seen clearly in their attitude to the Miners' Day celebration. In their 
speeches to the shift meetings on the eve of the celebrations both of them 
castigated the mean-spirited moaners who said that they would rather have 20,000 
roubles in their pockets than have a concert in the settlement. Both emphasised 
that the mine was not just an enterprise, it was a community, and if the community 
was to live, rather than merely survive, it had to hold on to such rituals. Otherwise, 
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'our children will have nothing to remember': the spirit of Vishnovka would be 
broken. 
But such unity of purpose is not guaranteed by the fact that the labour collective 
has a common interest in survival. For survival in the present climate does mean 
cutting costs. Paternalism is only one possible management strategy - although at 
the moment there are still strong incentives to opt for it, in particular because 
directors of many privatised enterprises can be voted out of office by their labour 
collectives. Nevertheless, a different director might not see maintenance of the 
social and welfare infrastructure as the first priority, and might seek to cut 
spending in this area, as well as reducing the wage bill to free up money for 
investment. Indeed, had a former director at Taldym who ran in the last mine 
election been successful he would have opted for just such a strategy (though the 
fact that he did so badly in the election underlines why paternalism is still popular 
among managers). Landed with such a director the union president would face a 
difficult choice: whether to defend the social and welfare infrastructure of the 
enterprise and the jobs of the less advantaged members of the labour force, or to 
support managerial restructuring efforts in the interests of the long term incomes 
and job security of the more privileged (Clarke, 1996b). And even with a 
paternalist at the helm, such dilemmas are not entirely absent: different managerial 
strategies do not exist in a pure form. As discussed in the previous chapter, the 
present paternalist director of Taldym has already opted for some 'rationalisation'. 
So far the trade union has completely approved of all his measures, but such 
approval may be harder to give, and harder to justify, if workers', rather than 
working-pensioners' , jobs are threatened. 
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Thus, the UnIon does have an incentive to carve out a new position in the 
enterprise. As argued above, the decline of state-funded sotskul'tbyt does render 
the unions less secure. And there is also the possibility that a new director might 
not be so supportive of the union: according to one worker, the unsuccessful 
former director promised during the last mine election campaign that one of his 
first acts in office would be to send the trade union president back to the coal face! 
Moreover, the trade union's ability to invoke 'the collective' and enlist its support 
at key moments is an important safeguard in changing times: it means that it can 
often play the decisive role in management in-fighting. Thus, the union has many 
reasons to look beyond the mine administration for support and to attempt to move 
closer to its supposed constituency, the workers. 
The union in transition: wooing the workers 
At the mines where the trade union officers are not inclined to throw in the towel, 
there is a sense that 'trade unionism' is the way forward. This was indicated by a 
comment made by several of the trade union presidents interviewed in the summer 
of 1994: 'we don't know what a trade union is yet; we are only just beginning to 
learn'. Certainly, the trade union president at Taldym is aware of the need for 
workers' support and does try to cultivate it. But at the same time, as the following 
analysis of his efforts reveals, he is also wary not to alienate the mine 
administration. He is, like his colleagues at other mines, caught between 
pressurised and no longer predictable managers and distrustful, disgruntled 
workers. His attempts to woo the workers are thus fraught with contradictions. 
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Most of the trade union president's attempts to achieve greater popularity are 
conceived within a traditional framework. This can be seen partly as a product of 
prudence, partly of habit. His heroic efforts to organise a decent Miners' Day in 
1996 have already been discussed. He made a similar effort to ensure that the 
workers received high-quality new year presents in 1994 and 1995: 11 in 1993 the 
standard of the presents had been a cause for complaint, and, as the example from 
Lenina mine discussed above indicates, this is a potentially explosive issue. This 
attention to such paternalistic gestures is part of a wider trend. The most notable 
change in the union since 1991 is its increased effectiveness in the provision of 
traditional protection offered within the framework of the paternalist enterprise of 
the past: the president is prepared to take the time to explain complex social 
security and pay regulations to workers; he developed Hot Spring so that more 
workers were able to go on holiday; he has refurbished the projilaktorii; he has 
attempted to prevent the transfer of the mine kindergartens to the local authority. 
Such activity certainly benefits workers, and does represent a change from past 
administrative indifference to the welfare of workers. While some members of the 
trade union committee see this development as evidence of genuine reform in the 
union, however, it actually stems from a traditional conception of the unified, 
paternalistic community of the labour collective, which constitutes workers as 
111 was present in the trade union office when the trade union president was negotiating with the 
supplier of the 1994 presents, and he was insistent that the quality must be very high. In 1995, the 
standard of the presents was so high that the chair of the audit commission at the mine attempted 
to prove that they had been illegally obtained! 
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individual supplicants. 12 So while it does something to improve the standing of the 
union, it does nothing to transform the nature of workers' relationship to either the 
union or their employer. 
Alongside this very traditional approach, however, the union has also attempted to 
become more responsive to workers' complaints. For example, it supported 
workers against the administration over the issue of the grafik, and generally the 
union will support workers if they begin to mobilise independently. \3 This does 
represent an improvement: the union would only support either the Party or the 
mine administration in the past. 14 At the same time, however, it can also be seen as 
12The most active shop trade union president certainly sees things in this light. He considers the 
union to be completely reformed, but mainly because of its increased attention to individual 
'social' problems. This comes across clearly in his account of the change in the union after the 
1989 strike: 'I don't need to tell you, you can see it perfectly well for yourself. How people come 
and how we help them. We try to help them as much as we can. And I think this is right. 
Otherwise who's going to help them if we don't? They elected us to this position so that we would 
help them.' 
13This was also the case at other mines where the union committee was quite active. At 
Baidaevskaya mine, for example, the mine trade union also supported the miners' attempts to 
retain the seven-hour grafik. At Abashevskaya mine, where, as discussed above, the union had 
been side-lined, the director returned to the six-hour grafik without any difficulty. 
14A long-standing shop trade union president was candid on this point: 'At that time the trade 
union just coIIected dues; the Party decided everything .... Then the Party would resolve things in 
favour of management; not in favour of workers, but in favour of management. A manager gave 
orders and that was that ... For example, they could say that they wanted to get rid of a certain 
person from the shop; just like that, get rid of them. And he would be removed, perhaps because 
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an attempt on the union's part to prove its utility to the administration as much as 
to workers: by negotiating a compromise the union can actually keep conflict 
under control. Moreover, on other day-to-day issues, where there was little 
potential for independent mobilisation, the union, like its counterparts at other 
mines, was far less active. For example, the general attitude to health and safety 
issues, as at other mines, was fatalistic: the most serious problems are considered 
irresolvable at a mine level and in general the unions simply ignore them. This 
approach at least in part reflects an unwillingness to provoke 'unnecessary' 
conflict with management. IS 
he said something loudly about the Party somewhere ... or said something to the manager. The 
manager could easily get rid of him and the trade union practically didn't intervene in such things. 
The only thing was, if he was a party member the primary Party organisation in the shop might 
speak up for him.' The same shop trade union president related that in the 1980s the trade union at 
the mine became involved in a conflict with the Party. But as the story progressed, it became clear 
that the trade union was actually playing a supportive role in the mine director's struggle with the 
Party secretary for control of the mine. 
ISHealth and safety in mines is, however, a complex issue which reveals some of the starkest 
contradictions of the planning system. Miners' wages are still determined by plan fulfilment rather 
than on a time basis. Thus, as in the past, production and especially development workers 
regularly risk their lives for the sake of a few extra roubles. Although workers often complain 
about the poor organisation of work, however, they do not consistently oppose the system, and 
usually break the regulations on their own initiative. AlI parties tacitly collude in the system: in 
place of reform the relevant managers are sometimes sacked after particularly tragic incidents in a 
strikingly ineffective form of collective contrition. As the trade union president commented: 
'There are necessarily violations of the safety regulations in order to meet the plan. There are not 
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The union committee wishes to avoid such conflict because its precarious position 
obliges it to maintain a delicate balance between the interests of the mine 
administration and those of workers. The union president negotiates this 
contradiction through the 'one enterprise' ideal that a virtuous circle can be 
created in which improvements in the position of workers lead to higher 
productivity and hence benefit the enterprise as a whole. He does try to resolve 
long-standing grievances, but at the same time he does not promote the 
mobilisation of workers: this could initiate conflict within the collective that the 
trade union would be unable to contain. For it is in the interests of the union to 
prevent any conflict reaching the point where it would be faced with a stark choice 
between siding with the workers or supporting the administration. Where the issue 
is not too controversial, as in the case of the grajik, the union president can pose as 
an 'honest broker', but if the conflict is more serious it threatens to expose the 
contradictions of the union's position. This desire to meet some of workers' 
enough materials to allow work to be carried out according to the regulations .... UsualIy an 
accident is the fault of the administration .... Several shop chiefs have been sacked for their role in 
accidents. Once the chief of the technical department was sacked after an accident. But all the 
same accidents continue to happen .... The indestructible system causes them. The government 
can't prevent accidents. Neither can the government inspectors. These are not independent 
organisations - someone can always make a phone call to the relevant person to sort things out. 
The problem is that there are no independent organisations which could prevent these accidents 
[his emphasis]. They do not exist here.' The trade union president seemed quite oblivious to the 
fact that he was the leader of the supposedly 'independent organisation' which in what Russians 
would term 'normal countries' would be responsible for playing this watchdog role. 
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demands without shattering the 'unity' of the labour collective can be seen clearly 
in the union president's approach the controversial issue of the mine's payment 
system. 
In the summer of 1995 a struggle began between the trade union and the mine 
president over the issue of the payment system. The twists and turns of this story, 
which is related in full below, provide graphic illustration of the way the trade 
union president is attempting to deal with the contradictions of his position, as 
well as highlighting the limitations of his political approach. The struggle began 
over the union's attempt to reform the pay system: the perceived irregularity and 
injustice of the pay system was and is a major focus of conflict at the mine. The 
trade union president identified the main problem as uncertainty: workers were 
never sure how much they were going to get at the end of the month, so there was 
no incentive for them to work. This was because of the interference of the mine 
director who, according to the trade union president, gave decent wages 'to those 
he likes, to "his" people'. Also, while the work of the underground development 
and production workers was nominally tied to their fulfilment of the plan, the pay 
of the surface workers was dependent on the mine's fulfilment of the plan and not 
on their own level of work. The trade union president wanted to introduce a new 
system to remedy these errors. Under the system that he sought to introduce, he 
claimed: 
The most important thing is that people know what they are going to be paid at 
the beginning of the month - they can clearly see what they are going to be paid 
if they fulfil the plan. And the new system can't be interfered with - it is a clear 
formula that can't be changed. So it will be independent of the mine president, 
he won't be able to meddle any more ... 
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The new system will improve discipline. It means stability. As I said, if a person 
knows what he's going to get at the end of the month, he will have an incentive 
to work. The essence of the new system is that the approach to everyone is the 
same. Not like now when the approach to everyone is different, depending on 
their relationship with the director. There are also productivity inducements in 
the new system because it doesn't just depend on the fulfilment of the plan, but 
the number of workers that it took to fulfil the plan. so there is an incentive to 
keep numbers down ... 
People must have an interest. The work of builders must depend on how much 
material they produce. Pay must depend not on coal production, but on [a 
worker's] own work. 
The new system that the trade union president was seeking to introduce was one 
which addressed the grievances of workers, who had long complained that they 
were unable to understand the basis on which their wages fluctuated and that there 
was favouritism at the mine. What the above quote makes clear, however, is that 
the trade union president was not only interested in increased fairness, he was also 
interested in discipline, stability and productivity: his plan was conceived within 
the framework of the 'one enterprise' vision. 
At the same time, however, there was a strong popUlist thrust to the trade union 
president's proposals. His preferred system would reduce the pay of certain 
members of the mine administration, though notably not that of the most powerful 
members of management, but rather that of the (hated and despised) lesser 
administrators and clerks: 
The pay of the chief specialists. the chief economist, the chief accountant. 
won't fall. But the middle level personnel, simple clerks, who don't influence 
production in any way, simple accountancy clerks and book keepers. basically 
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the book keepers - they have always been a bete noire [be/'mo v glazu) here. 
Their work load does not alter whether the mine fulfils the plan or not. They 
write their little bits of paper, just as they used to write them. But they get paid 
like core [workers) .... And they don't need to fulfil the plan. They don't need to 
do anything. 
This bias exactly reflects the opinions of workers, who, though they often criticise 
top management for being incompetent, reserve their most bitter disdain for the 
'simple clerks', whom they view as morally suspect parasites who contribute 
nothing of value to the mine. 16 Moreover, there is a particular animus against 
female administrators who are viewed as self-seeking and disdainful. Their 
hauteur is a major cause for complaint, particularly since it offends against 
workers' ideas about the dignity of labour. For example, an almost universal 
complaint of women workers was that women in the pay department were 
consistently rude and refused to answer any queries of workers. Thus, the 
proposed scheme of the trade union president was likely to appeal to workers - it 
improved their wages at the expense of the most unpopular employees at the mine. 
16During the 1989 strike demands for reductions in administrative staff commanded universal 
support among miners (Clarke et al., 1995: 39). This hostility has not diminished: most candidates 
for the post of mine director at Taldym have the promise to reduce administrative staff as part of 
their programme (though none of them act on it once in office). A typical example of the types of 
criticisms made by workers occurred in a conversation between a group of workers from the 
technical complex, who were discussing the material help available at the mine. They contrasted 
their own dignity and independence with what they portrayed as the grasping attitude of the office 
workers saying, 'We never go and ask for help. We would be ashamed. But them, they have no 
shame. They will go immediately and get anything that is on offer whether they need it or not'. 
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The trade union president thus appeared to have a very winnable case. He did not, 
however, seek to enlist the support of workers for his scheme. The scheme was 
due to be discussed at the meeting convened to discuss and sign the new collective 
agreement at the end of June 1995. But the trade union president did not distribute 
any literature about his proposal, and neither did he instruct the shop trade union 
presidents to discuss the issue with workers in their shops. In fact, he did nothing 
to prepare the opinion of workers, nor to mobilise them behind his scheme. 
This showed at the meeting. The collective agreement was concluded first, and 
then the meeting went on to discuss the proposed change to the pay system. The 
chief specialists all spoke against the proposal, arguing both that the mine could 
not afford it and that the pay of some workers would actually fall under the new 
system. When it came to a vote the proposal was defeated. As the trade union 
president admitted, the workers were afraid of the consequences of the new 
system: 
They were scared. The specialists tried to scare the workers, saying that they 
wouldn't get a premium under the new system and so on. People are always 
scared of the new. They are used to the present system. For example, the face 
workers were scared because the new system takes into account productivity. So 
those whose bosses invite a lot of bfatnye workers [workers who are given jobs 
as a personal favour] into the shop were scared that this would affect their pay. 
They were scared that because of what we call the podsnezhniki ['snowdrops' _ 
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workers who do not actually perform the job for which they are supposedly 
paid] they would get lower wages. 17 
But this is not really a problem. Under the new system everything will be clear. 
Workers will know how many workers there are in the shop and will understand 
the basis on which their wages are calculated. They will demand that their bosses 
reduce the number of podsnezhniki. They'll say, 'Excuse me, my respected one, 
I'm not going to feed your "children", I've got my own to feed'. 
Whatever the real implications of the proposal, however, it seemed that, through 
his failure to prepare and mobilise workers behind his reform, the trade union 
president had lost out to the presidential faction of the mine administration. 
But this was only how it appeared. In fact, the trade union president had been far 
more cunning than this. He had slipped a clause into the collective agreement, 
saying that a new pay system had to be agreed by the trade union and management 
by 1 July. This meant that it would be legally binding to introduce a new system, 
and he was confident that his proposal would be accepted: the new system had to 
be agreed by the trade union and he would not put his signature to any other. As 
he gleefully explained: 
The most important thing ... was that I got the point in the collective agreement, 
and that it was agreed. In that point it says that the pay system will be agreed at a 
meeting, and will be changed only with the agreement of both sides. I won what 
I needed to .... The discussion which went on after the acceptance of that point in 
the collective agreement already didn't worry me. It was already a victory ... 
17Th ere was a lot of heated discussion about podsnezhniki at the meeting of the labour collective _ 
the administration did not attempt to deny their existence. 
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They [the specialists] didn't pay attention. They thought, OK, let that point be ... 
I didn't argue with them strongly so that everything would be OK with that point 
... I immediately at the conference proposed that he [the director] sign the 
collective agreement, I signed it myself and put it in the archives. That's politics 
... you work out your every step. I knew that if I introduced the pay system 
straight away, the collective agreement wouldn't be accepted .... That's why I 
separated the collective agreement and the pay system. A cunning game. 
The president had been Machiavellian down to the last detail. The way that he had 
proceeded meant that workers would get their first pay packet under the new 
system in July, rather than June, and, as he explained, 'June didn't suit me': 
In July the mine will fulfil the plan and there'lI be a sharp increase in pay - and 
that's a solid indicator for the new system. Then no one will drive people back 
[to the old system]. Good people are quick to understand. If it had been 
introduced in June .. , we didn't fulfil the plan and there would have been a slight 
fall [in the wages of] the surface workers. There would have been opposition -
you can't explain anything to people. 
His apparent defeat was thus actually part of the skilfully executed plan of a 
political virtuoso. 
But the story did not end here. The point was in the collective agreement, and the 
president thought that he would be able to push through his system, claiming that 
he would not put his signature to any other. He was, however, unable to do so. The 
administration simply refused to accept his system, on the grounds that they could 
not afford it. Instead they introduced a different system which retained the main 
fault of the old system: it is, according to the trade union president, 'slippery; the 
administration can manipulate it to further their own interests.' Nevertheless, the 
president gave his formal agreement to the new system, and the boast that he 
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would take management to court if they did not fulfil their obligations thus came 
to nothing. This clearly illustrates the fact that in the last instance the president 
will not oppose the administration. 
What it also highlights is the limitations of his approach: as an individual he is 
obviously weaker than the mine administration. The trade union president 
conceded that he had been defeated: 'they were well-prepared. They are strong. 
I'm obviously weaker then them'. Had he, however, decided to involve workers, 
rather than fighting a one-man campaign, the administration might not have been 
able to defeat his proposal so easily. Because, as argued above, had he explained 
his plan to workers, it is likely that they would have been behind it. As it was, they 
were not even aware that the point had been slipped into the collective agreement 
and were therefore not surprised when the pay system was not reformed. 
The president, however, did not want to involve workers. There are two reasons 
for this which both relate to the nature of transition. First, objectively it was far 
easier for the union president to attempt to gain his point through cunning politics: 
his approach meant that he was in complete control of the process. He did not 
have to deal with all the contradictory demands which could have arisen from 
different collectives had he chosen to discuss it with them. He could present a neat 
package without having to go through a process of complex collective 
deliberation. Secondly, it is clear that it would be inconvenient for the trade union 
to be required to deal with workers as a mobilised collectivity: this could disrupt 
his relations with management, as well as causing tension within the labour 
collective. As a passive mass workers can be wheeled on and off the political stage 
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as required, but attempts to involve them risk sparking off conflicts which cannot 
be resolved within a 'one enterprise' framework. 
The union president did not, however, necessarily conceive this at a conscious 
level and certainly did not confess that this was his aim. Indeed, he frequently 
laments the passivity of workers. But his reflex action is to attempt to dampen 
down conflict and avoid mobilising workers. This is not only a calculated reaction 
to circumstance, but also a product of history, as can be seen in the following 
comment on the passivity of workers: 
There are lads with initiative, but very few. Generally they keep things among 
themselves. To come forward and demand things - it doesn't happen .... A 
Russian person is very patient. But when he breaks out - then it's a nightmare. 
This view of the destructive potential of Russian workers is very common among 
union officers and bears the clear imprint of the past - not only the Leninist horror 
of any 'spontaneity' among workers, but also the intelligentsia's fear of the bunt 
(mindless riot) which goes back to the Tsarist era. Thus, while there are objective 
reasons why the union might want to suppress the expression of contradictions 
within the labour collective, it also comes 'naturally' to do so. This also reflects an 
ingrained form of politics in which production is primary and the mobilisation of 
workers is actively discouraged: in the past any form of collective action on the 
part of workers was the enterprise trade union president's worst nightmare. 
Another way of viewing the union president's approach would be to argue that it 
is not so different from that of union negotiators in a country such as Britain. 
Writers such as Hyman, for example, have commented on the way that the use of 
specialist negotiators distances trade union members from the union and 
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engenders a politics of accommodation: 'collective bargaining undertaken by 
"specialist" negotiators on behalf 0/ the broader membership consolidates a 
representative hierarchy functionally oriented towards accommodation and 
compromise with capital and its agents.... Representation is detached from 
mobilisation' (Hyman 1989: 181). The Taldym trade union president's 'specialist' 
approach to the introduction of the new pay system could be seen as merely an 
example of this type of politics: trade union negotiators in Western trade unions 
may sometimes also want to avoid having a mobilised membership on their backs. 
But it is more complex than this - as argued in the introduction, Soviet trade 
unions were never constituted to represent workers' interests. The politics of the 
Taldym trade union president are the product of transition: the union is caught 
between the past, represented by the alliance with management and fear of the 
workers, and an uncertain future in which its new relationship with workers is yet 
to be defined. 
Workers and the union: scepticism and distrust 
Despite the apparent activism of its president workers at the mine are cynical 
about the union. For example, workers would often ask me why I had chosen to do 
research at Taldym. If I responded that that it was because their union was one of 
the most active in the area, they would snort in disbelief: 'It's no different from 
any of the others'. It is, however, important to note that workers have a deeply 
ingrained distrust of authority and denunciations come easily to their lips: as the 
trade union president complained, in Russia anyone who became an authority 
figure - anyone who 'stood up in front of the microphone' - immediately became 
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an enemy of the people. Certain complaints have a ritual quality, and they may not 
accurately reflect the opinions of those who voice them. A common complaint, for 
instance, is that members of the mine trade union committee are only concerned 
with lining their pockets and looking after their own; there is a housing shortage, 
but the trade union committee all have somewhere to live. 18 In a burst of 
enthusiastic denunciation one woman worker suggested that members of the trade 
union committee had several places of residence! On further acquaintance, 
however, it turned out that this woman had worked with the respective wives of 
the trade union president and of his deputy for years, had good relations with both 
of them and was well aware that they did not have 'several houses'. The same 
point is illustrated by this miner's remarks about the trade union: 
Our trade union· we need to wring things out of it, beat things out of this trade 
union. But they look after themselves alright. They'll do anything for 
themselves .... For example, the mine has its own farm. They write themselves 
out some kind of financial help,19 take a pig ... and off they go • the trade union 
live it up at the turbaza. Make themselves shashlik... 
laThe trade union president and vice president do live in the best accommodation on offer at the 
mine, although their secretary, with whom the president is on very good terms, lives in a cramped 
two-roomed flat with her husband and two sons. The president studiously ignores her 'joking' 
pleas: 'couldn't you just find me a nice new flat? No one would find out'. 
19The same miner reported in a later interview that on a visit to the trade union office he had 
witnessed the trade union vice president say to another member of the trade union committee , 
'Here, fill out a request for funeral expenses· we need the money for the celebration of the trade 
union day at the turbaza.' The union does sometimes write out receipts for fictitious funeral 
expenses when it needs money, although on the occasion when I witnessed the president do so, it 
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Now there's one fellow there - the president ... He approaches these questions 
humanely [cheJovechno]. He explains things to anyone who goes to him, tries to 
show them, help them .... There's one man in the trade union committee who'll 
fight for our rights and that's the president. He'll at least explain things to the 
men. 
Workers' initial responses to questions about the effectiveness of the trade union 
are thus at least partly a reflex action. They certainly resent the trade union, but at 
the same time there is some recognition that the current president represents an 
improvement on his predecessors. Although it is partly a hangover from the past, 
however, workers' distrust is none the less potent for that: although they may 
modify their denunciations on reflection, workers' action in concrete situations 
will often be swayed more by the weight of experience than considered reflection. 
Another difficulty with which the union has to contend is the fact that workers' 
expectations of it are rather contradictory. On the one hand, they say that the union 
does not do the work that it should and only performs social work, and on the 
other, as seen above, the workers do actually assess the union officers on their 
ability to deliver social welfare. Thus, any union that attempted to become a 'pure' 
trade union, unencumbered by the duty of social provision, would actually risk 
losing its members. For one of the advantages of the union's present position is 
was to help a pensioner. An old man arrived, needing money to celebrate his seventieth birthday. 
He struck up a lively conversation with the president about Yeltsin's deficiencies and the two 
obviously warmed to each other. Explaining to his vice president why he had decided to give the 
man money, the president said, 'He was genuine, he's never been in here before asking for money; 
I thought, let him have a nice birthday.' 
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that it gives workers a reason to remain in the union, a fact which the trade union 
president is very fond of reminding anyone who will listen: 'These people leave 
the union, and then someone dies, or something happens, and then they come to 
me for help, and I say, "You should have thought ofthat"'.20 This was a problem 
encountered by the independent trade unions: they were expected to match the 
benefits of their official rivals. Thus, the union is partly constrained by workers' 
expectations. Asked what a union should do workers will, almost without 
exception, reply 'defend workers' interests', but they also expect a whole range of 
services alongside this. 
On this measurement, the Taldym trade union committee does not do as well in 
the eyes of workers as it deserves. There is a recognition among some workers 
that, notwithstanding the decline in enterprise social provision which is affiicting 
the whole of Russia, the union's approach to social administration is fairer than it 
was in the past. As one miner commented: 
It is easier to go on holiday now. Before I couldn't get anything out of this trade 
union. You would go along to the office and they would say there is no chance 
201 witnessed a worker attempting to leave the union, because, he said, he had never been on 
holiday. The secretary smiled, and simply reminded him that ifhe left he would never receive help 
from the union again, help which he would certainly need when he retired. As the NPG president 
periodically reminds workers through the mine newspaper (he is friends with the editor), non-
union members are entitled to receive sick pay and other state benefits administered by the former 
official union. Nevertheless, workers still stand to lose the discretionary help available from the 
union if they leave. 
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of you going on holiday and that would be that. The trade union is more 
approachable now. It will try to help you. 
But not all workers would agree with this assessment. Indeed, the above comment 
was made in a group interview of miners, and the participants were completely 
divided as to whether the union had improved since the election of the current 
president. Thus, although the trade union president expends an enormous amount 
of effort on maintaining and improving social services, this has not had a decisive 
effect on his standing. This situation is only likely to be exacerbated as the crisis 
of funding in the social sphere intensifies. 
The union's attempts to move into the realm of 'defending workers' interests' 
have also made a limited impression on workers. The description of the 
president's campaign to improve the pay system provides ample explanation of 
why the benevolence of the trade union often falls on such stony ground. The 
initiatives of the union do just descend from above: when the union does 'win' 
something for the workers, they are often unaware of the fact. This could be seen 
in the negotiation of the 1994 collective agreement. In a group discussion with a 
mixed shop of development and face workers in the summer of that year, it 
emerged that a major cause for grievance was the fact that face workers were paid 
more than development workers. The trade union president, who was 
eavesdropping, interjected that in fact this problem had been remedied by the 
recent collective agreement and they would notice this when they received their 
next pay packet. The miners knew nothing about this - none of them were aware 
of what the union had negotiated on their behalf. Therefore, although the union 
was obviously sufficiently in touch to pick up on issues which concerned the 
205 
workers, its action did nothing to alter the relationship of the union and its 
members. But for this conversation, on the receipt of their next pay packet the 
workers may well have attributed the change to the good will of management. 
This again relates back to the union's contradictory position: if it advertises plans 
to remedy problems at the mine it risks promoting worker mobilisation around the 
issue concerned and angering mine management by its 'interference', but if it 
works quietly behind the scenes, doing what it can to remedy the worst abuses, its 
relationship with workers will not change, and it will have no one to defend it if 
management decides to jettison 'social partnership'. The union's equivocal stance 
thus does inhibit the development of a new relationship with its members, and 
provides justification for another of workers' traditional complaints that, 
notwithstanding its apparent activism, the union is 'just a pocket trade union'. 21 
This chapter has shown that there are structural constraints which limit the 
potential for union reform: for example, it is not easy for the unions simply to 
abandon social provision. The continuation and reformulation of past practices 
(such as paternalist provision) not only reflect external constraints but also the 
internalised conceptions of union officers and workers. At present, the external 
environment has not changed so much as to render the concepts of the past 
invalid, nor necessarily to make alternative courses of action feasible. But 
21The union's attempt to maintain an 'even-handed' approach also means that when it does involve 
workers, as over the issue of the grafik, the engagement is only temporary. Workers involved in 
the campaign to change the grafik were as cynical about the union as anyone else: only the wife of 
the trade union vice president cited the campaign as evidence that the union had changed! 
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significant changes are occurring: sotsku/'tbyt is no longer state-funded and 
subsidies are being cut. Management is facing tough choices, and so, in turn, are 
the unions: the trade unions will not be able to maintain their 'one enterprise' 
stance forever. The union at Taldym is at least attempting to move closer to the 
workers, although it is still far from clear which way it would jump in the event of 
a more stringent restructuring programme at mine level. At the majority of 
enterprises the unions have not even gone this far and many conservative unions, 
like the one at Abashevskaya, are effectively already dead. Where, as at Taldym, 
the union officers are determined that their organisations survive, the crucial 
question is how the unions' relations with workers will develop. This is still 
difficult to predict, and there are likely to be different outcomes at different 
enterprises. One thing is clear, however: the unions cannot become 'independent' 
without gaining the support of their members. 
This analysis raises important questions about the relations between unions and 
the workers. To drop their equivocal stance in an all-out attempt to gain the trust 
of their members would be an enormous risk for the unions, especially since the 
reaction of workers to even such full-blooded advances is difficult to predict. But 
is there no prospect of 'reform from below'? Couldn't the activity of workers, at a 
time of increasing conflict, initiate the transformation of the unions? The next 
chapter will begin to examine this question, through an analysis of the shop trade 
union committees at Taldym. 
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Chapter Six: Shop-Floor Trade Unionism: The 
Prospects of 'Reform from Below' 
If there is a chance of 'reform from below', it will come from the shop-floor. 
Therefore, the logical place to look for the beginnings of such a process is at the 
level of the shop trade union committees, which are the point of intersection 
between the union and the workers. As argued in the previous chapter, at the mine 
level the union still operates in partnership with management, albeit on a more 
precarious basis than in the past. But do the shop trade union committees operate 
within the same constraints as the mine union committee? Tension in the mining 
industry is mounting and spontaneous strikes are occurring increasingly 
frequently.! What impact is this having on the shop trade union structures? Are 
they playing any role in channelling the conflict or is it passing them by? 
IThere have been a series of such strikes among mine workers in the Kuzbass since the summer of 
1995. December 1995 was characterised by wildcat walkouts, hunger strikes and workers' 
meetings in the mining areas of the Moscow basin, Rostov, the Kuzbass, Sakhalin and the Urals 
(Nezavisimaya gazeta, January 1996: 2) and when in February 1996 the miners' union 
Rosugleprof announced an indefinite strike, the government met all the union's demands over the 
back payment of the subsidy after only two days. Clearly the government was unwilling to 
provoke the obviously restless miners further in the run up to a presidential election. Since then, 
spontaneous strikes have continued, although, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the call for a 
national strike in August 1996 did not receive enough support in the regions, and the strike was 
called off. 
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The fact that the unions do have shop-level structures is obviously an advantage. It 
is important to note from the outset, however, that in the past these organisations 
had a very lowly status within the enterprise, and were finnly subordinate to the 
shop Party committees. As one of the most active shop trade union presidents 
admitted when asked about the division of labour between the shop trade union 
committee and the shop Party committee in the past, 'IfI'm honest the trade union 
probably listened to the Party .... The Party was the head of the family at shop 
level.' Given this history of subordination, it is not surprising that at many mines 
the shop trade union committees are not a picture of institutional health. This, for 
example, was the assessment of the newspaper of the South Kuzbass territorial 
committee, Gornatskaya solidarnost', made in an article by V. Nachalova on shop 
trade union committees published on 30 September 1994: 
There are a lot of presidents of shop committees who don't want to work and 
don't deserve the trust of those who elected them. It is a paradox that in many 
coIlectives workers don't even know who is the president of their trade union 
committee. It's dreadful that one encounters such facts among workers from 
core professions where every day miners face a whole range of problems. And 
there are so many of them! The frequent violation of safety regulations, the weak 
production culture at work, the late payment of wages ... the collective should 
resolve such problems together. 
The author's explanation for the weaknesses she identified was that union 
elections were taken too lightly; most workers did not care who was elected to 
their shop trade union committees. This line of argument continues a long 
tradition of ritual Soviet breast beating: it does not explain anything. It blames the 
weakness of the shop trade union committees on the fact that workers do not take 
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them seriously, but it fails to ask why the umon elections are of so little 
consequence to ordinary workers. In fact, however, this question is the crucial one: 
how do workers relate to the shop trade union committees, and if they do not take 
them seriously why is this? Again, Taldym is a good place to examine this 
question because its shop trade union committees have not atrophied in the face of 
change, and exist in all but the smallest of the mine's forty-four shops. Although 
they are habitually referred to as 'committees', generally all the work is performed 
by the president and vice-president of the shop organisations. 
The role of shop trade union committees 
In order to assess whether the shop trade union committees are amenable to reform 
initiated by workers, their role within the enterprise must be examined in detail. 
According to the trade union president at Taldym, in the present period the main 
role of the shop trade union committees continues to be social administration of 
the mine: they administer the 'sick list' at shop level; they deal with issues relating 
to accidents at work and at home; they distribute goods in short supply and certain 
privileges, while the shop trade union presidents are supposed to be the first port 
of call for workers with queries about holiday vouchers, social guarantees or 
housing. Meanwhile, each shop committee also has its own small budget for 
financial assistance to which workers can apply. As far as their 'representational' 
and political duties are concerned, the shop trade union presidents organise the 
election of delegates to mine trade union conferences and they are required to 
report to members of their shops about the results of such conferences as well as 
about other trade union activities. In formal terms, the unions are also supposed to 
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represent the workers in their shops, but in practice this is the least important part 
of their work. 
Like the mine trade union committee, the shop trade union committees spend the 
vast majority of their time on 'social work'. This involves duties such as 
distributing goods to workers that the administration makes available through the 
trade union at reduced prices, and providing small amounts of material help to 
members.2 This face-worker's assessment of the role of the shop trade union 
committees was typical: 
They can provide financial help from their fund. They can provide vouchers for 
visits to the profilaktorii. The trade union now distributes barter, goods. That is, 
it works out that they deal with material help and things. 
The shop trade union presidents themselves provided a similar assessment of their 
role, again claiming that their main tasks were distribution of goods and the 
provision of financial help. This, for example, was the assessment of the female 
president of the predominantly male ventilation and technical safety shop: 
Most of the workers in my shop are men and I'm like a second mother to them. I 
get them products, give them vouchers for hot food, they come to me if they 
have an accident at work. They come to me like to a second mother, like I said. 
It's my third year, and I think they're all satisfied with me. When it comes to 
dividing up goods I do everything properly. I have an exercise book where I 
2At some mines the union is responsible for al\ such distribution. At Taldym, however, there are 
two paral\el distribution networks. The trade union distributes some goods, but the mine also has a 
commercial service which makes mainly imported goods in short supply available for workers to 
buy through a direct deduction from their wages (pod zarplatu). 
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write everything down. I do it fairly, I like to help people .... In the shop trade 
union committee we now have our own budget for financial assistance. Lots of 
people come to me for help. 
Her male colleague in the electrical mechanical service did not contradict this. 
Asked to list his main duties he replied: 
I help people; give them financial assistance when they need it. We distribute 
goods - cars especially. We divide them according to factors such as length of 
service. We give out information - which vouchers people are entitled to for 
holidays, which privileges they are entitled to .... We also organise the workers' 
holidays, and the distribution of the New Year's presents. 
When asked about the sort of issues with which workers were most likely to 
approach him he replied: 
Most often they need some kind of help - financial help. Often it's the director's 
responsibility to look after their needs, and in this case we help them approach 
him. People are different - some people get embarrassed about going to the 
director for help, so we help them; ease their path, help them get what they need 
out of him. 
Thus, the shop trade union committees above all look after workers' social needs 
through administering the social, and part of the commercial, services provided to 
workers by the enterprise. 
This certainly gives the union a hold over workers, but, as the previous chapter 
revealed, the administration's delegation of these distributive tasks to the trade 
union is something of a poisoned chalice. Neither the social nor the commercial 
services run by the union can meet the level of demand, and this is by no means a 
situation confined to Taldym: indeed since the mine is one of the more successful 
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in the Kuzbass, its levels of provision are superior to those at most other mines. In 
this shortage economy, conflicts over the justice of distribution are endemic. The 
availability of a limited amount of highly sought-after goods at favourable prices, 
for example, not surprisingly causes a good deal of trouble and the opprobrium 
thereby generated attaches itself to the trade union committees and does nothing to 
improve their standing. This, for example, was a typical assessment of the shop 
trade union committee's role in distribution made by a worker from one of the in-
mine transport shops: 
Our shop trade union committee doesn't do anything any more. It only 
distributes various things, televisions, fridges and so on. It gives them to some 
people and not to others. And all that comes of this is scandal and conflict. 
Thus, the problems of the mine trade union committee are replicated at shop level: 
the shop trade union committees' responsibility for meeting workers' social needs 
does nothing to improve their standing. 
It is notable that, when asked about the role of the shop trade union committees, 
neither trade unionists nor workers spontaneously mentioned representation or 
defence of workers' interests. The shop trade union committees are in fact in no 
position to represent the concerns of workers either to the mine trade union 
committee or to line management. Shop trade union presidents reported that they 
held shop trade union meetings on average four times a year - and even these were 
largely formal affairs. In general, the only contact they had with the workers in 
their shops, aside from their immediate work mates, was when they were 
approached for some kind of material assistance. Shop trade union presidents are 
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occasionally called upon to intervene in disputes, but this is far from a day-to-day 
occurrence. 
Their most important duty as far as defence of workers is concerned is to give 
their consent or otherwise when management propose to dismiss a worker. This 
can be either an entirely formal process or one which involves negotiation: the 
trade union does not automatically take up the case of its member. Whether or not 
this occurs depends on the confidence of the shop trade union president and her 
relationship with the shop chief, as well as the character, reputation and situation 
of the worker in question. One miner summed up the attitude of his shop trade 
union committee to dismissals in the following way: 
In our shop there was a concrete case: one worker came to work drunk, and the 
girls [in the /ampovaya] didn't let him go down the mine. So he ended up being 
marked down for absenteeism. The shop chief wanted to sack him. But the trade 
union stood up for him. He's got a family, children. They proposed that he 
should be transferred to lower paid work and the shop chief had to agree. They 
didn't sack him ... 
The trade union can stand up for a normal person. But if, for example, I haven't 
just skived off one day but several, and I work badly, then the trade union won't 
stand up for me. They also look at who they are going to speak up for and who 
they are not. Sometimes they might on the contrary tell management about a 
person who wags off work and works badly. And they will only support the 
dismissal of such a person. But before management sack or punish a person they 
have to consult with the trade union. 
What this quotation illustrates is that in its attitude to dismissals, the union has 
changed little since the communist era. The position described by this miner is 
very similar to McAulay's portrayal of the position of the unions in the past, 
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which was discussed in the first chapter: the union will put the interests of the 
enterprise as a whole - its productivity and workplace discipline - before the 
interests of an individual worker. A shop trade union committee will not defend a 
worker whom it regards as shiftless against dismissal, because it is in the interests 
of the enterprise to get rid of such workers, but it will defend a 'normal' family 
man, because his family is part of the mining community and it is in no one's 
interest to foster avoidable desperation and anger in the mine's midst. 
Thus, co-operation between the trade union and the administration continues down 
to shop level: their proximity to workers does not lead the shop trade union 
committees to take a less equivocal stance. This is by no means a situation unique 
to Taldym. Nachalova, in the article cited above, claimed that in the reformed 
Rosugleprof shop trade union committees had a new role: to defend workers' 
interests. Nevertheless, her comments made it clear that she actually did not 
envision the shop committees coming into conflict with shop management. 
Indeed, she did not seem to be sure whom workers should be defended against, 
since she presented work collectives as sites of communality where all essentially 
share the same goals. She therefore reduced the role of the shop trade union 
committee to that of an emollient, smoothing out incidental difficulties rather than 
systematically representing workers' interests. She argued: 
When we say that the trade union works well in this or that collective, we 
immediately imply something about the activities of the work group; [that it is a 
collective] where, as in small collectives, everyone knows everyone else not just 
as a good or a bad worker, but also from a moral and ethical point of view. Team 
work, interaction with others [obshcheniye] make a big contribution to the 
creation of a normal micro-climate in the collective. Is it normal everywhere? 
215 
Far from it. From the outside perhaps [it looks as it] everything is going 
smoothly, but actually there's someone nursing a grievance against the head of 
the workshop, the shop chief and the trade union leader, because they didn't pay 
him attention at the right time, they didn't help him. 
In this passage Nachalova links the shop trade union president and the line 
managers together as a bloc of authority figures and does not indicate any 
distinction between them. She moreover implies that the role of the trade union 
committees is to foster the right moral atmosphere in collectives - which, far from 
being about the defence of workers' interests, is very close to the disciplinary role 
that the shop union committees used to fulfil. Although, as explored in the last 
chapter, the tendency to identify the interests of workers with those of the 
enterprise does have an objective basis, the fact that a leading article in a union 
newspaper can advocate such a conception of the work of the shop union 
committees indicates that it is also a deeply ingrained perception which may well 
outlive the conditions which gave rise to it. 
But it is not simply that the shop trade union presidents, informed by the same 
conception of the labour collective as the trade union president, run their 
committees along the same lines. The mine trade union committee, in its concern 
to avoid fostering conflict between workers and managers, does not actually 
promote the shop trade union committees as channels through which workers can 
express their grievances. To do so would be to place the trade union at the centre 
of conflict at the mine - a position which the previous chapter made clear the 
union is keen to avoid. One of the most striking ways in which this tendency 
manifests itself is in the union's preference for shift rather than shop trade union 
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meetings. The union very rarely requests that the shop trade union presidents 
convene shop meetings, and consequently these are held on average only four 
times a year. Meanwhile, the union only organises shift meetings when it has 
something particular to communicate to its members such as the timing or results 
of one of the national or regional demonstrations over late payment of subsidies. 
Workers are highly unlikely to raise any of the issues that concern them at shift 
meetings. First of all, such meetings are always rushed. They are convened before 
the beginning of the shift and the workers have to hurry off as soon as the main 
business is over. Miners especially have to make sure that they don't get to the 
/ampovaya too late, so there is no space for stormy 'other business'. Most workers 
are, moreover, rather preoccupied with the shift ahead and want the meeting over 
and done with as soon as possible. Secondly, at shift meetings workers are simply 
thrown together with a random selection of workers from other shops. In such a 
forum they are unlikely to speak out, and will certainly not feel able to raise issues 
that only concern their shop. This was demonstrated quite clearly on a day of shift 
meetings in October 1994. A generally outspoken woman brigadier from the 
technical complex wanted to go to the meeting to raise the question of her 
collective's pay. Her work mates encouraged her to attend, but finally she decided 
against it saying, 'What am I going to do there - one haba [a colloquial term for an 
ordinary - originally peasant - woman] among all those men?' And her caution 
was fully justified: the only other woman at the meeting she would have attended 
(besides myself) was a member of the mine administration. 
Shift meetings are thus easy to control. The workers confront the union and the 
\ 
administration rs an unorganised mass, without any agreed agenda. The union and 
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management, in stark contrast to this, always have a very clear idea about what 
they want to achieve by convening shift meetings. Moreover, shift meetings are 
specifically viewed by the union as a way of calming the workers, rather than 
mobilising them. The workers are given a formal chance to 'have their say' and let 
off steam, which means that it is harder for them then to complain that decisions 
have been made without consultation. At the same time, the meetings generally 
entail complex explanations of the mine's financial position, to which it is almost 
impossible for the workers, who are neither united nor prepared, to respond. The 
use of shift meetings as a means of reducing tension in the labour collective was 
demonstrated on the eve of the Miners' Day celebration in 1996. The trade union 
president was very worried about what might happen over the weekend, because 
the mine could only afford to offer the miners 200,000 roubles as an 'advance' 
from their May pay packet.3 (Surface-workers were to be offered 100,000). He 
claimed, 'This weekend we are going to be sitting on a volcano. Any shift could 
strike.' He then continued, 'Probably I'll hold shift meetings tomorrow, to try and 
prevent it'. This is indeed what he did, and no strikes occurred over the weekend. 
In this case the union did have a good reason to try to prevent a spontaneous 
strike: at the time of the meetings the co-ordinated national strike was still due to 
go ahead on the following Monday. Nevertheless, the incident did highlight the 
ability of the union to control shift meetings and to use them to contain conflict. 
As already noted in the previous chapter, the meetings were a perfect example of 
3 At the time this represented between a quarter and a tenth of their monthly wage (depending On 
skill grade of the worker and the productivity of their shop). 
218 
'social partnership' in action: the trade union president and mine director put up a 
united front, firmly placing the blame for wage delays with the government as 
they explained why the mine was going to cease supply of coal (but not strike). At 
the same time, the mine president announced that, while he had managed to obtain 
money for miners and surface-workers to receive an advance, office workers and 
members of the administration would receive nothing. Workers seemed tom 
between scepticism and gratitude, but in spite of their doubts the meeting achieved 
its aim. 
Shop trade union meetings, in contrast to shift meetings, would give workers a far 
greater chance to get their views across. They could discuss the issues that 
concerned them within their collectives and ensure that these were raised at the 
shop meeting.4 Then, at the meeting, it would be far easier for workers to request 
that the shop trade union president raised the questions concerned with the shop 
chief or the mine union committee. Workers within shops tend to know each 
other, and the shop thus provides a far more conducive environment for workers to 
express their grievances. The workers from the technical complex certainly felt 
this: whilst they were deliberating, on the occasion mentioned above, over 
4The trade union president does in theory recognise that giving workers the opportunity for greater 
involvement is the key to challenging what he portrays as their passivity. For example, when 
discussing the workers who had been involved in the collective agreement drafting and monitoring 
committee in 1995 he said, • After working on this, they became completely different people; they 
began to understand a little bit. But I can't go round and talk to everyone; I can't get round them 
all'. By utilising his shop trade union committees, however, the trade union president would be 
able to 'get round them all': it isjust that at present he does not see any need to do so. 
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whether to send their brigadier to a shift meeting, they bemoaned the failure of 
their shop trade union committee to convene shop meetings, which meant that 
their complaints were never heard. 
In addition to inhibiting the interaction between workers and the shop trade union 
committees, the union's relationship with the mine administration also structures 
the relationship between the mine trade union committee and the shop trade union 
presidents. Rather than being concerned with matters of policy and strategy, the 
shop trade union presidents are treated rather like dogsbodies responsible for the 
routine 'social work' of the shops: they are not required to be activists promoting 
worker involvement in union activity. Most of the trade union work at the mine is 
carried out by the seven-strong presidium of the trade union committee. The forty-
odd shop trade union presidents (the number fluctuates somewhat) meet the trade 
union committee once a month, but the meeting is not so much a forum for 
consultation and exchange of information, as a chance for the trade union 
president to keep the shop trade union presidents informed of his activities. Again, 
the president's desire to contain conflict within the labour collective is apparent in 
his addresses to these gatherings. He often takes the opportunity to explain a 
particular decision of the mine administration or to scotch rumours and 
encourages the shop trade union presidents to disseminate the information within' 
their shops. For example, at a meeting in August 1996 he devoted a considerable 
amount of time to countering the rumour (which is in permanent circulation at the 
mine) that members of the mine administration had been paid while the workers 
had received nothing for three months. The trade union president said that he 
monitored the payment of wages himself, had to sign for any payments which 
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were made, and he could personally guarantee that the administration had not been 
paid. He pleaded with the shop trade union presidents to make an effort to get this 
message across to workers, and to send any persistent doubters to him. He would 
then investigate their claims and ensure that anyone who had been paid in advance 
of the workers would be sacked. The intention behind this message, which he 
repeated even more forcibly at the shift meetings, is clear.s 
Given the formal nature of the contact between the shop trade union presidents 
and the mine trade union committee, it is not surprising that many of the shop 
trade union presidents feel as remote from the charmed circle of the trade union 
committee as ordinary workers. For example, one of the shop trade union 
presidents related a tale of injustice which revealed precisely that she felt as little 
'part' of the union as most workers. As already mentioned, the housing waiting 
list is a focus of discontent at the mine, especially among the least privileged 
workers. The shop trade union president in question complained bitterly that after 
5The rumour persists in spite of the president's efforts. Whether or not it is true is difficult to 
prove. The mine director claimed that it was completely false, confiding to me, 'I'd be a fool to 
pay the administration and not the workers, it would be so easy for someone to find out'. This, 
however, is not the case: it would be possible to prove a formal payment, but there are all sorts of 
other ways in which managers could receive money from the mine and these would be very hard 
for a worker to investigate. In any case, no amount of denial will convince the workers, as the 
comments of this woman worker illustrate: 'I read an interview in the newspaper the other day 
with a chief accountant of some enterprise. They asked her directly whether it was true that the 
administration got paid when the workers didn't. Well, of course, she said, no, we don't get paid 
either. She's got her privileges too - she doesn't want the whole world to know about them'. 
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fifteen years on the housing waiting list she was still living in a one-roomed flat 
with her second husband, grown-up daughter and stepson, while in the same 
length of time on what is supposedly the same waiting list the trade union vice 
president had improved his accommodation twice.6 After relating this tale of 
injustice, this shop trade union president then began to complain in exactly the 
same way as most other workers about the inactivity and privilege of the trade 
union committee. This is in no sense to argue that the work of the shop trade union 
committees could be improved by extending the privileges enjoyed by the 
enterprise union committee to shop trade union presidents, but simply to illustrate 
the gulf between the union and its officers. As far as the shop trade union 
president was concerned, the mine trade union committee was nothing to do with 
her. She carried out social work: the mine union committee was, in her view, 
supposed to defend workers' interests, but instead was a bastion of privilege. 
Conclusion 
The relationship of the mine trade union with management thus defines the limits 
within which the shop trade union committees operate. They are not amenable to 
change 'from below' because they are not constituted as representative bodies: 
they are only ever used as a channel of top-down communication and even then 
not on a consistent or organised basis. They are not a channel through which 
workers can express their grievances; instead they function mainly as part of the 
6This particular injustice was something of a cause celebre among the acquaintances of the shop 
trade union president: the comparison with the trade union vice president was frequently invoked. 
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social and welfare infrastructure of the enterprise. Thus, the increasing tension 
within Russian enterprises does not exert pressure on the shop trade union 
committees to change because workers do not address their concerns to these 
bodies: in general they only turn to them when they require some form of financial 
or social assistance. Pressure from below will therefore only begin to influence the 
shop trade union committees if the mine trade union adopts a different policy 
towards these organisations and begins to use them as a two-way channel of 
communication with the workers. The constraints on the mine union have been 
discussed in the previous chapter: it is clear that its approach to the shop trade 
union committees will not change overnight. There is thus little prospect of a 
dynamic union reform movement emerging at the shop level in the near future: in 
the present environment even were an explosion of worker activism to occur at the 
mine it would leave the shop trade union committees untouched at the side-lines. 
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Chapter Seven: 'Our Mine': Workers and the Labour 
Collective 
The previous chapters have argued that the more active enterprise trade union 
committees, such as that at Taldym, are beginning to change. But the road to 
reform is a long one and the unions' progress down it, even if it continues, will not 
be rapid. Meanwhile, the independent trade union movement has atrophied: as 
already discussed, the NPG now has very little influence in the Kuzbass region. 
Thus, at a time when not only their living standards but their whole way of life is 
under threat, workers lack effective collective representation. The next three 
chapters consider forms of collectivity and conflict within the enterprise, as well 
as workers' response to the privations imposed by reform. Does the lack of 
organised activity mask a history of subterranean struggle? Certainly conflict is 
increasing within enterprises, so how is it expressed? And why has increasing 
tension not prompted new attempts to mount a collective response to reform? 
These questions will be dealt with in three stages. First, building on the analysis of 
the Soviet system of state paternalism developed in the first chapter, this chapter 
will begin to examine the characteristic forms of collectivity which existed within 
the Soviet enterprise. The chapter argues that the structure of the Soviet regime of 
production, which constitutes the labour collective as a supplicatory unity, and the 
internal dynamics of the enterprise to which the system of state paternalism gave 
rise, constituted a barrier to the definition and defence of workers' specific 
interests. Nevertheless, within the Soviet enterprise work groups were constituted 
as 'collectives' and the next chapter goes on to ask why it has not been possible 
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for workers to realise the collectivist potential apparently immanent in this form of 
organisation. It takes one particular collective - the lampovaya - and examines the 
changing potential for collective organisation at the grass roots through an 
analysis of the history of the collective from the Gorbachev era onwards. The last 
chapter in the section will then ask: if workers are not organising within the 
workplace, or on a wider political level, how are they responding to reform? And 
how is their response influencing the development of the 'New Russia'? 
Forms of col/ectivity within the traditional Soviet enterprise 
Workers identify strongly with the ideal of the united labour collective despite 
their acute awareness of the deep division which exists within this supposedly 
solidaristic entity. This chapter analyses this contradictory consciousness, and, on 
the basis of this analysis, begins to examine why workers' collectivist ideals are 
never realised in the form of independent organisation. The first section considers 
the form of workers' identification with the enterprise fostered by state 
paternalism. The second section then goes on to examine the main forms of 
division within the enterprise and the form of oppositional consciousness to which 
this gives rise. The chapter argues that what above all characterises this 
consciousness is that it is negatively defined and is not expressed in any form of 
workers' self-organisation. The last section then attempts to provide an 
explanation for this limitation on the basis of the analysis developed in the first 
two sections. It also asks how far the structural barriers to workers' organisation 
identified by the chapter are being eroded in the transition period. 
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The labour collective 
Soviet enterprise collectivism is a complex phenomenon. First, as already 
mentioned, the term 'collective' (kollektiv) is used to refer both to the whole 
workforce of an enterprise and its individual subdivisions. Managers and workers 
use it to refer to the different work groups within the mine - the workers in the 
lampovaya or zaryadnoe would describe themselves as a 'collective', for example. 
The employees of a particular enterprise are also collectively referred to as the 
'labour collective' (trudovoi kollektiv). In practice, the distinction between the two 
forms of collective in everyday speech is rather blurred, but in understanding the 
character of collectivism it is important to distinguish between them. To avoid 
confusion, hereafter the term 'labour collective' is used to refer to all the mine 
employees, whilst individual work groups are referred to as 'work collectives'. 
One further clarification should be made: 'the collective' is at the same time an 
ideological construct and a material reality and the term is used here in both its 
ideological and concrete senses. This reflects workers' usage of the term which 
constantly shifts between the ideal and the real. 
As argued in Chapter One, the Soviet enterprise was one of the central institutions 
of Soviet society. Within the ideology of state socialism work was central to the 
self-identification of the individual and the group, while within Soviet society the 
work collective was a key site of social integration. The labour collective 
accordingly had a dual significance: it was at the same time the locus of social 
control and the locus of self-realisation, the point of intersection between the 
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totalitarian aspirations of the Party-state and the individual and collective 
aspirations of the workers in whose name the Party-state ruled. 
The 'labour collective' is a reality, but it is also a rhetorical device, appealing to 
the unity of interests of workers and management in the face of external forces. 
The collectivism of the labour collective is expressed in various symbols and 
rituals, slogans and icons, now supplemented by the nominal ownership of the 
mine by its employees. Although the collectivity of the labour collective is largely 
symbolic, it finds a very real expression in the authoritarian paternalist system of 
social and welfare provision which is the tie that binds the individual worker and 
work groups to the labour collective. The labour collective, as the site of social 
provision, is a focus for workers' aspirations, but it is neither perceived nor 
realised as the product of the collective organisation of individual workers or the 
association of their immediate work collectives. It is seen as an entity external to 
workers and work collectives, an entity from which they receive and to which they 
appeal, an entity which is personified in the chief who represents them and who 
bestows or withholds favour from them. In this sense the labour collective is an 
alienated collectivity in which the workers relate to their own collective existence 
as something standing outside and opposed to them. Although this alienation has 
been weakened by the collapse of the Party-state which has largely removed the 
repressive force with which collectivism was imposed on workers, it nevertheless 
persists. 
In spite of its alienated form, however, workers identify with and are attached to 
the labour collective which they see as their immediate guarantee of security. This 
attachment is not unambivalent: workers are aware that the collective is riven by 
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conflict, and they also resented the forms of control that the Party was able to 
exercise through the labour collective in the past. For example, a persistent form 
of individual deviance which plagued the Soviet enterprise was drunkenness, 
usually on the part of male workers. The treatment of workers who were caught 
drunk (whether at work or, more usually, by the militsiya on the street) highlights 
the most repressive aspects of enterprise collectivism. If the level of inebriation 
was judged to be sufficiently serious then the offender would be detained and 
forced to spend the night in the drying out cell (trezvytelnyi). After this, 
punishment within the labour collective would be swift and severe. This is how 
one of the fitters from the in-mine transport shop described the process, in an 
impassioned impromptu speech to his work mates, some of whom had been 
waxing lyrical about the communist past during a lunch-time political discussion: 
If you were a complete alkash, then they considered you to be ill, and the Party 
would look after you, send you to a clinic to get you treated. Ah, but if you were 
an ordinary, simple worker - perhaps you only drank once a year - but God help 
you if the mililsiya caught you drunk: you'd have to spend the night in the 
trezvytelnyi and then they shamed you in front of the whole collective [pozorili 
na ves kollekliv}. They'd remove you from the housing waiting list - you might 
be third on the list and they'd put you to the bottom - deprive you of a summer 
holiday, of your thirteenth month, your premium. You were completely shamed. 
In such cases a notice would be put up at the enterprise naming the offender, 
informing the collective that he or she had had to spend the night in the 
trezvytelnyi, and then detailing all the benefits of which he or she had been 
deprived. This attempt to control the behaviour of male workers was deeply 
unpopular, and highlights the repressive side of the labour collective: the putative 
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'opinion of the collective' was a strong disciplining agent, while the 
administration's ability to withhold benefits obviously gave it an enonnous 
amount of power over workers. 
Nevertheless, despite such negative features, workers did tend to view the 'labour 
collective' as a valuable and meaningful entity: the very fact that being 'shamed in 
front of the whole collective' was seen as something that mattered is an indication 
of this. Indeed, although there was resentment about some of the forms of 
managerial control exercised in the name of the labour collective, other aspects of 
the system of paternalist provision which from the outside might appear repressive 
were actually appreciated by many workers and interpreted as a sign of concern 
rather than a fonn of control. This can be seen, for example, in the comments of 
the brigadier from the zaryadnoe about the system of social security delegations 
which existed in the past: 
Before when I was a member of the shop trade union committee we used to have 
social security delegations which visited people who were on sick leave. They 
went to them and gave them five roubles - it was possible to buy something with 
five roubles in those days. They were paid some attention and they got better 
more quickly because they felt that their colleagues were waiting for them at 
work, that they were needed. Now that doesn't happen. If you're off sick a 
friend from work might come and visit you, but that's all. In 1993, for example, 
I was in hospital for a month and no one came to see me except one friend from 
work ... 
A person needs to know that he's needed in the collective; not just at home, but 
also in the collective. 
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This quotation neatly captures the duality of enterprise collectivism. Obviously, 
the social security delegations were not just designed to cheer the sick and 
suffering - they also functioned as a checking mechanism in the struggle against 
absenteeism. But this worker, who participated in the visits herself, interpreted 
them as a form of care. And in this she is by no means unique.' Such opinions 
highlight the importance to many workers of the sense of belonging that they 
derive from their membership of the labour collective. The collective is seen as a 
source of meaning and support in life: an individual finds her value within the 
collective. Being cut loose or neglected is bad for the individual and bad for 
society. 
Although workers also consider themselves to be part of smaller, more particular 
collectives, consisting of their immediate work mates or all the 'simple workers' 
Ca term workers often apply to themselves) in the enterprise, they do have a 
definite sense of identification with the labour collective. The attachment to 'our 
mine' is strong and in many instances can eclipse conflict within the collective. 
The fact that the workers are now the formal owners of the mine has only 
·Such opinions were, however, particularly prevalent among women who, to a certain extent, 
appreciated the attempts of the authorities to control the behaviour of male workers. For example, 
many women at the mine were actually quite appreciative of the mine Party committee's efforts to 
control drunkenness, especial\y in the days of Gorbachev's war against alcohol. As one worker 
recounted with approval, 'in 1985 there was a "war against alcohol". It was very strict. We in the 
Party sent a lot of people for treatment. Wives of men with drinking problems would come to the 
party and ask for their husbands to receive treatment.. .. The Party disciplined people. This meant 
that people tried to show their best side'. 
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strengthened the case for seeing the labour collective as a united (and besieged) 
entity. This, for example, was a typical attempt of a worker to reconcile the 
existence of conflict with the ideal of the united labour collective. She resolved the 
dilemma in favour of the collective: 
Some people are threatening to take the mine to court for non-payment of 
wages. I don't think that's right. Now we're an AO - we are the shareholders. It 
works out that we're taking ourselves to court. It's hard to sort out, but I think 
that the problem lies with the concern and Rosugol' • 
Another worker struggled with the same contradiction, although she did not come 
to a firm conclusion. She condemned the position of the trade union, and 
explained: 
The trade union should defend the workers and struggle against the 
administration, but it can't. Why? Because the director is elected by the narod 
and the trade union can't go against the narod It can't do anything. It just does 
the work of the administration. 
In this case the idea of the united collective, personified in the director, is seen as a 
barrier to the expression of real conflicts, but the worker sees no way out of this: 
the trade union, in her opinion, can do nothing.2 
The director is both the embodiment of this contradiction - he is elected by the 
workers, but is also the power against whom they have to be defended - and the 
means through which workers resolve it: they need to be defended against the 
2This analysis is actually quite close to that of the last two chapters: since the trade union 
represents the whole labour collective rather than workers in particular it is ineffective as a trade 
union. 
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director only because he is not fulfilling his role as the father of the collective. 
That is, 'one enterprise' collectivism is structured through the relationship to the 
patemalist director. Workers do not see consistent collective pressure in all-mine 
fora as the answer to their problems, but directoral repentance or re-election. Thus, 
as the earlier discussion of privatisation indicated, though workers have 
theoretically gained control of the mine through privatisation to the labour 
collective, they have so far proved unable to realise this potential power in any 
other form than the periodic re-election of the mine director and his team of 
managers. The director is the figurehead of the collective and is supposed to look 
after it. Such feelings become particularly acute in relation to the 'outside world'. 
The director is expected to do battle against Moscow and other assorted authorities 
in defence of the enterprise. The mere mention of such struggles is enough to 
provoke workers passionately to defend 'their' enterprise. Meanwhile, the 
behaviour of both workers and managers is informed by this paternalist 
conception of the enterprise. At Taldym mine, for example,every Monday 
morning the director has a 'surgery' to which workers take their problems. People 
take a variety of problems, most of them connected with home rather than work. 
One worker, for example, needed some top soil for her garden and hoped that the 
director could arrange for the mine to deliver some. Other people go and beg for 
their children to be taken on by the mine, which officially is not taking on any 
more staff. This is all seen as quite normal - being a member of the labour 
collective is about being looked after. 
Such a conception of the enterprise has its problems. Workers do not like to be 
made to feel their supplicatory status, but, so long as the collective retains such an 
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alienated form, workers are ultimately dependent for their guarantees on the will 
and the whim of their director. This generates an enormous amount of resentment. 
Two female construction workers claimed, for example, that the director could be 
curt to those who asked for the mine to pay the funeral expenses of relatives killed 
in industrial accidents. Such disappointments in the director are the cause of bitter 
denunciations. Workers continually feel that 'bad father' directors are failing to 
fulfil their obligations, especially since their concept of paternalism is 
significantly wider than that of the management. For example, a typical complaint 
from a woman worker concerned the fact that the mine management had refused 
to help a miner whose house had burnt down. He had two children and his wife 
was pregnant. She thought that in this situation it was the duty of the mine to spare 
a brigade of workers to rebuild the miner's house before the baby was born. 
Indeed, since the director offered only a pittance in compensation, the workers 
were forced to stand in for the inadequate paternalist and they organised a 
collection of money and goods for the family themselves. Such tension results 
from the fact that workers and managers have differing concepts of collectivism. 
The workers, rather than thinking of themselves as dependent, feel that 
management has a duty to meet the needs of the labour collective in accordance 
with egalitarian principles of social justice. Managers, meanwhile, have an 
authoritarian relationship to the collective and believe that it is their prerogative to 
decide the level and distribution of provision within the enterprise. 
Although the patemalist enterprise is being eroded by reform, the labour collective 
is still a site of social provision as well as a social focus and source of meaning in 
Vishnovka. In the mind of the workers, the collective should be run on principles 
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of egalitarian collectivism, administered by a just director. The director, on the 
other hand, views the enterprise as his enterprise, which he rules as an 
authoritarian paternalist. This gives rise to the perennial contrast between the 
workers' ideal vision of the enterprise and the everyday reality, a contrast which 
the workers attribute not to the paternalistic system but to the failings of the 
director. The solution, in the eyes of the workers, is not to free themselves from 
their dependence, but to change the director. The workers' aspirations, therefore, 
are never channelled into collective organisation, but are always focused on the 
person of the director. 
Slat 
While workers' ideal vision is of the united labour collective, their daily 
experience reveals the enterprise to be deeply divided. This section examines the 
form and basis of divisions generated within the paternalist enterprise, focusing on 
questions of distribution which emerged from the interviews as the issue which 
caused most frustration among workers. For, as argued in the first chapter, what 
above all characterised social provision within the Soviet enterprise was its 
inadequacy. Within an environment of chronic shortage and competition for 
resources, money, as has been seen, played only a marginal role in regUlating 
access to goods and services. In its place informal mechanisms developed to 
determine distribution, the most significant of which was blat. This feature of the 
life of the Soviet enterprise was a major source of dispute and division within the 
supposedly united labour collective. This section will explain the working of this 
system, which still orders the life of the enterprise. This is followed by sections 
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highlighting the relationship of blat to other forms of division and analysing how 
far such systems are being transmuted by transition. 
Blat is the Russian term that is used to describe a particular form of informal 
relations through which people create and call in obligations in order to secure 
access to a variety of desirable objects, from jobs to caviar. People use the means 
at their disposal to do a favour for someone in anticipation that this person's 
services may be useful in the future. One woman worker at Taldym mine gave the 
following example to define blat: if the mine trade union president goes to the 
local shop to buy caviar and the shop assistant has old caviar and new caviar, she 
will make sure that the trade union president gets the best stuff. She will do this 
because the trade union president controls, among other things, the housing 
waiting list and she may need a favour from him in the future. Since there are no 
precise 'rates', blat is a somewhat uncertain currency, but the implied obligation 
of the generous gesture is always understood. For example, the former mine 
director, criticised by an opponent at a meeting of the Shareholders' Society for 
spending the mine's money on building garages for the local police, responded by 
saying, 'any director would be a fool not to do this'. No further explanation was 
required - all the workers at the meeting understood that the goodwill of the police 
was necessary, not only to allow for any personal peccadilloes of the director, but 
also for the smooth running of the mine. Bla! also includes pre-existing relations 
of kith and kin, which in the Soviet setting imply automatic obligations: anyone in 
a position of influence in an enterprise is expected, as far as possible, to provide 
work for close friends and family; shop chiefs within enterprises are under an 
informal obligation not to blame anyone close to them for any mistakes they 
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make at work; shop workers are expected to obtain any desirable goods they 
happen to be selling for family and close friends and so on. Thus, anyone with 
something to offer or with the right connections can become part of the blat 
system. Most people can participate in the system to at least some extent through 
their family and friends, but blat is in general a hierarchical system in which 
position and proximity to desirable resources are all. 
The degree of blat open to different individuals thus varies greatly, and in this way 
it divides people into concentric patterns of insiders and outsiders, or what in 
Russian are referred to as blatnye (those to whom blat is available) and neblatnye 
(those to whom it is not). Those who have any position of power within the 
enterprise, such as members of management or the trade union president, 
automatically become blatnye, independently of their will. Blat is a property of 
their position rather than their person. When they lose the position, they, like 
everyone else, have to depend on their family and friends, though they are of 
course more likely to have friends in high places. In this sense, the boundaries 
between the blatnye and neblatnye are fluid: a good position can be lost, and an 
insider in one situation can be an outsider in another. 
Nevertheless, to the ordinary workers, who in most circumstances fall within the 
ranks of the neblatnye, the system seems rigid and impenetrable: they feel 
themselves to be forever on the outside. They feel disempowered and diminished 
by blat within the enterprise; a feeling that was powerfully described by one 
worker who said that it was only the blatnye who were 'treated like human 
beings'. This sentiment was very common: a miner, talking about the way he felt 
the trade union committee used the mine's leisure facilities for their own private 
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entertainment, described the atmosphere at such gatherings using the potent 
phrase, 'Everything's done in a human way [po chelovech'i] there'. He then 
continued 'and for the miners .. .' before breaking off in disgust, but the implicit 
contrast was clear - the blatnye create a civilised world for themselves while the 
miners are not even treated like human beings.3 Such resentment pervades the 
enterprise like a cancer: it is difficult to talk to a 'simple worker' at Taldym mine 
without some reference being made to the frustration caused by the unfairness of 
blat. 
Patemalist provision within the enterprise was the focus of this frustration: 
workers deeply resented the discretionary basis on which benefits were 
distributed. Although this, as will be discussed below, is beginning to change, in 
the past workers' quality of life was chiefly determined by their position in the 
various queues at the enterprise. And those with connections always came first, as 
this worker from the /ampovaya, who is in her mid-50s, explained: 
I, for example, may have been first in the queue, but you're blatnye so you got 
your flat first. Or holiday vouchers - perhaps I went to the trade union and asked 
for them before you but you got the holiday all the same if you had blat. And 
kindergarten places, that was another hot issue in the past.... Those were the 
three main questions in the past: the distribution of flats; holiday vouchers and 
3Similar examples included the idea that managers and office workers - sometimes referred to as 
'white' people - would always be given the food of their choice in the mine canteen, whereas as 
soon as a dirty worker - a 'black' person - came along she would be told 'nechego netu ': 'there's 
nothing left'. 
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vouchers for the proji/akJorii, and the waiting list for the kindergarten. And now 
the main question is who gets paid on time. 
Oh, and the waiting list to buy a car - that was another place where blat was 
everything. Up until about 1993 it was very difficult to buy a car. Now if you've 
got the money it's no problem. But before you needed to wait for years. The 
only people who got them were those close to the 'distribution kitchen' ... 
You could [also] be removed from the housing waiting list or the waiting list for 
the kindergarten, for example, if you violated discipline. But again, it depended 
on b/at. If one ofthe b/atnye violated discipline, he wouldn't get removed from 
any list. The same is true now. In short, if you've got blat, you don't have any 
problems. 
In the communist era, the sense of humiliation felt by 'simple workers' was not 
confined to the enterprise, it was also felt outside work. The neblatnye felt that 
they encountered injustice at every step. This, for example, was the comment of 
one male mineworker on his experience at school: 
When I was at school no one helped me. If I was sitting there unable to do my 
sums, the teacher would leave me to it and I would end up with a dvoika [2]. 
But, the mine director's son - the teacher would go and help him and he'd get a 
pyaterka [5]. [Five is the highest mark in Russian schools and one is the lowest. 
A two is considered pretty shameful.] Does this get to me? Yes it gets to me.· 
Such feelings are commonplace. The problem was obviously particularly acute in 
small settlements such as Vishnovka, but it was not only in such places that the 
subordination of workers within the enterprise carried over into other spheres of 
• Again, a version of the powerful rhetorical expression Mne obidno? Obidno, was used here. 
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life. Enterprises everywhere played a central role in service provision; even in 
large towns workers tended to be clustered in the housing estates around their 
enterprises. And even when such urban enterprises were part of a wider municipal 
system, they nonetheless formed something of an enclosed world. 
Along with the sense of exclusion generated by blat goes the idea that the blatnye 
managers at the mine are using their position to enrich themselves at the expense 
of the workers. This, for example, was the response of a group of miners to the 
question of who they defined as blatnye: 
Miner 1: It's the mine administration. There are lots of vice-presidents, it's all 
these 'vices' [vice presidents]. They are all blatnye. They can get all sorts of 
resources; they can build themselves houses. And the chief accountant: she pays 
us a bit less and then keeps it herself. She can rob the miners. 
Miner 2: Yes, the chief accountant gives the miners' money to her friends. 
Such feelings of being cheated by management are very common, as is the 
vilification of female office workers who are often portrayed as dishonest 
embezzlers by manual workers. 
Although in the present period elements of the state paternalist system, such as the 
housing waiting list, are losing their salience,S connections are still very important 
at the mine. For example, one worker's account of her attempt to rent a tractor 
from the mine in the summer of 1996 to harvest her hay neatly illustrates the 
continued significance of blat in the organisation of everyday life. The daily rent 
for tractors at this time was 400,000: approximately half this worker's monthly 
50n changes in housing provision see Chapter Three. 
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wage.6 She rents a tractor every year, but usually she arranges this through her 
connections: although she, like everyone else, laments the injustice of blat, she is 
actually very well connected at the mine. In 1996 she decided to do it 'like a 
simple person' and see how it turned out: 
Every day I turned up to ask and they'd say 'you'll have it tomorrow'. It's 
offensive [obidno] - I've paid half my wages for it. Anyway, finally on Friday I 
went to see the chief mechanic ... and he said 'Why on earth didn't you come 
before? You'll have it on Monday'. I said, 'Well I just thought I'd try and do it 
like a simple worker.' 
The moral of this is clear: doing anything 'like a simple worker' IS time-
consuming, irritating and sometimes fruitless. 
Moreover, workers claim that blat has extended into new, highly significant 
territory: they argue that it now determines the order in which workers receive 
their wages. In an era of endemic wage delays workers claim that the well-
connected are given priority whenever there is any hard cash (zhivye den 'gi) at the 
mine. As mentioned in the previous chapter, it is very difficult to prove whether or 
not this is the case, but workers are convinced that this occurs. The following 
accusation from a worker from lampovaya is typical: 
Of course, when we're paid late, the blatnye can still get money. When some 
money arrives at the mine, their contact will tell them that there's money at the 
/cassa and they'll go and get paid .... A month's pay, half a month's pay, 
depending on how much money there is. Say, for example, a worker from the 
lampovaya has a friend in the accounts department - she'll phone her and say, 
6The money is deducted from workers' wages: they are not expected to pay cash for such services. 
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'Go to the cashier now and you can get some of your pay.' Well, of course, this 
creates a lot of bad feeling. that some people have been paid and others haven't. 
The ones who haven't start to blame the ones who have for their problems. And 
the ones who haven't [been paid] are in the majority. This is making people 
more and more angry as time goes on. The problem is getting more and more 
acute. 
This is certainly a major cause of tension at the mine: the efforts of the trade union 
president to scotch such rumours, described in the last chapter, reveal that it is 
viewed as a potentially explosive issue. The delicacy of the question is highlighted 
in the following account of the ill-fated outburst of one worker about this 
perceived injustice: 
If you've got b1at then you can live, but if you haven't then you just survive. 
That's what they say here and it's true. For example, the management - we've 
noticed that they don't queue at the bank to get their pay with us. They get it 
directly from the kassa [cash office] and no doubt about a month before us. One 
of my friends from the technical complex, she said that to the director's face -
she said, 'it's OK for you, you don't get paid late'. He didn't like it. What she 
said was true - but one thing I've learned is that people don't like it when you 
tell them the truth to their faces. Now she says they are after her. They check up 
on her every movement - whether she's late for work or leaves early· he wants 
to catch her out. He wants to punish her. Supposedly we've got democracy now, 
but it means nothing. 
Thus, the focus of discontent at the mine is shifting somewhat, but the idea that 
the labour collective is divided into a 'them and us' of 'simple workers' and the 
blatnye remains as strong as ever. 
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The privileges of Party members 
Two distinctions should be introduced into this picture. First, with reference to the 
past, it is important to explain how Party membership fitted into this system of 
personal ties. Then, in the next section, the evolving relationship between blat, 
bribery and money will be discussed. 
The meaning of Party membership in the Soviet context can be elucidated by 
comparing it with the situation which existed in China. Andrew Walder has 
analysed the system of factory administration in communist China, and concluded 
that a key element in the prevention of collective action was the deliberately 
fostered division between the fifteen to twenty per cent who were Party members 
and ordinary workers: 'the party itself rewards and promotes people preferentially 
according to the loyalty and service they render to management and party', a form 
of clientelism which Walder terms 'principled particularism' (Walder, 1986: 25). 
Although personal loyalties do arise between specific leaders and followers in this 
setting, this personal dimension is not the significant feature of these ties: 'Party-
clientelism is created "from above"; it is an institutionally prescribed clientelist 
network' (p. 25). Alongside this system there is a network of instrumental-
personal ties through which primarily non-activist workers pursue their interests. 
These relationships, popularly referred to by the term guanxi in China, are 
comparable to those referred to by the term blat in Russian (p.171). These form an 
important component of the system of factory administration just as they do in 
Russia, but the particular feature of the Chinese industrial system which 
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distinguishes it from that of other communist countries is the strong system of 
party-clientelism. 
In the Soviet Union Party members did, as in China, have privileges, but the Party 
did not control the enterprise in the same way that it did in China, and neither was 
Party membership accorded the same ideological significance. Walder's study 
shows that the Chinese communist authorities had a far greater concern for 
political mobilisation and intensive group organisation than their Soviet bloc 
counterparts. Although this occurred to a degree in the Soviet Union of the 
Stalinist era it was not continued thereafter.' The form of Stalinist industrialisation 
dictated a less politicised approach to factory administration. First, labour turnover 
rates in Russia were very high, while in China the work force was highly stable, 
which allowed deeper Party organisation. Secondly, while in the Soviet context 
'Soviet mobilisation campaigns were always more instrumental: indeed, political campaigns which 
interfered with production were generally prohibited. In China, by contrast, the Party was utterly 
serious in its attempts to re-educate and re-socialise workers. Thus, for example, while 'group 
criticism' was a pervasive element in Chinese accounts of organisational life of the 1950s and 60s, 
it did not feature nearly so prominently in accounts of the Stalinist period. Criticism and self-
criticism meetings only appear to have been held among Party members and even then not very 
often (Walder, 1986: 121). The Chinese authorities, in contrast to their Soviet counterparts, 
'infused factory reward systems with a pervasive moral-political content': 'to the student of China 
the Soviet experience reflects scant attention to the moral and ideological cultivation of workers' 
(pp. 121 - 2). Stalinist campaigns directed at workers focused on dedication to work: the Party was 
not interested in workers' inner beliefs regarding the latest ideological twist, so long as they 
showed no sign of open resistance. For an account of the work-focused campaigns of the period 
see Kotkin, 1994. 
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factory Party organisations had to be rapidly created when new enterprises were 
established (as occurred at Taldym), in China the party organisations were already 
stable and well developed in the era of rapid industrialisation: in contrast to the 
'disciplined elite' created by Lenin, the Chinese Communist Party was 4.5 million 
strong when it achieved power. Moreover, the turnover in the enterprise Party 
organisations in the Stalinist era was nearly as high as among workers, because the 
weakness of the Party in rural areas meant that newly recruited members from 
industrial enterprises were often almost immediately dispatched to help with the 
collectivisation campaign. Thus, in the Soviet context, rather than the Party being 
responsible for discipline, managers controlled workers through their control over 
the distribution of goods and services and their ability to manipulate wage 
differentials and piece rates. In China, the Party was the key institution in the 
enterprise and industry was run on the basis of mobilisation through the Party 
(pp.113 - 20).8 In contrast to this, Soviet managers, even though they were nearly 
always Party members, acted in partnership with, or occasionally in opposition to, 
the enterprise Party secretary. 9 
SThe Chinese initially attempted to introduce Soviet-style incentive systems in the early 1950s, but 
they were administratively complex and required large numbers of educated clerical staff who 
were in short supply. Such problems could have been overcome, but it was not actually in the 
interests of the factory Party organisations to follow the Soviet route, which would have reduced 
their power in relation to that of the technicians. 
9<fhe director was, however, unquestionably subordinate to higher Party organs. 
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In the Soviet enterprise, Party members, unlike their Chinese counterparts, did not 
have to demonstrate high levels of political consciousness, and neither were they 
set aside from other workers to the same extent.10 Instead, Party membership was a 
way of co-opting energetic, respected or charismatic members of the workforce 
and ensuring that their leadership qualities were exercised in favour of the 
authorities. 11 Moreover, what was primarily valued in Party members was not their 
political commitment, but their work record: the Party was above all concerned to 
promote production and its members were supposed to set a good example in this 
regard. 12 Thus, the Party sought to recruit good workers: it was considered 
important for the Party's authority that they were members. This can be seen in 
the remarks of an MGVM from Taldym who was active in the trade union and 
Komsomol. He had a glowing record of achievement, and the Party was keen to 
enrol him: 
Communists had big privileges .... I worked and to this day I haven't become a 
communist. And I worked well, and the whole time they said to me 'Vyacheslav 
lOIn China activists were expected to denounce their fellow workers and were hence deeply 
resented. They were also isolated, which reinforced their dependence on the Party. In contrast to 
this, denunciations of co-workers by Party members seems to have been the exception rather than 
the norm in post-Stalinist Russia. 
\lAfter the 1989 miners' strike there was a concerted effort to recruit 'active' workers into the 
Party. 
12A content analysis of the minutes of Party bureaux and committees in ten enterprises in the Komi 
Republic between 1966 - 75 found that on average questions of productio~ management occupied 
62.4 per cent of the meetings (lIyin and I1yina, 1996: 375). 
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Ivanovich, don't you want to join the Party? You work well. Why aren't you a 
communist?' I always gave the same answer, 'I want to show that I'm not a 
communist and I don't work any worse than a communist'. 
Often the Party attempted to lure such workers with the promise of promotion or 
other benefits. A skilled and responsible male worker from one of the mine 
maintenance shops reported: 
If you joined you got promotion. I was on skill grade four, and the shop chief 
openly said that I could move up to five if I joined the Party. But I refused; it 
was a principled decision. The communists shot my grandfather. He was what 
they called a kulak. I stayed on skill grade four for years. 
Acquiring a flat was the biggest inducement the Party could offer: Party members 
were given preferential treatment on the housing waiting list and help if they 
wanted to build their own home in the private sector. As one worker from the 
/ampovaya explained: 
Party members got flats first; they got any material they needed to build a house 
first. They got everything first.. .. The blalnye were those who had power, and 
their friends and relations. But the communists had privileges .... For example, a 
friend of mine was on the housing waiting list and they just weren't giving her a 
flat. She'd been on it for ages. So eventually she complained to the Party 
committee. They said, write an application, join the Party and you'll get a flat. 
So she did, and they gave her a flat. Then, two weeks after she'd got all the 
documents, she just left. Good on her. 
Despite these privileges, however, Party membership did not divide the workforce 
in the dramatic way that it did in China: in the Soviet context, the networks of 
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instrumental personal ties, which everyone had to cultivate to at least some degree, 
were far more divisive. \3 (Although, of course, becoming a Party member could be 
a means to develop such ties this is distinct from the system of 'principled 
particularism' depicted by Walder). The fact that Party members had privileges 
was not hidden and was accepted as an, albeit undesirable, fact of life: at least the 
Party members had to pay for their privileges by attending meetings, presenting 
themselves as model workers and so on. 14 B/at, by contrast, was an open secret 
which drove workers nearly to distraction. 
13 Alongside the hierarchies of access, there were also status hierarchies between different 
categories of workers within enterprises. These hierarchies were related but did not fully coincide. 
For example, in the era of state planning (though less so now) the status those main production 
workers who 'drove on' the plan was higher than that of auxiliary workers who were generally 
paid less, while the elite of the enterprise were the so-called kadrovye workers who had a long 
record of service, high skills, a good disciplinary record and some record of voluntary 'social' 
activity (Kozina and Borisov, 1996: 136 - 161.) Nevertheless, even though, for example, workers 
in the elite production collectives could expect certain privileges, divisions between main 
production and auxiliary workers did not fully determine their respective levels of welfare: at 
Taldym there are well-connected women workers in auxiliary collectives who have much better 
access to resources at the mine than many of the face and development workers who constitute the 
elite workers at the mine. This non-correspondence between different hierarchies may be more 
common at an enterprise such as Taldym which is situated in a small settlement where blood ties 
or (culturally crucial) god-parent relations between workers and managers are more likely to exist, 
but it is by no means confined to such enterprises. 
14Moreover, Party membership was quite accessible to those who had a decent work record. 
Indeed, at Taldym in the late communist period the Party seemed to be keen to have anyone who 
was prepared to join. I spoke to several 'good workers' who refused to join, although not enough 
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Bribery 
Blat should be distinguished from bribe giving. Bribes are resorted to where 
people have no recourse to blat. The worker who, for example, desperately needs 
to receive her sick payor holiday pay on time (payments which at Taldym mine 
seem to be made on the discretion of the employees in the accounts department), 
and has no connections and no influence which would induce the accounts 
department to do her the 'favour' of paying her on time, would have to resort to a 
bribe in order to be paid. Bribe giving is, however, a less universal and refined 
system than blat. Everyone is aware of blat and knows the rules of the game. 
Interestingly, though it is generally recognised that bribing is a possibility, not 
everyone is aware of the etiquette. For example, two workers from the lampovaya 
to provide a definite opinion of the reasons why workers were reluctant to join the Party. On the 
basis of impressionistic evidence, however, it seems that workers did not want to be burdened by 
the extra duties that Party membership involved. Moreover, although Party members mixed with 
other workers quite freely within their collectives and were not stigmatised unless they made 
themselves objectionable in other ways, many workers nonetheless felt that to join the Party was to 
sully their status as 'simple workers'. Their view of the Party was contradictory, however. On the 
one hand, as the approval of the worker who cheated the Party to get a flat indicates, it was viewed 
as part of the hostile 'them'. But at the same time it was viewed as a weapon and a protection 
against 'them' in the mine administration: the worker who applauded her friend's trickery also 
spoke with approval about the way that the gorkom could 'punish, and punish hard' members of 
the mine administration who were caught making mistakes. This parallels workers' attitudes to 
managers who are often portrayed as their defenders in relation to the 'outside world', but their 
oppressors within the enterprise. 
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at Taldym, who knew and liked each other, had very different attitudes to bribe 
giving. One of them saw it as a humiliating, but nevertheless necessary, activity, 
and reported that she had bribed the accounts department the week before in order 
to receive her husband's sick pay, which the accountant had 'suddenly' found that 
she was able to pay when she received a packet of high-quality imported biscuits. 
The other worker said that she had no idea how to go about giving a bribe: 
Ijust don't know how I could walk into an office and give one of those women a 
bottle of champagne so she'd help me. How would I do it and what would I say? 
I just don't know. And how could she say, 'right, yes, I can help you', when the 
day before she'd sworn blind there was nothing she could do? It would be so 
blatant. I just couldn't do it. I would be ashamed. 
This difference of opinion on bribery did not extend to the subject of blat: both 
women felt equally excluded by it. 
Having said this, however, there is some evidence that impersonal forms of 
exchange are becoming more important as economic reform progresses. Although 
the Russian economy is not yet fully monetised, money is beginning to play a 
more important role in the system. A whole range of goods and services, which 
could previously only be acquired through the enterprise or connections in the 
distribution network, can now simply be bought for money: flats, cars, holidays 
and erstwhile 'luxuries' such as condensed milk. Of course, workers who receive 
their un-indexed wages several months late do not have much chance of buying a 
249 
flat on the open market, IS while acquiring a car is a major struggle. Moreover, the 
fact that the payment of wages up to four months late does not lead to mass 
starvation and riots shows the extent to which money is still not what determines 
the ability to survive in Russia. Nonetheless, it can now open a whole variety of 
doors to which blat previously constituted the key. This has made many small 
details of life, in particular visits to food stores, far easier, but in general workers 
feel that one form of exclusion and injustice has simply been exchanged for 
another, with the winners and losers remaining largely the same. The comment of 
this male worker neatly captures this feeling: 
It's very hard. My daughter tried to get into college here .... They said to them 
openly, you're all troikas [grade threes] and so if you want to get in you're 
going to have to pay - weB, she'd been getting fours and fives at school, but it 
makes no difference. Before you needed blat, but now money determines 
everything. You have to pay. So the mine administration will all make sure that 
their children are properly educated just like they were before: the mine can 
pay .... The only thing that has improved is that before the shops were empty and 
you needed blat to buy anything. Now you just need money. 
Others felt that money was gradually replacing the uncertain currency of blat, and 
that bribery was now more pervasive than blat had been in the past: 
It's even more unjust now than it used to be. Now bribes are becoming more 
important than they were in the past. It's impossible to live honestly these days. 
'Chestnyi' [honest] is a word which will soon disappear from our language ... 
UTo buy a flat pod zarplatu through the enterprise it is still necessary to be at the top of the 
housing waiting list. 
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Under communism there were boundaries. You knew that you could go thus far 
and no further .... Blat always existed of course, but there was some level of 
control. You could complain to the Party committee. Now there is no control at 
all. 
Thus, although the forms of division may be changing within the enterprise, 
workers feel as excluded as they ever did. 
The limits of collectivism 
From this standpoint the ideal of the harmonious collective is shown up to be a 
sham and a deception: the enterprise is clearly divided into 'them and us'. And, 
broadly, this 'them and us' means managers and workers. Thus, though workers at 
some level aspire, on behalf of their enterprises, to the ideal of the united 
collective, they also have a strongly developed oppositional consciousness.16 
Indeed, their critique of their society could be described as 'total' in that it is not 
confined to the workplace: workers see the world in terms of a hierarchy in and 
outside work in which they are definitely at the bottom. Notwithstanding the 
misogynist undertones of the animus against female office workers, it could be 
16Burawoy and Luklics (1992) have argued, with reference to Hungary, that the regime of 
production under state socialism was more conducive to the development of class consciousness 
than that of capitalism, claiming that 'class consciousness is endemic to socialist production' (p. 
S3). They argue, however, that the consciousness produced is 'negative', in that it is purely 
oppositional, and that a 'positive' consciousness, 'a vision of an alternative order ... can only be 
forged in class mobilisation' (p.114). It is this step from 'negative' to 'positive' class 
consciousness which proves so elusive in the post-Soviet context. 
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argued, then, that blat engenders a consciousness in workers which is radical and 
even potentially revolutionary.J7 But there is a major obstacle on the road to 
revolution: the community of the neblatnye is only defined negatively in relation 
to the enterprise 'insiders', and as such has only an emotional and rhetorical 
existence. 
The apparent unity of the 'simple workers' in opposition to their blatnye managers 
conceals other foci of collective identification, as well as divisions between 
workers. The definition of a 'simple worker' can be a slippery issue and hence the 
boundaries of the 'them and us' are constantly shifting. As with blat, an individual 
can be an insider in one situation and an outsider in another. And although in 
general workers assume a unity between themselves and colleagues in non-
managerial, dirty, manual, unpleasant or unskilled jobs, such a collectivity can 
shatter in concrete situations. The following extract of a face worker at Taldym 
mine talking about the decision of a trade union meeting to stop paying its female 
employees for a monthly 'women's day' at home, gives an interesting insight into 
this process: 
Up until then [the last trade union meeting] the collective agreement gave 
women one paid free day. At the expense of the mine, at my expense, at the 
17Workers' denunciations of injustice would certainly excite anyone looking for evidence of 
revolutionary potential in the Russian working class. One worker, for example, after denouncing 
the division of the mine into 'black' and 'white' people, was explicit in her intentions: 'The 
chinovniki [officials] are bourgeois. We need to get them all against the wall and shoot the lot of 
them - And I want to watch'. David Mandel's published interviews also contain many extracts 
which highlight the rhetorical radicalism of Russian workers and union leaders (Mandel, 1993). 
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expense of my comrade. It's bad is it, that my wife has one free day to spend 
with the children? I'd give her half my wages. Let her spend time with the 
children. That's not how it worked out. One clever clogs got up - perhaps he 
didn't have children - [and said] 'why should I give my money to that lot?' '" 
How many women are there at the mine? You can count them on one hand. The 
office workers, for instance, well, what do they do? And then there are those 
[collectives] such as the lampovaya, the technical complex and the zaryadnoe 
where the conditions are diabolical... 
There are normal men ... and then there are men who for a kopek are prepared to 
take money away from a comrade at work .... They think like this, 'they sit there 
in the lampovaya and they don't do a blind bit of work. They sit there in the 
lampovaya, I'm fucked ifl'm going to give them my money'. Yes, they sit there 
in the dust and the dirt ... 
Of course men, they think about women at the mine: the office workers sit there, 
three storeys of them and they fleece us .... Someone should have stood up and 
said 'Don't pay the office workers'. But there are women who have labour-
intensive work, dirty [work]. They should have been paid. 
This extract gives a good indication of the shifting nature of the workers' 
collective identification. Some male workers, it is argued, don't see women in 
collectives such as the /ampovaya as real workers and assume the women sit 
around all day. Since the women lost their paid 'women's day' at this meeting it 
can be assumed that some male workers do hold this view. Other workers, such as 
the speaker, have a different view. Women who do dirty work in diabolical 
conditions are worthy of respect. All are apparently clear on one thing: the office 
workers are not simple workers, they are parasites. Although definitions of the 
worker camp differ, this potent division between simple workers and the mine 
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administration is felt by all. Nevertheless, amid the confusion over collective 
identification, women workers lost out. Their defeat illustrates the limitations 
imposed by the fact that the seemingly passionate solidarity of the neblatnye is 
only negatively defined. Although continually re-asserted verbally, the collectivity 
of the neblatnye dissolves in the face of other cleavages such as that between 
miners and female surface workers illustrated above. 
Such divisions are not even confined to different categories of worker. For 
example, female surface workers from different collectives display a striking lack 
of solidarity with each other. This was dramatically illustrated at the 1995 meeting 
to review and revise the collective agreement at Taldym. First of all, the trade 
union president proposed that the lowest paid workers at the mine - the women 
who work at the profilaktorii - should be the first to be paid the back pay that they 
were owed because, he claimed, it was impossible to survive on such low wages if 
they were paid late. This proposal was agreed to by the meeting, but not before a 
few derisory comments had been made by other women workers: 'We could all 
get up and tell the meeting our monthly wage and argue that paying such low 
wages late was impossible'. Then, during a different discussion on pay, a 
representative from the kotel 'naya stood up and complained about the pay and 
conditions in her collective, claiming that miners who visited the collective were 
usually shocked and had often commented that the women working there would 
have an easier, and much better paid, time working underground. Despite her 
compelling description of the discomfort of the boiler house, however, the speaker 
did not elicit any sympathy among the delegation from the lampovaya, the 
outspoken leader of which was scornful. She stood up to oppose a pay rise for the 
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kote/'naya and claimed (erroneously) that the conditions there were no worse than 
those in the /ampovaya. The incident ended with the issue of rhetorical invitations 
between the two collectives, each daring the other to come and discover the nature 
of real work. Thus, while workers, when criticising management, often conjure up 
the image of 'simple workers' united in their oppression, there is actually very 
little solidarity between workers outside the confines of their work groups. IS This 
partly reflects the strength of particularism based on the insular cultures of 
immediate work collectives, but at the same time it highlights the weakness of 
workers' identification with each other as workers. 19 
The potential for collective organisation on the basis of the collectivism of the 
immediate work group is the subject of the next chapter, but before moving on to 
examine relations at this level it is important to ask why a more general form of 
workers' solidarity, which is so frequently invoked rhetorically, has not emerged. 
Why do the neb/atnye remain as a negatively defined grouping? Why, in concrete 
moments of conflict, do workers so rarely unite against their managers? 
IBThis is con finned by research at other enterprises. A survey of workers at a Moscow light 
engineering factory, for example, found that workers were only ready to support members of their 
own subdivisions in defending their rights (Kabalina et al., 1996: 242) 
19What this particular example also reveals is women's lack of solidarity with each other as 
women. 
255 
Contested identities 
Workers at Taldym mine express their attachment to the collective at every turn, 
but at the same time the precise focus of their identification is difficult to pin 
down. At first sight it seems that workers have a strong loyalty to 'their mine' 
despite all its imperfections. It soon becomes clear, however, that the workforce is 
deeply divided between the blatnye and neblatnye. But the neblatnye do not stick 
together when it counts. Meanwhile, although loyalty to the immediate work 
group is strong, even at this level, as will be seen, collective identification rarely 
extends into sustained and active mutual defence. In short, it becomes apparent 
that there is no 'real' site of collectivity, but that the collective identification of 
workers shifts according to the circumstances. This is possible because the fonns 
of collectivity that exist, though real enough for the workers at the moment of 
articulation, are never given any kind of organisational expression. So, as 
mentioned above, the neblatnye, though they definitely feel a community of 
interests with each other, are really only a notional, negatively defined grouping. 
Meanwhile, all-mine collectivism takes a patemalist form in which all 
expectations are directed at the figure of the director. 
Their shifting sense of collective identification renders workers peculiarly 
vulnerable to managerial manipulation. When discontent is simmering, managers, 
whose worst nightmare is independent worker mobilisation, employ the ideal of 
the united labour collective to full effect. Although in casual conversation 
identification with the labour collective as a whole does not arouse anything like 
the passion which workers summon up when they talk about blat, 'our mine', 
256 
does, as argued above, have a special place in their hearts. Managers appeal to this 
reserve of latent loyalty on a frequent basis. The example of the shift meetings on 
the eve of the miners' day celebrations in 1996 has already been discussed in 
Chapter Six. Such meetings also occurred in the era of the previous director: the 
hostility between the trade union president and the mine director did not prevent 
them from working together in an effort to contain conflict at the mine. For 
example, in October 1994 Rosugleprof held a demonstration in Kemerovo in 
protest at late payment of wages and the government threat to social subsidies 
channelled through the mines. At a time of rising tension, the trade union at 
Taldym mine held shift meetings to inform the workers about the protest. Again 
these meetings, like those in August 1996, were designed to emphasise the 
community of interest between the mine director and the workers. The trade union 
president gave a speech in which he explicitly said that his union would be 
working in co-operation with the mine directors against the government. The mine 
director, meanwhile, also attended and in his speech gave his blessing to the 
protest (to which each mine had sent only a handful of representatives in order to 
avoid any disruption). At the same time he announced a new patemalist initiative: 
the mine had received some new cars in a barter transaction and it would sell these 
for cash in order to pay arrears in holiday pay, make a few discretionary payments 
to those especially in need and buy a new bus. This precisely parallels the strategy 
of his successor at the August 1996 meetings: the decision to use the cars for the 
good of the many, rather than distribute them to the few, appeals to exactly the 
same sentiments as the decision that the office workers would not receive an 
'advance' on their wages to spend on Miners' Day. 
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It is clear that, for the moment at least, such tactics will prove successful at 
Taldym mine. For all the workers' disdain of the management, the appeal for the 
labour collective as a whole to struggle against Moscow is very potent and allows 
the director to structure workers' grievances to suit his own purposes. Meanwhile, 
the workers, because they have no alternative organisation of their own, lose sight 
of their own interests. They continue to moan about injustice in the enterprise, but, 
for the moment, workers' organised action does not go beyond their participation 
in management-controlled campaigns against the government. 20 Meanwhile, when 
anger is directed at management it is within a 'one enterprise' framework: workers 
worry that their present managers are not capable of getting the mine through the 
crisis. In spite of episodic eruptions when the collective dismisses its leaders with 
abandon, the leader remains, for good or ill, the embodiment of the collective. It is 
the chief who is responsible for the good or bad fortune of the collective and the 
immediate solution to bad fortune is not to give more reality to the collectivism of 
the labour collective, but always to elect a new chief. 
But why do workers not challenge this vision, even if only on a limited basis 
within the mine? While the chapters on trade unions have shown that there are 
objective reasons for the labour collective to unite against the 'outside world', the 
interests of workers and managers do, nonetheless, diverge and workers are well 
20rhis recalls the events of the 1989 strike. In this case, the workers did begin with their own 
agenda but the mine directors did their best to retain at least the appearance of a common interest 
with them, while the regional authorities were able to use the miners' strike as a means of pressing 
their own demands against Moscow (Clarke et al .• 1995: 17 - 80). 
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aware of this fact. Why do they not seek to resolve their problems with 
management through independent organisation?21 In part, of course, it is because 
although the Soviet authorities promoted ritual collectivism within enterprises, 
they suppressed any form of independent collective organisation. But this cannot 
fully explain why now, in a much freer climate, there is scant sign of burgeoning 
collective organisation. Fear of the authorities has to some extent been replaced by 
fear of redundancy, but though this is a hindrance to worker organisation, at 
Taldym such fear is in no way overwhelming.22 Workers still have the courage to 
21This question will be returned to in more detail in Chapter Nine. It is obviously complex because 
some the important problems confronting workers cannot be resolved within the enterprise, most 
notably that of late pay. As one worker put it. 'Neither the brigadier, the shop chief, nor the trade 
union can do anything about late pay'. Nevertheless, as indicated in the section on b/at, workers 
are under the impression that managers and those connected to them are paid before they are. It is 
therefore legitimate to ask why workers make no collective attempt to deal with this and similar 
forms of injustice about which they constantly complain. 
22The 'whip' of the labour market is beginning to exert a greater influence on Russian workers, 
and fear of dismissal is now sometimes cited by workers as a reason for their lack of protest. (See, 
for example, Kabalina et al., 1996: 243). The extent of this should not be exaggerated, however. 
Unemployment has so far not followed from reform in the automatic fashion that most economic 
commentators expected and it does not constitute a sufficient explanation for workers' lack of 
protest in the present period. Workers at Taldym do claim that managers' habitual response to any 
complaints is now: 'You don't like it? Then leave'. In fact, however, workers at the mine are very 
rarely sacked for anything other than drunkenness (and even this has only become firm policy 
since 1995). Workers may have become more concerned about hanging onto their jobs than they 
were in the past, but this is not why they fail to organise collectively: they do not even consider 
collective organisation as a response to their problems. This ingrained individualism is what the 
259 
talk about their individual grievances. Managerial tactics are another factor, but 
why are they so successful? The solution to this problem in fact comes back to the 
system of state paternalism described in the introduction. As has been argued 
above, in the absence of money, relations within the enterprise became highly 
personalised. Position was all-important, and so were relationships to those in a 
position of power. The discretionary nature of benefits within the enterprise forced 
workers to confront those in authority as individuals rather than as members of a 
collective. So though ordinary workers generally feel themselves to be outside the 
ranks of the blatnye, it is almost impossible for them not to become to some 
degree ensnared in the endemic special pleading and deal-making within the 
enterprise. To challenge this relentless individualisation is very difficult precisely 
because most workers are implicated some way or another, and are used to the 
system. Their instinctive reaction to any problem is to seek an accommodation 
with the appropriate member ofmanagement.23 Collective action, meanwhile, is an 
following section seeks to explain. For more details on the phenomenon of 'structural adjustment 
without mass unemployment' see Clarke, 1996a. 
231n the past one of the options open to workers was to make an individual complaint to the mine 
party committee or the gorkom. As has already been discussed on the chapter on Vishnovka, if the 
problem was deemed sufficiently serious then the Party would often intervene on the worker's 
behalf. The evidence from Taldym completely supports Ilyin and Ilyina's (1996) assessment of the 
role of the Party in the enterprise: 'If at the level of the country as a whole the liquidation of the 
CPSU was a great leap forward in the democratisation of the country, in enterprises the liquidation 
of the primary party organisation meant the liquidation of the sole effective form of control of the 
activity of the administration on the part of the labour collective' (pp. 378 - 379). It should be 
stressed, however, that the control exercised by 'the labour collective' was not 'collective' in 
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unknown quantity with the potential to destroy predictable, and sometimes 
profitable, relationships. 
This does not only apply to the sort of personal problems taken to the director's 
surgery discussed in the section on the labour collective. Workers will often make 
individual approaches to the director on questions of a collective nature. And they 
often deliberately couch their pleas in personal terms, playing on his pride and 
appealing to him as a 'human being' to live up to their expectations of a 'good 
father' ,24 The shop trade union president from the lampovaya, for example, was 
able to trap the director into agreeing to pay for new overalls for her collective 
through precisely such means, by questioning the truth of his claims that he would 
love to help if only he had the money to do so. Her account of her encounter also 
neatly captures the atmosphere of the patemalist enterprise (though there is 
obviously a gendered aspect to this tale): 
I kept going to the director until he agreed [to give us the overalls]. I was in his 
office nearly every morning. Finally one day he said 'Do you know what a fuss 
character: generally the Party would be approached by dissatisfied individuals rather than groups 
and the Party decided whether or not to pursue the complaints 'in the interests of the collective'. 
24Such appeals are surprisingly potent in the Russian context. ]t is a matter of pride to be able to 
provide to petitioners (on a selective basis, of course). The present director, for example, who is 
currently waging a campaign against drunkenness, was persuaded to give a job as a fitter in a 
development shop to the alcoholic husband of a woman he had worked with as a young shop 
chief. The man in question had been sacked from the open cast mine and refused employment 
everywhere else he had applied. The Taldym director, however, immediately agreed to take him, 
reportedly with the words, 'A man who can't help a friend is no better than a pig.' 
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the chief accountant will make if I sign for you to get this money for new 
overal1s? She told me off only yesterday for signing too much money away'. I 
said, 'OK, but so that I know that you've real1y tried, phone her now while I'm 
here and we'll see what she says'. He said 'Oooh, [ like people who deal with 
me like this - that's the way to get something done'. So he called her. He said, 
'You know that I prefer to undress women, but in this case I'm going to do the 
opposite - I'm going to dress the /ampovaya.' She [the accountant] said that 
there was no money at the mine that day, but that I could go and get it on 
Monday. 
The personal, and especially woman's,2s touch is frequently resorted to in this way 
to deal with a whole variety of problems. For example, a similar scene was played 
out at the end of two separate large scale mine meetings. After a meeting of 
brigadiers in October 1995, a brigadier from the technical complex sidled up to the 
director in the corridor and appealed to him, as a paternalist, to improve the wages 
of women workers of the technical complex. The director smiled but promised, 
and delivered, nothing. Meanwhile, after a meeting of the shareholders' society in 
June 1995, the brigadier from the zaryadnoe approached him, and asked for the 
'Kuzbass' bus service, which serves the 'private sector' housing of the settlement, 
to be reinstated. This woman had a stronger relationship with the director, and her 
request was cheaper to fulfil. 'Of course, I'll see to it at once' the director replied, 
2sProstration in front of the patemalist is obviously culturally easier for women than it is for men. 
Nevertheless, although men do not appeal to the director as a 'big, strong man' in quite the same 
way as some women workers, they still take care to cultivate informal relations, relying instead on 
notions of honour and responsibility to 'the lads'. 
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smiling, 'I didn't even know it had been stopped,.26 This culture of personalised 
pleading obviously strongly militates against the collective organisation of 
workers. 
Despite this, there are instances of spontaneous collective defence within work 
groups, but these almost always remain on an informal and small-scale footing. At 
the more general level, workers will sometimes mobilise over a specific issue, 
usually a management decision which has a negative effect on their payor 
working conditions, but such mobilisations are fleeting and do not result in the 
establishment of lasting organisational structures.27 Moreover, such activity rarely 
unites the neblatnye as a whole, but is usually confined to one group of workers, 
in most cases mining brigades. Thus, despite all the subterranean tension which 
blat engenders, within an environment in which access to resources is so crucial 
the patronage system at the enterprise is neatly self-perpetuating. 
Monetarisation and informal relations 
Is the gradual monetarisation of the economy undermining patronage networks 
and informal relations within the enterprise and ushering in a society governed by 
261n spite of this promise the bus service has now ceased for good. This points up the fact that 
while such personal appeals may have borne fruit in the past, they are not actually an effective 
way of dealing with the problems created by transition. Old habits die hard, however, and workers 
may have to suffer a good deal more disappointment at the hands of imperfect patemalists before 
they adopt new approaches. 
27The miners' and female surface workers' success in their campaigns to change their respective 
shift systems (the latter of which is discussed in the next chapter) are an example of this. 
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'legal-rational' criteria? So far there is no evidence of this. Individualised informal 
relations extended beyond the regulation of access to goods and services, so even 
were blat to lose its significance in this regard, the culture of the enterprise would 
not change overnight.28 Moreover, the examples cited above show that while the 
various waiting lists at the enterprise may be becoming a less salient feature in the 
reproduction of a culture of individualised relations at the enterprise, for the 
moment blat still plays an important role in the organisation of everyday life. 
Informal relations governed all aspects of the life of the Soviet enterprise. The 
'untechnological, unduplicable, unreproducible' character of Soviet and post-
Soviet production (Alasheev, 1995b: 93) means that line managers are highly 
reliant on the informal co-operation of workers to keep a rickety system on its 
2BThis conclusion is supported by the sociologists Kabalina et al. who, on the basis of their study 
of the Moscow light engineering enterprise, argued that 'monetarisation penetrates and strengthens 
the infonnal relations which ... maintain production.' In the words of the section chief they quote 
in their study, 'Labour relations cannot be fonnalised at all levels, because management simply 
will not play by the rules, infonnal relations will be preserved' (Kabalina et al., 1996: 211). 
Similarly, Sergei Alasheev, in his study of infonnal relations in the Russian enterprise, concluded, 
'If in the past it was important to have acquaintances, connections with Komsomol, Party or trade 
union bureaucrats (the biggest distributors), these organisations have either vanished or their 
distributive functions have been curtailed, but connections with the management of the factory, 
with the shop chief or foreman, with the production structures, remain important' (Alasheev, 
1995a: 67). 
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feet.29 Without significant improvements in supply and organisation, it will be 
difficult to transform this relationship of mutual assistance: none of the attempts to 
transform relations on the shop floor in the Soviet era were successful for this 
reason. 
Meanwhile, the culture of punishment for workplace offences was, like the system 
of distribution, personalised and discretionary. Managers often did not apply 
immediate sanctions for disciplinary infractions, preferring instead to create a 
drawn-out dependence in the worker who had been 'let off this once,.30 This 
culture was explicitly mentioned by workers at Taldym as a reason why it was 
impossible for them to secure improvements in their position. One of the women 
workers from the zaryadnoe, for example, complained bitterly about the high 
concentration of gas in her depot, and the prevalence of respiratory diseases in the 
29In the same way, enterprises are very dependent on line managers running around and engaging 
in all kinds of infonnal deals to secure the supplies needed by their workers. For a detailed 
examination of this element of the Soviet production system see Jlyina, 1996. 
JOFor a more detailed discussion of infonnal relations in Soviet production see Alasheev, 1995a. 
Specifically on work place punitive regimes see Alasheev, 1995a: 52 • 58. The approach of line 
managers to discipline and punishment is perfectly captured by one of the foremen quoted by 
Jlyina in her ethnographic investigation of the role of foremen: 'If a fitter has drunk a bit, the most 
important thing is not to punish him, but to notice the fact and make sure he realises that I have 
noticed. Who has not had one or two? If he is a good worker, if this is not regular, but a lapse, if 
he has drunk a bit, then I can cover for him, and he will be grateful to me and will work even 
better than before, and I will be respected as a tolerant person and as a boss who does not punish 
people for trifles' (Ilyina, 1996: 75). 
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collective. Asked why it was not possible for the workers to press for the 
installation of a more effective ventilation mechanism, she replied: 
Because managers always have something to hold against you. Either they've 
seen you reading at work - which is forbidden - or they have seen you going to 
the canteen. Officially we don't have the right to go to the canteen on our shift 
system. They know that we go, but then if they need to they can use it against us. 
Then there's the night shift. When we have done all our work we often have a 
sleep on the bench here. You never know whether or not you have been seen. 
This is something else that can be used against you. There is always a reason to 
punish or even sack you, so it's impossible to open your mouth. 
This form of individual dependence will only be strengthened as economic reform 
progresses, because while in the past workers would not have been sacked for the 
sort of offences described above, the experience of enterprises where there have 
been large scale redundancies shows that violation of workplace discipline does 
become more dangerous when decisions need to be taken as to which workers to 
dismiss.31 Thus, although fear of the sack is not yet a major determinant of 
workers' behaviour at Taldym, it may well become more important in the future. 
Similarly, transition to a system in which workers receive a straightforward cash 
wage rather than a series of discretionary benefits in kind alongside their wage, 
will not of itself erode the culture of personalised relations within the enterprise. 
Pay systems in the transition era will develop on the basis of norms inherited from 
the Soviet past - and there was always a discretionary element in the payment of 
31For ethnographic accounts of the way in which staff reductions have been carried out in other 
industries see Metalina, 1996 and Kozina, 1996. 
266 
wages as well as in payment in kind. Although payment scales were highly 
formalised and in principle strictly controlled by norms and scales laid down from 
above, in practice line managers enjoyed a considerable amount of discretion in 
determining the earnings of individual workers, particularly through the allocation 
of piece work, the distribution of premiums and bonuses and the imposition of 
various fines and penalties.32 Similarly, at an enterprise level, the wages of 
particular shops or brigades could be inflated beyond the limits of the official pay 
system according to the needs of production and of management. This 
discretionary system is what the trade union president at Taldym tried, and failed, 
to eradicate. His failure is not at all surprising: discretion is the key to managerial 
authority within the enterprise. 
This chapter has provided part of the explanation for the lack of independent 
workers' organisation, concentrating on the shifting nature of workers' collective 
identification and the culture of informal relations within the enterprise which, it 
has been argued, promotes individual dependence and discourages collective 
organisation. This still leaves one question unanswered: are there any mechanisms 
through which conflicts of a collective nature can be resolved within the 
enterprise? As has been seen above, workers are able to resolve some of their 
problems through individual approaches to members of the administration. But 
32For examples of this see Vedeneeva, 1995: 224 - 239 and Donova, 1996: 41 - 62. I1yina also 
notes that foremen are able to determine the coefficient of labour participation (KTU) as a way as 
rewarding or punishing workers, and can also encourage workers through use of the so-ca11ed 
'foreman's fund' (I1yina, 1996: 76 - 7). 
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questions of a collective nature generally cannot be resolved in this way, as the 
failure of the individual pleas for a pay rise for the technical complex and the 
restoration of the 'Kuzbass' bus service reveal. So how do immediate work 
collectives deal with their problems? Are there any channels through which they 
are able to express their grievances? And if workers do collectively defend their 
interests within work groups, could this form the basis for wider workers' 
organisation? The next chapter will consider these questions, focusing on the 
nature of collectivism and collective action at the level of the immediate work 
groups. 
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Chapter Eight: The Lampovaya: The Stunted 
Collectivism of the Immediate Work Group 
'The /ampovaya is the heart of the mine' (Quotation from the former 
forewoman, Anna Petrovna's, retirement album). 
To assess the ability of the workers to give a more substantial reality to 
collectivism within the enterprise we have to turn from consideration of the 
collective as a whole to analyse the immediate work collective. The collectivism 
of the immediate work groups, like that of the labour collective, has a symbolic 
dimension, but it has a more tangible reality in the particular social relations 
formed at the level of the work group. If a new form of collectivism is to emerge it 
is most likely to be based in the first instance on the collectivity of work groups. 
The next section of this chapter therefore focuses on the nature of workers' 
relations to their immediate work collectives. Then, on the basis of a case study of 
one such collective, the lampovaya, the chapter goes on to chart the development 
of social relations in these collectives from the late perestroika period onwards. It 
argues that while the collapse of the Party and the erosion of discipline at the mine 
allowed the work collectives more autonomy, workers have proved unable to 
. develop the collectivist potential immanent within immediate work collectives. 
'My collective· my second family' 
The immediate work collective was the point at which the individual's integration 
into Soviet society was monitored and regulated, but it was also a focus of 
sociability where workers spent half their lives together. The effectiveness of the 
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work collective as a locus of social integration and control depended on the fact 
that individuals were attached to their work collectives. This section describes the 
relations of workers to their collectives and highlights the centrality of the 
collective in their lives. 
Soviet communism imposed a particular form of relation to the work collective 
which had both a material and an ideological basis. First, the impoverishment of 
the material conditions of private existence was the corollary of the provision of 
social and cultural facilities through the workplace. Cramped housing conditions 
and the lack of leisure facilities in the Russian urban context mean that work is 
both an escape from the drudgery of home and a welcome opportunity for 
communal sociability. As Alasheev has argued, workers 'live in such conditions 
that work ... is the single socially approved possibility of self realisation' 
(Alasheev, 1995b: 71). This material basis of workplace collectivism has outlasted 
the system that gave rise to it. Secondly, the communist authorities continually 
stressed the value of 'the collective' and, although workers did not relate 
uncritically to communist categories, these did have a lasting influence on their 
perception. Thus, while the precise significance accorded to the collective by 
workers differed from that prescribed in official discourse, the idea that the work 
collective was a crucial reference point was common to both. This is true for both 
male and female workers. Men and women do not relate to their collectives -
which in the mine are almost exclusively either all-male or all-female - in 
precisely the same way, but both attach similar levels of importance to their lives 
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within the collective.· The same point can be made about different categories of 
workers, such as male surface-workers and miners. 
The following discussion of relations to the collective draws on interviews with 
male and female workers at Taldym conducted in the years 1994 - 1996. The 
quotations used in this section illustrate a particular kind of attachment to the 
collective which still exists, but it is important to point out that there is an 
increasing tendency for workers to note that their collectives are becoming less 
close, that life at the mine is becoming 'less interesting', and that work is 
becoming less important to them because 'they don't pay us'. This was especially 
marked in August 1996, a time at which the mineworkers had not been paid for 
three months. The following section thus isolates a set of attitudes which appear to 
be being transformed in the present stage of transition, though they nonetheless 
still inform workers' normative expectations: work and the collective may be 
becoming less important, but this is far from a welcome development. Indeed, the 
pervasive sense of loss induced by the waning of this form of communal 
sociability fuels the longing for security and protection which characterises 
contemporary Russian political life. This development is one of the themes of the 
next chapter. 
Both male and female workers describe the collective as a welcome retreat from 
the pressures of home, though since men and women face different domestic 
pressures, they tend to look for a different kind of relief at work. For women, there 
are two main themes. First, women workers often claim that their work within the 
'For more details on women's attitudes to work see Ashwin and Bowers, 1997. 
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collective is less arduous than their work at home. At home they feel isolated and 
under constant pressure, while at work their load is lightened by companionship. 
Since work at home not only involves traditional 'women's work' such as 
washing and cooking, but also includes fruit and vegetable production and often 
animal husbandry as well, it is often at least as physically exacting work at the 
mine, if not more so. This was the view of a brigadier from the zaryadnoe, who 
keeps cows, pigs and chickens: 
There are breaks at work when you can rest. You can't rest at home. There is 
always something to be done. I have the cows to look after. My mother helps me 
a lot but there is still a great deal to be done. The home has to be in order .... 
Work is hard, but not always. Perhaps it's because you are in a collective that the 
time goes quicker. It seems that soon after you arrive it's time to leave. You can 
chat and you don't notice the time going by. At home you work on your own. 
Thus, rather than home being viewed as a refuge from work, for women the 
collective in some respects acts as a haven from the pressures of running a 
household.2 
2A number of women argued that work at the mine was actually a defence against housework: 
because they worked at the mine (usually on twelve-hour shifts) and were not always available, 
their partners were forced to take more domestic responsibility. Most of the husbands of 
mineworkers with children had, for example, been forced to develop their culinary skills at least to 
the level where they could feed the children when their wives were on shift. One worker from the 
lampovaya made exactly this point. Her husband is a face-worker in one of the most successful 
shops at the mine and has enough money to support his family. He had been trying to persuade his 
wife to give up work, but she had no intention of doing so. She liked the fact that her husband 
gave her some help with her housework, and claimed that this partnership would be instantly 
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Secondly, women describe the collective as a social focus and vital source of 
emotional support. This can be seen, for example, in women's re-appropriation of 
the Soviet era expression 'Off to work, like to a holiday' (na rabotu kak na 
prazdnik), which, along with expressions such as 'we pretend to work and they 
pretend to pay us', made joking reference to the supposedly endemic slacking 
among Soviet workers. This expression cropped up several times in interviews 
with women workers from a variety of collectives, but it was not employed 
ironically. Instead it was both posited as an ideal and used descriptively. One 
worker from the lampovaya, for example, talking about what she felt was the 
wonderful atmosphere that had prevailed in her collective before the forewoman 
had decided to break up established shift teams, claimed: 
I used to look forward to going to work - I went to work kak na prazdnik. If I 
had any problems I used to get to work and tell the girls about it and they'd say, 
'Don't worry Lyuda it'll all work out' and I already used to feel better. We all 
used to help each other. For example, we used to fight over the floor cloth: I'd 
say, 'look you have a rest I'11 do the floor today' and they'd say, 'No Lyuda, 
you're always doing it, let us do it'. 
In their emphasis on the value of their collectives, women have adapted 
communist ideas of the past in the light of their own experience: they treat the idea 
of the collective with a reverence that the communist authorities would have found 
very pleasing, but in place of the rather sterile idea of the collective as a cell 
working towards the construction of the communist future, for women the 
. dissolved if she agreed to give up work: 'You're at home al1 day, do it yourself, that's what our 
men say'. 
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collective is a vital support network. The seriousness with which women approach 
the role of the collective can clearly be seen in the following comments made by 
the brigadier of the zaryadnoe. She explained how a worker had recently joined 
the collective, and, as was the brigadier's custom, while explaining the job to the 
new worker she had taken the opportunity to ask her about her family background 
and so on. The young worker resisted answering her questions and finally said, 
'Don't pry into my soul'. At this point, the brigadier felt compelled to explain the 
meaning of the collective to the new worker: 
I'm sorry, but we all know each others' problems here. The collective is your 
second family. You come to work and you can express [vyskazat 1 your feelings, 
talk about your problems and then you'll feel better. That is how it should be. 
The brigadier was genuinely perturbed by the attitude of the new, 'closed' member 
of the collective and she was determined that she should learn the proper place of 
work in life. As this example shows, feelings about the importance of the 
collective do not just reflect daily experience, they also contain a normative 
component: this is what work should be about. 
The idea of the collective as a 'second family' constantly recurred in interviews 
with female workers.3 Indeed, it functions as a buttress to the actual family which 
3Such ideas are by no means exclusive to women working in mining. A recent study of a Samara 
chocolate factory with a predominantly female labour force revealed exactly the same attitudes: 
the conference paper in which they were analysed was entitled 'My factory • My home' 
(Romanov,1996). 
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is usually portrayed as the cause of distress. The following formulation of a 
worker from the /ampovaya is typical: 
We are like a family. We can discuss personal problems together, for example, if 
someone has a problem with her husband. We give advice. Everyone has 
someone in the collective whom they trust. 
Meanwhile, the collective also provides stimulation which is often lacking in the 
home. The latter point is well captured in the explanation of this retired worker 
from the /ampovaya as to why she wanted to return to work: 
The collective is your second family. I, for example, do not need to work for the 
money - my husband and son are miners. But I will look for work in the winter 
because I need to be in a collective. I need to be with people. Housework gets 
very boring. And your family, well you can get bored of them too if you don't 
see anyone else. Human beings need to socialise. 
Male workers do not express their attachment to the collective in these terms and 
would only very occasionally refer to the collective as a family. This is partly 
because the prevailing norms of masculine behaviour mean that it is less 
appropriate for men to describe their relations using 'feminine' family imagery, 
but it also reflects the fact that the nature of the respite provided by male 
collectives is different: while female collectives tend to have a confessional, 
confiding culture, for men the collective offers light relief. The difference is well 
captured by the comments of a group of fitters from one of the in-mine transport 
shops: 
Fitter 1: How could we survive now without the collective? 
Fitter 2: You come to work and the collective raises your spirits .... we're a 
cheerful collective. 
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Fitter 3: Yes, we've got our own 'circus' here, we don't need to go and pay for 
it. He's on leave at the moment, although our clown's still here. 
As mentioned in Chapter Three, it is common for such collectives to go drinking 
together after work a few times a month,4 and many workers also go fishing with 
work mates in summer. A significant part of the pleasure of these encounters 
derives from the all-male company, which again provides a haven from what male 
workers tend to portray as the female-dominated domestic world. The value 
placed on the all-male company of the work collective is well captured in the 
bemused response of the fitters quoted above to a question about why they didn't 
drink with women: 
Fitter 1: How could we? It's not possible. It's after work and we're together and 
she's got things to do at home. 
Fitter 2: We're an exclusively male collective. The only time we drink with 
women is on holidays and birthdays. They drive us out [of the home]. 
Their collectives offer both male and female workers companionship and an 
important forum of self-expression, although, as indicated above, the nature of the 
interaction within the collectives differs. Partly as a consequence of the different 
functions of the collective in the lives of men and women, a notable distinction 
between the two groups is that male collectives tend to socialise together outside 
~Many male workers noted, however, that such impromptu gatherings were becoming less 
common. Explanations for this included the lack of money for vodka caused by wage delays and 
the fact that work on allotments was taking up so much of their time. 
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work time - clowning is even more enjoyable with the addition of vodka - while 
women workers tend to have separate networks of friends outside work. 
Another distinction in the attitudes of the two groups is that men, unlike women, 
do not see work at the mine as less onerous than the work they perform at home, 
which includes tasks such as tending the family plots, chopping wood, and in the 
case of those with livestock, hay-making in summer. In the case of underground 
workers, the reasons for this are self-explanatory. More generally this difference 
can be explained by the nature of the sexual division of labour in the home. 
Women not only have more work, they also feel that work at the mine is more 
meaningful and socially valuable than cooking and housework, the prevailing 
attitude to which is well captured in the comment of one woman worker, 'You 
cook a meal, it gets eaten and then what have you got to show for it?' Meanwhile, 
the productive and creative nature of work on family plots, which constitutes the 
bulk of the male contribution to the household, means that both men and women 
tend to view it not only as a necessity, but also as a hobby. 
Both men and women workers have a strong sense of identification with the 
collective which gives them both support and a sense of meaning of life. The 
importance attached to the co-operative culture at work, and the value of the 
relations built up over time are well captured by the warmth and feeling with 
which the miner quoted below spoke of the (model and highly productive) brigade 
to which he had belonged for nearly his whole working life. The brigade had been 
transferred en masse from a nearby mine to Taldym where it worked for several 
years before being disbanded. Recently, however, its members had been reunited 
when the (locally famous) brigadier agreed to return to work after a long illness - a 
277 
history which in itself says a good deal about the strength of relations within the 
collective. The miner portrayed a solidaristic culture of mutual support and 
understanding: 
Once they divided us up. I don't know why. It was simply stupid ... .lt seems to 
me that when a collective's friendly, as they say tight-knit [skolochennyi], where 
everyone knows each other, you work better because you understand each other 
in half a word, half a look, even .... We're very close [splochennYll, not quite as 
much as before ... but before we were very friendly. The collective alone 
decided everything. For example, if someone worked with us in a low skill 
category, and the collective decided it wanted to we'd go to the brigadier and 
say, 'This person works with us and like us, and he should be paid the same as 
us, regardless of his category.' 
The attachment to both the social reality and the idea of the collective which 
comes across in this quotation and those of the women workers cited above is a 
distinctive feature of Russian working life. But does the collectivity of the work 
group provide a basis for independent workers' organisation? The next section 
attempts to answer this question through an analysis of the /ampovaya. 
The work of the /ampovaya 
Although there are individual exceptions, the same situation exists at every 
enterprise. [Corruption] starts in the Kremlin and goes down to the mine level. 
You find it at the smallest kindergarten, at every enterprise - everywhere in 
Russia it's the same. [Anna Petrovna, former forewoman of the lampovaya.] 
The /ampovaya is a small collective of only thirty-two workers. This chapter 
argues, however, that events in the /ampovaya exemplify in microcosm processes 
occurring both within the mine, and more widely in other Russian enterprises. For, 
278 
while workers feel a strong identification with their immediate work collectives, 
they reproduce within them the same hierarchical and paternalistic form of 
relations which exist within the mine (and indeed the coal industry) as a whole.s 
The /ampovaya is the collective responsible for the re-charging and maintenance 
of the miners' lamps and for monitoring the attendance of underground workers. 
Underground workers from all shops are obliged to register at the /ampovaya both 
before going down the pit and on their return. The /ampovaya is an autonomous 
unit within the mine, managed by a forewoman (master), although the collective 
formally comes under the jurisdiction of the chief of the ventilation and technical 
safety shop. 
The collective is divided into four brigades of seven workers. The brigades are in 
effect shift teams, working according to a twelve-hour shift system. In addition to 
the brigade members, the collective comprises one tabel'shchitsa (time-keeper), 
responsible for keeping records of miners' annual leave, sick leave and attendance 
and undertaking the associated paperwork, and two fitters responsible for repairing 
defective lamps. These members of the collective work a five-day week, eight 
until four, as does the forewoman. 
Each brigade is led by a brigadier, responsible for ensuring that the shift fulfils the 
required amount of work. Unlike in some other collectives the brigadiers are not 
STIle following analysis and narrative on which it is based has been chosen because it starkly 
reveals a dynamic which could be observed in col\ectives throughout the mine. This claim is 
substantiated at the end of the chapter in a section which discusses the form the same process takes 
in other collectives. 
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elected, but are appointed by the forewoman. There is actually no competition for 
the place of brigadier, because it is the brigadier who is responsible for any 
mistakes made by her workers. For this reason, the forewoman tends to rotate the 
position among the most senior members of the collective. As one brigadier 
commented: 
Even if everyone who should be on shift is at work, I still have to answer for any 
mistakes that are made. If I don't notice and correct a mistake in time, it is 
counted as my mistake .... No one wants to be brigadier, so we only do the job 
for a year and then change over. No one wants the responsibility. 
Meanwhile, within each brigade there is a tabel'shchitsa who is responsible for 
filling in the attendance of the miners into the grafik record books of each shop on 
a daily basis. This task is also in principle rotated within the brigades, but the 
forewoman decides who should do it, and in practice some workers are chosen to 
do this job far more often than others. 
The forewoman is responsible for ensuring that the work of the collective is 
properly implemented - that the lamps are re-charged and function for the correct 
amount of time; that the shop chiefs receive all the information they require; that 
any miners who have failed to turn up for work are contacted and so on. Miners 
also have to have their requests for annual leave signed by the master of the 
lampovaya: the signature can only be obtained if they do not have an unexplained 
absence (progul) recorded against them.6 The forewoman assigns duties (the 
6The forewoman exercises this power in the imperialistic manner characteristic of female 
administrative staff at the mine. On one occasion she discovered a progul in the records of a miner 
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naryad) to the brigades and makes sure that they fulfil them; she determines the 
work roster of the collective. Essentially, she is the immediate line manager of the 
workers of the lampovaya, but because of the autonomous status of the collective, 
she has slightly more managerial responsibility 'than foremen and women in other 
collectives. 
The day of the lampovaya begins with the miners arriving for the first shift. They 
begin to arrive from 7.00 onwards for a shift which begins at 8.00 at the coal face.' 
Until the spring of 1996 the miners collected their lamps themselves, dropping a 
token with their number on it into the boxes of the different shops lined up along 
the 'front desk' of the lampovaya as they left. Now, however, the lampovaya has 
been 'closed' and the women bring the miners their lamps and record their arrival. 
Management introduced this change - which is unpopular among the women 
because it means more work and among miners because it means they often end 
up waiting in a queue - because they deemed that too many lamps were going 
• • 8 
mIssmg. 
who had come to her for a signature, and her tone immediately changed from grudging politeness 
to open rudeness. She shifted directly from the polite 'you' form (ry) to the familiar ty form, and 
refused to make any enquiries as to whether the records were correct or not. This form of 
humiliation (unizhenie) is highly effective way of disempowering workers. It is, however, also a 
major cause of resentment. 
7Taldym has three mining shifts in twenty-four hours: 8.00 to 16.00, 16.00 to 00.00, 00.00 to 8.00. 
The first of these is a maintenance shift. 
8The women discussed requesting a time-motion study to determine whether their wages should be 
raised as a result of the change, b~t they were unable to reach agreement on the issue. Eventually, 
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After all the miners have been dispatched, the women check off the tokens against 
the lists they have received from the shop foremen as to who should have turned 
up for work. This takes some time. Later the label'shchitsa copies the results into 
the official shop grajik books. Very soon after this job is accomplished, miners 
from the third shift begin arriving back from the mine. Previously, the miners 
called out their numbers to the women who stood at strategic points round the 
lamp racks, but after the 'closure' of the lampovaya, the women now replace the 
lamps themselves. Having done so they again check the numbers against the lists 
of those recorded as going down the mine, information which is later recorded 
officially by the label'shchilsa. It is the responsibility of the workers of the 
lampovaya to notify the mine duty officer if any miners have failed to return from 
the pit. They are also supposed to mark down in the grajik books any miners who 
return before the end of the shift, so that they can be punished, but in practice the 
women often exhibit discretionary blindness when it comes to spotting marginally 
9 
early retumees. 
one of the most influential members of the collective, a brigadier, put an end to the discussion. She 
argued that if they were not united on the question there was no point in requesting the study. 
During such a study it was important for everyone to appear rushed off their feet and the dissenters 
could not be relied upon to put on the required show. In this situation the study could even result 
in their wages being reduced. 
9The present forewoman, in contrast to her predecessor, never lets miners off for finishing work 
early, and her workers are unable to do so if she, or any other members of management, are 
around. Many workers will, however, let miners off if they get the chance: a high proportion of 
them are married to miners. The vigilant comrades of the collective are disliked both by their 
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After this procedure is complete the workers have a short (unofficial) breakfast 
break, and then commence with the other side of their duties, the maintenance of 
the miners' lamps. From the summer of 1995, all the miners have been provided 
with SMS lamps, which signal the presence of methane by flashing at a speed 
which indicates the concentration of the gas. These lamps have been introduced 
over a number of years, and now that all miners at Taldym are equipped with them 
it is far harder for them to work when there is a danger of explosions: the flashing 
makes it impossible for them to see properly. The mechanism of the lamps relies 
on chemical change in one of the components in the electrical circuit of the lamp, 
which causes the light to flash. After continuous low exposure to methane, 
however, chemical change means that the component ceases to be effective. Since 
there can be no precise 'expiry date' in such a process the lamps are checked by 
the women before each shift. They gather the lamps of the miners who will be on 
the next shift on trolleys and take them to their laboratory, where they pass 
methane over the relevant component in the lamps to ensure that they flash at the 
required rate. Those that do not are passed over to the junior fitter who fits a new 
colleagues and by the miners, as the following quote illustrates: 'If a miner comes up from the pit 
early -let's say half and hour or ten minutes early - I am supposed to note it down, and then they 
reduce his monthly premium a bit. Well, I can't do it. I always think of his family - they need that 
money. I feel sorry for them. And the miner - perhaps he's got to get off early because of his 
family. We always want them to come home early .... There are others, though, who always report 
the miners. Nadia's that sort of woman. They are all afraid of her. With me, they know I'm a softy. 
They come up and say, "Look, I've got to get off a bit early today". They know I'll never report 
them.' 
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'methane detector'. This having been accomplished, they return the lamps to the 
shelves. 
The women then clean the shelves. From about 13.00 until 3.00 there is a rather 
slack period in which lunch is eaten. Then the second shift begins arriving, and the 
process of checking the miners off re-commences. This continues until about 
17.00 by which time the return of the first shift has been recorded. After this, the 
women clean the floor, and wait for the arrival of their next shift. IO Alongside 
monitoring this work, the brigadier of the shift also has to check that the lamps re-
charge for the correct amount of time: 'over-cooking' the lamps can result in 
malfunction or early expiry of the batteries. 
'Blatnaya rabots' 
The work of the lampovaya is considered to be blatnaya as it can only be obtained 
through the use of connections. I I As the above description implies, the work is not 
'orhe somewhat obsessive cleaning of the lampovaya appears to be an example of the work-
creation ethic of Soviet enterprises mentioned in earlier chapters. It is an official part of the 
collective's duties, but this thankless work is undone in an instant by the comings and goings of 
dusty miners. 
JIlt is not a coincidence that both the wife ofthe trade union president and vice-president work in 
the lampovaya. Earlier the wife ofthe trade union president had worked in the technical complex. 
She said that after her first day of work there she had gone home and cried her eyes out. Many of 
the workers in the lampovaya reported that they had got their jobs po blatu (through blat), 
although some of them had been transferred from other collectives. A number had been members 
of the building brigades in the Shundulidi era. 
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too onerous, and compared with most of the other manual work available to 
women at the mine it is positively luxurious. It is therefore highly sought after, 
which means, in the Russian context, that blat is required to get it. The women 
. who work in the collective are quite candid about this. One worker, asked by a 
friend who did not work at the mine whether the women she worked with were 
blatnye, replied, 'Yes, yes, of course, every single one of them. They are all 
blatnye' .12 
Despite the relative privilege of the workers of the lampovaya, however, they are 
clearly seen as workers: although the work in the lampovaya is a good deal more 
comfortable than other manual work available to women at the mines, the 
lampovshchitsi (the collective name for the workers of the lampovaya) do get their 
hands dirty and wear overalls. \3 This, in the eyes of other workers, immediately 
places them above office workers who are generally assumed to do very little. 
Moreover, although work in the lampovaya is blatnaya in the sense that good 
contacts are generally required in order to get a position there, once a place has 
been obtained a worker there has no more recourse to blat, by virtue of her 
position, than any other: short of selling spare parts for lamps, the opportunities 
for using a position in the lampovaya for personal gain are severely limited. The 
12This reinforces the point made in the last chapter about the way blal divides people into 
concentric patterns of insiders and outsiders. In many situations, the lampovshchilSi would not be 
considered blatnye, but in relation to their less privileged counterparts in the kOlel 'naya or 
technical complex, for example, they constitute a privileged group. 
I30nly the forewoman and the full-time label 'shchitsa work without overalls in clean clothes. 
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lampovshchitsi also consider themselves to be ordinary workers and they identify 
strongly with the value system in which manual work has a higher status than 
white-collar work. This attitude is very deep-rooted and was displayed even by a 
former teacher and forewoman of the collective, Anna Petrovna, who claimed that 
her work in the lampovaya was much easier than her work at the school. She 
complained both that the office workers were paid too much, and that the 
differentials between office workers and their managers were too great: 
The head of the planning department is a woman. She gets far higher pay than 
my husband who's a miner. She gets twice as much as a prokhodchik. And in 
her department there are four women. They get two or three times less money 
than their boss, but they do the same work. It's unjust! [her emphasis]. The chief 
accountant gets more than a miner too. It's not right. It makes people angry. 
Others, meanwhile, intimated that office workers were work-shy: 
The women from the offices think that our work is dirty. And we think that it's 
dirty work. One of the accountants came here to work· she lasted three months 
with her manicured nails. Then she went back again. 
The /ampovaya is thus seen very much as a workers' collective, and, despite some 
ambivalence about the dirt, this is generally viewed as something positive. 
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Attitudes to work: The superwomen of the lampovaya14 
The lampovshchitsi are as committed to their collective as any of the other 
workers at the mine and, as the previous section illustrated, the fact that they are 
women does not mean that they have a more instrumental, less serious attitude to 
their work. Nevertheless, they are by no means immune to traditional ideas about 
what is fitting work for women. The dominance of such ideas means that it is all 
but obligatory for them, and the miners who pass through the collective, to register 
the divergence from traditional gender stereotypes involved in women doing dirty 
work: in this way the stereotypes are preserved as cultural norms even while they 
are constantly contradicted by reality. Thus, the lampovshchitsi are expected to 
moan about the dirt, while miners walking through on their way back from the pit 
make jokes about what the women have to put up with and so on. The chivalry 
with which they are treated serves to highlight the femininity of the 
lampovshchitsi and neutralise the threat to traditional ideas posed by their status as 
workers. This is illustrated by the following comments of a miner, who is married 
to one of the workers from the lampovaya: 
-
My wife - my other half - works in the lampovaya. Their work is diabolical 
[adskaya] because there's coal dust everywhere. She works without gloves. 
She's got hands like a miner, like a man. Then she strokes me with those hands ... 
J40ne of the many verses the collective composed for Anna Petrovna's retirement album read, 
'Lampovaya proslo klass, superzhenshchiny u nas': 'In the lamp room we're dead cool, 
erwomen one and all'. sup 
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In a nonnal lampovaya they would have ventilation to extract the 
dust. ... yesterday I popped in to see her in clean clothes· I got dust all over me. 
This miner's remarks, as his playfulness about the hands that stroke him indicates, 
was half humorous, half serious. On the one hand, he was exaggerating for 
dramatic effect: it is perfectly possible to visit the lampovaya in clean clothes and 
not come out covered in dust. On the other hand, he was serious. He went on to 
argue that women's work was an aberration only forced on them by unfortunate 
social circumstances: 
[My wife] gets very tired, she only goes to work for the money. All women only 
work at the mine for the money. [For] very, very low wages. At other enterprises 
the pay is even lower. What else is there to say? Here women all work, 
regardless of whether it's clean or dirty work. They only work for the money. 
They can work up to their waists in dirt, as long as they get paid. 
The wife of this miner, who was present when he was interviewed, enjoyed these 
remarks: her husband was, after all, paying her an indirect compliment by saying 
that she was too feminine for her job. The day after the interview she gleefully 
reported to her work mates that her husband had said that their work was 
'diabolical'. Nevertheless, while the lampovshchitsi enjoy being complimented on 
their stoicism in face of the dirt, they by no means go along with all that such 
comments imply. Despite the fact that she enjoyed her husband's humour, for 
example, the wife of miner quoted reported that she had no desire to give up work, 
saying, 'I like it. It's true that it's dirty work, it's not what you'd call prestigious, 
but there's no other work round here. Russian women get used to it wherever they 
work. We already go to work with satisfaction.' 
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While women workers enjoy being treated as ladies, they know that, whatever 
may be promised to them in jest, to survive in Vishnovka they have to be strong, 
rather than lady-like. They have to work at the mine and then go home and work 
in the garden, feed the animals or the children and clean the house. As one 
member of the collective said in the context of a discussion about domestic 
violence, 'What saves us is the fact that Russian women are not scared of work'. 
And although on one level women in the lampovaya might agree with the 
essentialist assumptions which inform the view that ideally they should not be 
doing dirty work at the mine, they also have an enormous pride in their own 
capabilities and strength. Such pride is informed by another idea of womanhood 
which runs counter to the concept of the 'lady-like', weak and beautiful woman: 
the idea that women are in fact stronger than men. In the same way that they 
archly complained about the dirt, the lampovshchitsi also joked that a Russian 
women was like a 'cart horse' (loshad' lomovaya); a joke which conceals not a 
small amount of pride in their ability to hold the two sides of their lives, and their 
men, together. The sense of achievement that comes from managing to get 
everything done and combine their different roles is very important to women 
workers' sense of identity. IS As the brigadier from the zaryadnoe put it, 'I always 
IS A verb which often cropped up in such discussions was uspeval ': to have time or to manage. To 
get everything done is to be an ideal women. This is not something men are generally credited 
with doing - they are more often portrayed as obstacles in the smooth-running of the household. 
As one woman worker put it, 'men are just big children who you have to look after: "give me this, 
give me that'" . 
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say a women is everything: she is a mother, a wife, a lover, a laundress, a cook, 
and everything else. She does everything' . 
'The collective can do nothing' 
The lampovshchitsi are committed to their collective, but do the social relations of 
the work group provide a basis for self-organisation? And can the collective 
defend itself? The following section explores these questions by examining the 
development of relations in the lampovaya from the late Gorbachev era. 
The immediate work collective has always been an important arena for self-
expression, though in the communist period this was balanced by its function as a 
locus of control. But the change in the political landscape in the late perestroika 
era created a space in which the emancipatory aspects of the communal life of the 
collective could potentially develop. After 1989 much of the disciplinary 
apparatus was dismantled: the draconian disciplinary code which applied to the 
mines was suspended in 1989, the Party and the state security bodies have since 
been removed from enterprises, managerial authority has been substantially 
undermined and workers have acquired the ability to remove their managers. The 
combined effect of these developments was to shift in the balance of power in 
favour of the workers, allowing them to increase their collective control over the 
production process and to order the lives of their collectives in a way which suited 
them. But this flowering of collectivism also had its limitations, the nature of 
which became more apparent as the optimism generated by Gorbachevian reform 
dissipated in the cold light of the Yeltsinite new dawn. This stunted growth of 
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collectivism can be clearly illustrated by an account of the development of work 
relations in the lampovaya during this period. 
The years 1988 - 1992 represented the high point of collectivist development 
within the lampovaya. In 1988, the lampovaya became the first collective in the 
mine to remove its line manager by democratic vote: as the eventual successor to 
the deposed forewoman proudly put it, 'Democracy came first to the 
lampovaya '. 16 The forewoman of the collective, Daria Nikolaevna, was voted out 
of office after an attempt to disrupt the stability of work relations by introducing a 
regime of three-monthly changes in shift teams. As one of the brigadiers from the 
collective reported: 
She first of all broke up all the shift teams, then terrorised everyone; ... she did 
everything awful she could to the collective, and annoyed everyone so much that 
we simply got rid of her. 
After a brief spell with another forewoman who was deemed unsatisfactory, the 
collective elected a former teacher, Anna Petrovna, whose four years in office are 
remembered as a golden age within the collective. In 1992 Anna Petrovna 
resigned as forewoman on grounds of ill-health. I? The mine director re-appointed 
16After the 1989 strike voting unpopular managers out of office soon became common practice 
throughout the mine. As one shop chief lamented in an interview, 'After the strikes it even got to 
the point where it was obligatory to change managers - business-like or not· hands up, let's have a 
different one'. 
17Anna Petrovna claimed that in 1992 she had been to see a witch who had told her that someone 
was after her place and had cursed her with ill health: a shiver went down her spine and she said 
she knew instantly that Daria Nikolaevna was the author of the curse. She decided to resign, 
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Daria Nikolaevna to the post and the collective did not resist this on the grounds 
that she had 'learnt her lesson' and was no longer a threat. This proved at first to 
be the case and the working practices developed in the Anna Petrovna era 
persisted for some time. 
After 1988, the workers of the /ampovaya were able to create a highly conducive 
working environment for themselves. One of the most important aspects of this 
improvement was not a development restricted to their collective. The shift in the 
balance or'power in favour of the workers after 1989 meant that the 'women's 
collectives' at the mine were able to secure a change in their grafik from an eight-
hour to a twelve-hour regime. Thus, instead of a gruelling regime of three days on 
a first shift, followed by three days on the second shift and then three on the night 
shift, each three days only separated by one day off, the women now work one 
twelve-hour day followed by a twelve-hour night shift with two days off in 
between each stint on duty. The campaign for the change in grafik represents the 
most significant achievement of collective action among women workers at the 
mine.18 It is cited by all the women working according to this grafik as a positive 
although Daria Nikolaevna tried to talk her out of it, saying that the collective wanted her to 
remain as forewoman. Anna Petrovna was adamant, however, and said 'Look Dasha, the craze for 
democracy is over now; the director will appoint you as forewoman and that will be that.' After 
Daria Nikolaevna's appointment, Anna claimed that the problems with her health ended. 
liThe twelve-hour shift system was introduced on the initiative of the women workers of the 
kotel'naya who, in a period between shop chiefs, simply took a unilateral decision to re-organise 
their working hours. Their example was taken up by the other women's collectives who persuaded 
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aspect of their work - not only does it allow women conveniently to combine their 
home and work lives, it also weakens managerial control because line managers 
often work according to different shift systems. 
The change in forewoman and grafik allowed the lampovshchitsi a great deal more 
autonomy over the organisation of their work. Since the forewoman only works a 
five day week and the brigades work on the continuous twelve-hour shift system, 
for the majority of the week the brigadiers are in charge of the work of their shift 
teams. And since a brigadier, as shown above, is just 'one of the girls', this means 
that for the majority of the time the collective is effectively self-managed. 
Workers were thus able to establish their own informal norms within their 
brigades and arranged their work in a way that suited them. As one of them 
reported of her former shift team: 
Lena was the senior lampovshchilsa on our shift and she was understanding. For 
example, ifI had to get home early for some reason, I could ask her and she'd let 
me go - without, of course, Daria Nikolaevna knowing anything about it. And on 
the night shift we used to take it in turns to sleep. Of course, we'd have been 
punished if anyone had seen us - but we used to get all the work done. 
Thus, not only was the lampovaya a close collective, it also seemed that in the 
period after 1988 the collective had developed a capacity for self-organisation 
which might provide a basis for furthering the workers' own interests. Later 
the trade union to pursue their case. As mentioned earlier, the eight-hour shift for underground 
miners at Taldym was a similar post-1989 victory for the miners. 
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developments, however, starkly revealed the limits of the form of collectivism 
developed within the /ampovaya in the Anna Petrovna era. 
In January 1995, Daria Nikolaevna suddenly announced that she was breaking up 
the established shift teams, the offence for which she had been removed in 1988. 
Women who had been working together in brigades for years were suddenly 
divided up and arranged into new teams, without even being consulted as to whom 
they wanted to work with. One worker reported: 
When Daria Nikolaevna said she was going to break up the brigades everyone 
pleaded with her not to do it. She just said 'we'll see' and then went ahead and 
did it anyway. I think she didn't like the fact that we all got on so well and 
enjoyed work - I think she thought that it meant we weren't working properly. I 
don't agree with her. I think if you're happy you work better. 
This action had a dramatic impact on the collective: the atmosphere of gloom was 
palpable on my return to the mine in June 1995. 'We've fallen out with each 
other' (my razdruzhilis), one of them explained. The workers reported that 
everything had changed; nothing, it seemed, was the same, even down to the buns 
of the stolovaya which were formerly a staple snack in the /ampovaya before some 
mysterious but spectacular de-skilling afflicted the mine's kitchen staff. The cosy 
companionship of the old brigades had been destroyed, and along with it the 
autonomy which the shift teams had previously enjoyed. For example, previously 
the women had cooked and eaten lunch and supper together in the cubby hole 
behind the lamp racks or in the 'laboratory' where the functioning of lamps was 
checked, away from the eyes and ears of the forewoman. Under the new regime 
Daria Nikolaevna led a melancholy luncheon party to the stolovaya every day. 
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Moreover, because the brigades were not composed of workers who trusted each 
other, they were unable to organise their work informally as they had done in the 
past. One brigade in particular was deeply unhappy: they had ended up with the 
'good communist'19 of the collective, who could be relied upon to report any 
irregularities to the forewoman. As one of the brigadiers remarked of this worker 
and another close family friend of the forewoman: 
There are tell-tales in the collective who tell Dasha [Daria Nikolaevna] 
everything. I suppose every co\lective has such people. No one wants them on 
their shift - because a shift will always have something it wants to hide from the 
forewoman. 
Whereas these workers had in the past been kept under control by strong 
brigadiers and workers who knew them inside out, in their new teams they created 
enormous tension. One worker even claimed she had taken time off sick to avoid 
the 'good communist'. 
Thus the forewoman had dramatically increased her power over the collective. As 
one ofthe brigadiers memorably declared: 
I think Dasha's a vampire. She draws energy from us when we're all quarrelling. 
It suits her far better when we're not getting on with each other. 
The forewoman again re-organised the shift teams at the end of June 1995 without 
consultation, and announced that they would be re-organised every three months 
thereafter. Her plan ensured that most members of the collective would eventually 
have to serve alongside the 'good communist', and that it would be extremely 
19She had in the past been an active member of the Communist Party. 
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difficult for the workers to re-establish informal working arrangements: the 
collective had been broken. 
There was no collective response to the forewoman's action. A few brave 
individuals remonstrated with her, but this was as far as the protest went. The 
collective was awash with talk about replacing the forewoman, but no one was 
prepared to put themselves forward as an alternative candidate. Even when insult 
was added to injury with the announcement that the shift teams would be re-
organised regularly, the workers did not foresee themselves resisting. Asked what 
would happen if the forewoman went ahead with her plans, one of the older and 
more outspoken members of the collective replied, 'Nothing will happen. 
Everyone moans between themselves, but there are very few people who will say 
it to her face'. 
Why had the seemingly well-organised women of the /arnpovaya not been able to 
resist this assault on their collective? The answer to this question reveals the 
limitations of the development of collectivism after 1988, as well as the 
vulnerability of work collectives in the face of managerial encroachments 
connected with restructuring.20 First, although in the heady days of the late 
Gorbachev era workers were able to achieve many improvements in their position 
lOEven though the actions of the forewoman of the lampovaya were not specifically connected to 
restructuring, her action did have the effect of 'softening up' the collective. Any future changes 
desired by mine management will now be far easier to push through: the lack of cohesion in the 
collective is well-illustrated by the failure of its members to decide on a response to the 'closing' 
of the lampovaya. 
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at work, this was strongly conditioned by the vulnerability of managers in this 
period as they accustomed themselves to life without the Party. The grafik 
campaign is a good example of this. It was a gain for the women workers at the 
mine, but it was one which was achieved without a high degree of managerial 
resistance. Moreover, it did not lead to any lasting organisation among women at 
the mine. Similarly, once the lampovshchitsi had secured what they saw as a 
desirable amount of autonomy, they were not concerned to build on the incipient 
organisation they had developed when they first took the decision to remove Daria 
Nikolaevna. This meant that as management have begun to reassert its control 
over the enterprise (a process which is continuing but not yet complete), workers 
have become increasingly vulnerable. The changing possibilities of self-
determination within collectives in the 1980s and 1990s are well captured by the 
brigadier Lena's account of the period: 
When perestroika and glasnost' began it was easier to change [the forewoman]. 
Now there isn't any glasnost', there's nothing. Now the managers decide 
everything again. But before perestroika it was absolutely impossible. 
Gorbachev gave us some rights.... He allowed the collective to decide 
everything. Now there's very little that's decided by the collective.21 
21This account was largely confirmed by interviews with workers from other collectives, although 
elite workers such as miners in the famous brigade mentioned above felt that even in the 
communist era they had the possibility of influencing the director or mine Party secretary. They 
would, however, only have been able to resolve a dispute with their line manager through recourse 
to a higher authority - an open democratic rejection of a shop chief was not possible. 
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What is notable about this account is the passive role it (accurately) accords to 
workers in the process: rights are 'given' and taken away, rather than fought for or 
defended. 
A major reason for the failure to develop the organisational potential immanent 
within work collectives lies in the structure of the traditional Soviet enterprise in 
which the line manager as well as acting as a representative of management also 
represents the interests of her collective to the enterprise administration. The role 
of the lowest level of mine management is to safeguard the rights of immediate 
work collectives; to get the best deal for 'their' workers, in the same way that the 
role of the mine director is to get the best deal for 'his' mine. Rather than 
defending themselves against the lowest level of mine management, therefore, 
workers would normally expect to be defended by this 'representative' of the 
collective. In the Anna Petrovna era, this is exactly what had occurred. Anna 
Petrovna saw it as her role to stand up for the lampovaya: 
When I was forewoman - I am the kind of person who can't bear injustice - and I 
always fought for justice, always spoke the truth. I got on well with the shop 
chiefs. But [not] with the konlory [office workers] and the director. I complained 
if we didn't have normal conditions to work in - so that we had some ventilation 
and so on. Dasha never does that - she won't even ask for a lick of paint to make 
the place look a bit better. I was always going to the director, to the chief 
engineer; I was always speaking up for the workers, because they worked well, 
but they would swear at them for any tiny mistake. I don't know why but none 
of the directors before ... have been fond of the lampovaya. 
Workers confirmed that, in contrast to Daria Nikolaevna, Anna Petrovna had 
stood up for their rights: 
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When Anna Petrovna was forewoman she defended our interests. If we needed 
something we could simply gather and talk with her either in the shop trade 
union committee, or just between shifts. She would go to the trade union, the 
economists, the director, with questions, with demands, saying that they needed 
to do something for us, that the collective was demanding or asking for 
something that needed to be done. 
Daria Nikolaevna does not go - she doesn't want to draw attention to herself in 
the eyes of the president [the mine director], or the eyes of anyone else. She 
doesn't want anyone to notice and say that she's going there and asking for 
something or other. She doesn't want it. She wants everything to be quiet and 
peaceful so that no one notices her and she can get on with her work. 
This reveals why, having elected Anna Petrovna, the lampovshchitsi considered 
that there was no cause for further organisation: like a trade union representative, 
she would look after their interests. The problems with this perception were only 
revealed when Daria Nikolaevna redefined her role within the collective from 
representative to manager. 
Nevertheless, the instinctive reaction of workers to the unpleasant turn in the of 
their collective fortunes under Daria Nikolaevna was still to consider a change in 
forewoman. The other alternative was to appeal to the mine director for protection, 
but at this stage he was not prepared to give it.22 The women did not feel able to 
resist the change while Daria Nikolaevna remained as forewoman: an alternative 
22 Just before he was voted out of office at the end of 1995 the director did intervene on behalf of 
the lampovshchitsi: he publicly criticised the forewoman for upsetting her workers at the weekly 
meeting of shop chiefs. After this an uneasy truce emerged in the lampovaya. Again, however, the 
workers had not been able to protect themselves - they had to rely on a managerial benefactor. 
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figurehead was felt to be a prerequisite for any kind of reaction. Just as the 
solution to the mine's problems is seen as being the election of a benevolent 
patemalist, so the solution to the lampovaya's problems was seen as being the 
election of a better 'mother' to the collective. And since the self-organisation of 
workers does not extend to collective defence this estimation is, in the immediate 
term, perfectly accurate. 
Contested collectivism 
Although the lampovshchitsi may not be capable of defending themselves against 
their forewoman they had, as described above, carved out a comfortable 
communal life for themselves after 1988. Collectivism within the lampovaya is 
limited, but it is not non-existent. The workers do feel attached to the co-workers 
with whom they have built up co-operative working relations, with whom they 
have habitually shared meal times, with whom they have concealed minor 
infractions of work discipline from the forewoman and so on. It was precisely this 
form of collectivity which the forewoman broke up when, as the disgruntled 
lampovshchitsi put it, she 'scattered' (raskidivala) the established shift teams. 
Daria Nikolaevna herself claimed that she had broken up the shift teams in order 
to increase the cohesiveness of the collective, saying: 
I did it so that the shifts would all be friendly. So that the girls would all know 
each other. I did it for the sake of unity [splochennoslJ If you work on one shift 
with the same people forever, you get sick of it. You could work for years on the 
same shift and not get to know the other members of the collective. You could 
pass them on the street and not even say hello. To work as a collective, everyone 
has to know each other. Anyway, this is my personal opinion. 
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The forewoman here asserted an abstract view of the collective, and a formal view 
of unity: not a cohesiveness born out of informal, co-operative relations, but a 
putative unity forced on the collective from above. Her attack on the collectivity 
of the brigades is reminiscent of the Soviet antipathy to what in Soviet-speak were 
referred to as 'false collectives', that is, from the official communist point of view, 
'sub-groups that might potentially challenge the supremacy of the kollektiv from 
within, or the devolution of the kollektiv into an in-group that does not aspire to 
support broader social values and pursues only narrow group interests' 
(Kharkhordin, 1996: 30). The trouble with 'false collectives' from the point of 
view of the authorities is that they command more loyalty than the so-called 'true 
collectives' which are subordinate to official control. The forewoman thus 
'scattered' the 'false' collectivity of the shift teams turning the collective into a 
mere aggregate of unhappy workers, who were only 'unified' in their common 
subjection to her will. This was quite clear to the workers who had accurately 
predicted what the forewoman would say if asked why she had broken up the old 
shift teams. Their view of her concept of splochennost' was 'eto konechno 
chepukha': 'it's rubbish of course'. 
The ease with which she accomplished her alms, however, reveals the 
vulnerability of the limited form of collectivism which existed within the brigades 
of the lampovaya. Within the old shift teams, workers had built up relations of 
trust with each other over a long period and had been capable of ensuring that 
work was organised in a way that suited them. But the relations which developed 
were based on co-operation over work: the brigades were work groups not 
defensive alliances. This is highlighted by the fact that although the brigadiers 
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could use their discretion in ways which benefited their brigades, when the 
forewoman decided to break up the shift teams, the teams themselves were not 
able to put up any resistance. Covering up for each other is a very different thing 
from acting as a group to defend a collective interest. So while collective co-
operation does exist at the level of the brigade, it barely extends beyond the day-
to-day detail of organising work. Workers express a loyalty to 'the collective' - the 
lampovaya - but this form of collectivity is only realised through the medium of 
the line manager. The collective is not able to represent itself: it can neither obtain 
resources from the mine administration without the good offices of the line 
manager, and nor is it capable of defending itself against turn-coat 
'representatives'. In the face of a volte-face such as that committed by Daria 
Nikolaevna workers simply look for an alternative figurehead to defend them. In 
this sense, 'the collective' amounts to little more than an aggregate of individual 
supplicants. Thus, although the action of Daria Nikolaevna can at one level be 
seen as merely her whim, it does strikingly reveal the vulnerability of workers to 
authoritarian assaults from the very matriarchs and patriarchs to whom they look 
for their salvation: they do not have the organisational resources required for 
systematic resistance. 
Informal representation by line managers 
How typical is the lampovaya? Are other collectives, in particular mining 
brigades, more robust and able to defend themselves? The argument put forward 
here is that while mining brigades may be in a stronger position when it comes to 
obtaining resources within the mine, they are equally dependent on their line 
managers to press their case. The director is expected to defend the interests of the 
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mine, shop chiefs try to secure the best conditions of work for their shops, while 
brigadiers represent the case of their brigades in just the same way that the 
forewoman of the lampovaya is expected to defend her collective.23 The similarity 
in the position of male and female collectives is strikingly illustrated by the fact 
that even the locally-famous brigade of development workers, one of the long-
standing members of which was quoted above, was unable, as the quote revealed, 
to resist being broken up when management decreed it. His brigade may well be 
splochennyi and skolochennyi, but its very existence is dependent on the whim of 
management.24 
Thus, the system of representation by line managers is a general feature of the life 
of the mine and male workers are equally dependent on the advocacy of their 
brigadiers or foremen. In the mining shops the brigadiers - who, aside from the 
duty (zven 'evoz) brigadiers responsible for particular shifts rather than the brigade 
as a whole, are nearly always elected - have a very significant place in the 
structure of the shop and play a crucial role in negotiations with management over 
23In underground shops the foreman is responsible for health and safety, while the organisation of 
work is the responsibility of the brigadier. It is the brigadier rather than the foreman to whom 
workers turn to as their 'representative' . 
24The lampovaya may actually be less divided than miners' brigades because it is a homogenous 
collective with few significant variations in grade and skill. In contrast to this there are wide 
variations in skill and pay among underground workers, from the highly skilled combine operators 
(MGVM) to the lowly 'underground mine workers' (GRP). Such differences do cause some 
resentment. For examples see Ashwin, 1996: 33. 
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output and payment levels.25 The structure varies slightly between production and 
development shops - in the former one brigadier is responsible for all the face-
workers, while in the development shops, there is a number of brigadiers 
responsible for different parts of the production process (for example, in a 
development shop there would be a brigadier elected by the explosives team) - but 
the role of the brigadiers is very similar. Most importantly, both attend the 
monthly planning meetings convened by the chief engineer to discuss output 
targets and payment for the month ahead. The role of brigadiers at these meetings 
_ which are usually convened on a shop-by-shop basis - is to argue the case of 
their brigade: to agree an achievable plan with the administration; to ensure that 
they have the materials they require to meet it, and to agree a favourable level of 
payment for the brigade. This is an on-going war of attrition, as the following 
comment from the former head of the planning department illustrates. She 
acknowledged that the input of the brigadiers into the planning meetings was very 
important because they knew the conditions 'on the ground', but at the same time 
she felt it was necessary to guard against their influence by restricting the 
information they received about concessions granted to other shops: 
,', 
If, for example, the chief engineer decides there is a particular problem in one 
shop he might say, 'OK, this month we'll give you a plan for eighty rather than a 
hundred metres or eighty rather than hundred tonnes'. Well, if another shop 
hears that they'll want their plan reduced too. It's human nature. I think it's 
2SIn most of the auxiliary shops, by contrast, the position of brigadier is usually more formal, and 
unelected. In this situation, workers take their concerns over issues such as payment and work 
organisation to the foremen or women. 
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better to deal with people separately, so that people know as little about what is 
going on in other shops as possible. That way everything is much easier. 
The brigadiers gave a similar picture of continual struggle. With regard to 
materials, for example, one of the brigadiers from a development shop claimed: 
The job of the brigadier is to demand the material that the brigade needs to fulfil 
the plan - the pipes, metal and so on, so that the brigade can do its job. We have 
to make sure that we actually get all the materials that we should according to 
the plan - this doesn't happen as a matter of course. We often don't get them. 
The endemic tensions within the production process are thus channelled upwards 
through the brigadiers who try to get the best deal that they can for workers. 
Workers reported that, in contrast to the shop trade union committees, their 
brigadiers looked after their interests. The following, for example, was a typical 
assessment of a worker from a development brigade: 
[The brigadier's) one of us. He'll come and help us out when we're working. 
He'll realise, for example, if we need another worker and he'll take one from 
somewhere else. He can raise the coefficient of those who work well a little bit 
and cut it from those who don't. 
In production brigades the system is the same: as one groz (face-worker) put it, 
'he [the brigadier] looks after our interests. He notes who works well and who 
works badly, and in accordance with this will raise or reduce [their] coefficient'.26 
In addition to this, the brigadiers will also stand up for individual workers who fall 
26Interestingly, miners never complain of injustice in the administration of this system: the 
brigadier is 'one of us' and is not seen to use his discretion unfairly. 
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foul of the administration. As one of the brigadiers from a development shop 
explained: 
We look after pay-related issues. We sort it out with the shop chief if a good 
worker for some reason did not turn up for work; we get involved if someone is 
punished unjustly. 
Here, the mentality of the trade union is discernible - brigadiers will defend good 
workers - but nonetheless, the brigadiers are in general far less equivocal than the 
union and certainly play a far more important role in handling conflicts within 
mining shops. 
Can the system stand the strain? 
Soviet enterprises have always been plagued by conflicts over supplies of 
materials required for production, work speeds and pay, but the economic 
disruption caused by economic reform has exacerbated all these tensions. At 
present, the conflict within the mine can be channelled up the mine hierarchy but 
it is questionable how long it can be contained within this framework as the 
financial difficulties of the mine deepen. These mean that managers are both less 
able and less willing to grant concessions to workers, while the workers have more 
grievances than ever. 
Cracks are beginning to appear within the system, as is apparent from 
conversations with brigadiers and miners. For example, the deals that the 
administration makes with the brigadiers with regard to payment cannot always be 
honoured as a result of the mine's financial problems. This obviously undermines 
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the negotiation process between the brigadiers and the administration. As one 
face-worker commented of the planning meetings: 
. A year ago we used to conclude a written agreement. It had to be signed by the 
brigadier, the shop chief and the [mine] president. And then the brigadier could 
demand our money. Now we're asking to have this system reinstated. Because 
now they can promise to pay us a lot, and then say that the mine hasn't got any 
money and pay us less. But if we had a written contract then we could demand 
our money. 
The reinstitution of written contracts, however, though it would help resolve 
conflicts over back-pay, would not solve the problem that the mine is living from 
hand-to-mouth and that it is often simply unable to pay wages on time. And, 
likewise, there is no easy answer to the shortage of investment funds, which have 
an influence both on working conditions - because of the dangers and discomfort 
associated with the resultant 'make do and mend' approach to production - and on 
wages, because shortages of necessary materials mean that workers are unable to 
meet the plan. Although there were always shortages in the past, these have been 
exacerbated in the present period. As one miner noted: 
There is a problem with machinery, there is a constant lack of money. Either 
there's not a complex, or there's no conveyors. For example, in shop eight -
they've put a complex in, but there are no conveyors .... It always works out like 
this here. 
In this situation, it is becoming increasingly difficult for brigadiers to achieve a 
favourable deal for their brigades. 
This does cause a good deal of tension but, in line with the argument of the last 
chapter, this is diffused somewhat by workers' adherence to a 'one enterprise' 
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vision. Mineworkers generally consider that the mine's problems are caused by 
government policy towards the coal industry and this only strengthens the idea 
that the solution is for the mine to pull together to weather the storm. This can be 
seen clearly in the following commentary of a miner on the way that the 
bargaining power of the brigadier was being eroded in the present period: 
He [the brigadier] does his best for us, because he's a worker just like us. If he 
knows that we won't fulfil the plan that they want to give us then he'll try to 
reduce it. But now because of non-payment [of subsidies and on the part of 
customers] he can't reduce the plan. And we try to fulfil the plan. 
Workers try to fulfil the plan not only for the sake of their wage levels, but also for 
the sake of the enterprise: non-fulfilment of the plan is far more serious in an era 
when everyone is acutely aware that mine closures are being planned. Similarly, in 
auxiliary shops late payment of wages and shortages of materials are a constant 
cause of complaint, but generally this is directed at the government rather than the 
mine administration. 
This situation can certainly continue for some time to come. But if managers 
begin to seek more authoritarian routes out of the crisis by cracking down on 
workplace discipline - and this process appears to be beginning at Taldym27 - the 
informal system of representation by line managers may begin to break down. 
Moreover, the present system has the potential to act as a force for fragmentation: 
as competition for scarce resources intensifies, there is a risk that the enterprise 
27Workers from a variety of collectives reported that it was again becoming more difficult for them 
to remove their managers. 
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will be consumed by a destructive 'each shop for itself struggle for survival. To 
avoid such a scenario, it is quite likely that enterprise managers will want to 
strengthen the authority of line managers, so that rather than channelling demands 
both from managers to workers and vice versa they would restrict themselves to 
the former. In such a situation workers would be left without even the 
'representation' they currently enjoy. 
How would workers respond in such a situation? Since Daria Nikolaevna 
effectively re-defined her role within the /ampovaya from that of representative of 
the collective to representative of management, events in the /ampovaya provide 
some preliminary answers to this question. First, nothing happened quickly, 
because of the problems of self-organisation within collectives discussed above. 
Workers did, however, begin to re-define the limits of the notional collective in 
their own minds. Since Daria Nikolaevna had, in the eyes of the collective, 
abrogated her responsibilities as forewoman, she became cast in the role of 
outsider, as a member of the hostile forces of the mine administration; she was no 
longer a member of the collective, although in this case it was not excluded that a 
different forewoman could be re-admitted into its ranks. This could clearly be seen 
from the fact that the forewoman became the target of exactly the same sort of 
criticism usually reserved for those perceived as being part of the 'them' of the 
mine administration, rather than the 'us' of the collective. She came under 
increasingly strict scrutiny by workers accustomed to the feeling of being cheated 
by 'them'. Workers became very curious about the level of her salary, for 
example, and managed to find out through informal contacts in the accounts 
department how much she earned. They were horrified: she was said to earn just 
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over twice their wage.28 The forewoman was also accused of defrauding workers 
whenever she had the chance and of using the mine's resources for her own gain. 
In short, she was seen to be reproducing in microcosm all the sins of the mine 
administration. This can be seen clearly in the following comment: 
She is not honest. For example, the mine administration gave the /ampovaya a 
delicate white Japanese kettle, the like of which we'd never seen before. She, 
without saying a word to anyone, just took it home with her. Of course, 
everyone knew but no one said anything. All of us would have liked to take that 
kettle home with us - What, am I not a human being too? Wouldn't I like a nice 
kettle too? I nearly said something - but why create unnecessary trouble for 
yourself? 
The question posed here 'am I not a human being too?' clearly marks the 
forewoman out as being on the wrong side of the 'them and us' divide in this 
worker's mind: as revealed in the last chapter some of workers' most bitter 
denunciations of management concern the fact that they arrogate to themselves the 
right to live in a civilised manner and treat workers as a sub-human category. 
Similarly, the forewoman was felt, like other members of management, to be 
defrauding the mine for her own gain: 
She ordered some clear plastic to cover our graflk books. But she ordered twice 
as much as she needed for that. I suppose she used the rest on her allotment to 
make her polytunnels. 
28This level of differentiation was a new phenomenon: the forewoman had aroused curiosity when 
she began to hide her wage slip. The former master, Anna Petrovna, was as shocked by the extent 
of differentiation as anyone else. 
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Such criticisms revealed that Daria Nikolaevna had become associated in the 
workers' minds with the mine administration, although this did not, as discussed 
above, lead them to change their expectations of the norms of behaviour expected 
from line management in general. 
In the case of a wider strategy to introduce a more authoritarian model of line 
management, however, the possibility of re-election would be removed in order to 
liberate managers from populist pressures. Workers would therefore no longer 
have the option of seeking the perfect parent figure for their collective and would 
be forced to live with the manager imposed on them from above. Could this lead 
them to develop an increased consciousness of their interests as workers? 
Evidence from other enterprises does suggest that changes in the status and role of 
line management can result in increased conflict, and perhaps even a greater 
tendency towards collective action on the part of workers. For example, Galina 
Monousova reports an incident at a Moscow watch-making enterprise, which she 
calls 'Device', where the sharp increase in pay differentials between workers and 
their line managers led to a situation in which, in the words of one foreman at the 
enterprise, 'we were forced to hide the list of wages, distrust arose among 
workers. We began to lose the manageability of the collective' (Monousova, 1996: 
177). This discontent eventually manifested itself in a strike and the removal of 
the director of the enterprise by a vote of the labour collective. After the strike , 
however, which brought limited gains, workers, according to Monousova, began 
to feel nostalgic for the authoritarian style of the old director. The patemalist 
mentality is deeply ingrained, and even if, referring back to the example of 
Taldym. the current discipline drive does result in a more authoritarian model of 
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line management,29 there is no guarantee that workers would not initially hope that 
the situation could be improved under a new director, just as the workers at 
'Device' did: the post-privatisation history would suggest that this is quite likely. 
The way workers relate to 'the collective' is complex. At the very lowest level -
the level of the brigade - there is a culture of co-operation and mutual assistance, 
but this is based on the organisation of work and does not readily extend into 
collective defence or representation. Representation is left up to line managers 
who 'personify' the immediate work collective: the collective itself has no 
organisational force without its figurehead. In this way the global planning order 
which defined the labour collective as a supplicatory unity is replicated within the 
enterprise and the 'unity' and interests of the immediate work collective as a 
productive unit take priority over the particular interests of workers. Some of 
workers' needs can be met in this way - they can get 'a lick of paint' for their 
work-places - but only when these do not directly contradict the interests of the 
administration. For example, brigadiers from production or development shops 
can attempt to ensure that their brigades have the materials they require to meet 
the plan and thus maintain wage levels, but they can do little about health and 
29This is a big 'if in any case. The difficulties of Soviet and post-Soviet production mean that 
management is highly reliant on the informal co-operation of workers. 'Working to rule' in this 
environment has the potential to cause enormous disruption. Thus, there are strong pressures on 
managers not to behave as straight down the line representatives of the administration. Fear of 
unemployment may, of course, begin to erode workers' capacity for informal, individualised 
resistance, but, as discussed in the previous chapter, this is as yet not the crucial determinant of 
workers' behaviour. 
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safety problems if their resolution will interfere with production. The collectivity 
of the immediate work group is thus not an expression of workers' self-
organisation: the work group has a defined place within the mine hierarchy and 
representation by line managers is an established informal procedure which, for 
the moment, counters the collectivist potential of the division of the enterprise into 
'collectives'. The system of representation by line managers is not without its 
tensions and fissures, but though it is presently subject to strain it has not yet 
broken down; conflict within the enterprise can still be channelled up the 
enterprise hierarchy. This leaves the trade union and its shop trade union 
committees untouched at the sidelines: increasing tension exerts no pressure on 
the union to reform, but rather places management structures under strain. Thus, 
workers remain dependent on the protection accorded to them by their managers. 
When they are let down they do begin to see their managers as members of the 
administration rather than as 'representatives', but, for the moment, workers 
resolve this dilemma by reversing the process of representation and appealing to 
the director to protect them from the unjust line manager. 
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Chapter Nine: Redefining the Collective: Russian 
Mineworkers in Transition 
The previous two chapters have provided an analysis of why the conflict 
unleashed by transition has neither resulted in a renewal of the old trade unions, 
nor prompted workers to form their own organisations outside the official 
structures, but they have not developed a systematic account of precisely how 
workers are responding to the privations of the reform era. This chapter considers 
workers' reaction to change from a different angle: instead of asking why workers 
are not organising, it analyses the nature of their survival strategies during the 
transition period and the political implications of these. For although workers do 
not constitute an organised presence on the political stage. their responses to 
reform, be they individual or collective. nevertheless play a crucial role in the 
post-communist recomposition of the Russian state and economy. 
The argument developed here is that workers adopt complementary strategies in 
the face of reform. On the one hand. they are far from indifferent to the loss of 
security provided by the social guarantees of the past, or to the destruction of the 
collective institutions of social and welfare provision. But rather than seeking to 
build a new relationship between individual and collective. in which the workers 
would take control of their collective institutions. they remain locked into the 
alienated forms of symbolic collectivism inherited from the past, treating the 
collective as a resource imposed from above and seeking their salvation in a 
paternalistic leader who can promise to restore the security of the past, a salvation 
which the Kuzbass mineworkers seek through their support for the Communists , 
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and other brands of authoritarian leaders, at the local and national level.' 
Meanwhile, as a complement to their search for collective salvation, workers are 
also very active in pursuing individual survival strategies.2 Such strategies, 
however, are not pursued through the social relations of the work collective, but 
through networks of family and friends which are in most cases independent of the 
social relations of the immediate work collective. Enterprise collectivism is thus 
coming under pressure from below as workers increasingly look outside the 
enterprise for their survival - which in turn reduces the possibility of their 
mounting a collective response to transition and reinforces their dependence on 
authoritarian leaders. The complementary perspectives of individualism and 
'alienated collectivism' adopted by workers are a key force in shaping the labour 
collective, and Russia, of the future. 
Individual survival strategies 
The story of the stunted development of collectivism in the /ampovaya is just one 
example of the inability of mineworkers to realise the promise of 1989 by 
developing new kinds of self-organisation, a failure which can be seen on a wider 
IAs mentioned earlier, in the years 1989 - 1993 the mineworkers constituted a key element of the 
'democratic' movement in Russia, but since 1993 support for the Communists and Nationalists has 
been growing in mining regions: by the 1995 election the once 'reformist' Kuzbass coal basin had 
become renowned as a Communist stronghold, while the polar coalfield ofVorkuta, with its strong 
anti-communist traditions deriving from its gulag past, voted heavily for Zhirinovskii. 
2The strategies are 'individual' in the sense that they are formed independently of 'the collective'; 
although they are often family-based they are nonetheless 'private'. 
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scale in the failure to develop an effective independent trade unionism out of the 
workers' committees and in the similar failure to realise the potential implicit in 
the form of privatisation in which ownership was transferred to the labour 
collective. It is not enough, however, to put these failures down to the system of 
line management and the culture of individualised informal relations within the 
enterprise. For 'the collective' (in all its forms) is also being redefined from below 
by the daily practice of workers as they increasingly look outside the mine to 
secure their survival. Although workers look to a patemalist for their salvation at 
work, they are increasingly engaging in various kinds of economic activity and 
building on networks of family and friends beyond the workplace.3 Some of these 
opportunities existed in the Soviet period, but many have only opened up, or have 
only become legal, with the development of market relations, sometimes replacing 
facilities which were formerly provided by the enterprise. 
The nature of the pressures faced by workers in the transition era was described in 
detail in Chapter Three: they are not paid on time; their savings have been wiped 
out by inflation; credit is drying up; housing is no longer free, and sotskul'tbyt is 
gradually being destroyed. Although, as argued in the previous chapter, workers' 
collectives are important to them, their immediate survival strategies in the face of 
such difficulties have been largely family-centred rather than based on networks at 
work. While in large urban enterprises workers are more likely to engage in paid 
3 Although such activities occur outside work, they can nonetheless be seen as the logical 
continuation of workers' attempts to cut individual deals within the enterprise: when their 
benefactors at the mine can no longer help them they are thrown back on their own resources. 
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secondary employment, often using skills acquired in their primary employment,4 
in mining settlements secondary employment largely takes the form of small scale 
food production within the household. As described in the chapter on Vishnovka, 
mineworkers have always had allotments or kitchen gardens attached to the self-
built wooden houses of the 'private sector'; grown potatoes on the large tracts of 
land rented by the mine from local collective farms for its workers, and many of 
them kept cows, pigs and chickens in the past. Workers generally felt, however, 
that such activity had assumed greater importance during the transition period: as 
one fitter put it, 'what is one hundred per cent true now is that we'd die without 
our allotments'. This sentiment was expressed in different forms in nearly every 
interview with workers in August 1996. Small scale food production had also 
become a source of monetary income for many workers, who reported that while 
in the past they had given their surplus away to friends, now they would usually 
sell it. Meanwhile, keeping cows is becoming increasingly popular, and the money 
to be made from selling milk more significant. One worker, for example, reported 
that she had kept cows all her working life, but in the past her wages had been 
worth far more than her milk money. Now she made a million roubles a month (at 
the time of the interview just under $200) from selling milk, while her monthly 
wage, when she received it, fluctuated between 600 - 800,000 roubles. 
~For more details see, Donova and Varshavskaya, 1996. 
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Although other forms of secondary employment are less common in Vishnovka,' 
the mine's financial difficulties definitely increase the relative importance of the 
household and family units in relation to work and the collective. Ironically, while 
the changes in shift system at Taldym can in one sense be seen as a 'collectivist' 
achievement, they also mean that both male and female workers spend fewer days 
in the month at work and thus have more time for their individual and family-
based activities. Wage delays in particular cause workers gradually to disengage 
from the life of the mine: in the absence of wages, work obviously seems less 
important than production within the household or paid work outside the mine. In 
the most extreme cases, workers' outside interests come to dominate completely. 
This applies, for example, to those workers who buy themselves sick notes from 
doctors, and receive sick pay while involved in other work, most commonly trade. 
The trade union president reported that this was a serious problem at the mine: in 
August 1996, over 500 workers were on sick leave and he estimated that a 
substantial proportion of these had paid for fictitious sick notes. For this reason, 
the social security commission at the mine, which, after the collapse of the Party, 
had effectively ceased to operate, had been re-activated and delegations were 
again being sent to check up on 'sick' workers. Those who were found working on 
5 Although some workers with marketable skills, such as fitters and welders, are able to find paid 
work outside the mine, this is not nearly as widespread as in urban areas. Since workers' food 
production enables them to survive they will usually only seek additional paid employment if 
faced with a specific financial need, a good example being the mine kindergarten teacher who had 
arranged a business buying meat in the Altai to sell in Osinniki because she needed to pay for her 
son's higher education. 
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their dachas or trading at the bazaar are forced to return to work or to leave the 
mine. Other workers noticed that. even when they attended work regularly, those 
who had an regular income from their 'secondary' employment were less 
committed to their work at the mine than they were in the past: 
There's a woman in my shop who goes to Novosibirsk and buys things there 
cheaply and then sells them here for more money - Vishnovka is a very 
expensive place. She goes there on her days off. There are lots of people like 
that. For example, Novikov's brother - he runs 3 or 4 kiosks and he still works at 
the mine. Pasha's old shop chief at the open cast mine had his own shop. People 
are beginning to have several jobs ... 6 
But the woman from my shop, she has less interest in her work. One of the other 
workers went to look for her at work the other day and she was off collecting 
berries during working hours. Well, in my book that's not a serious attitude to 
work. She's more interested in trading than work. There she gets money directly. 
Although involvement in trade is far from universal, this example does illustrate 
that the mine is no longer as central to workers' survival as it once was. 
Correspondingly, workers generally feel that work is now no longer the social 
focus and source of meaning in life it once was. This is not only a result of the 
greater importance attached to outside interests by workers; the attitude of 
management has also changed with the collapse of the Communist Party. They are 
6'fhe extent of trading among mineworkers in Vishnovka is rather more limited than this would 
suggest: when workers talked about trading, they almost exclusively cited the same people as 
examples. This indicates that, rather than being commonplace, trading is, for the moment, still a 
visible exception to the norm within the labour collective. 
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no longer required to foster the integration of communist citizens through the 
promotion of 'the collective': they now have a more narrow concern with 
maintaining discipline and production levels. The change in atmosphere is well 
captured in the comments of this woman worker from the technical complex: 
Before they [management] kept us informed about what was going on. For 
example, they kept us up to date with all the prikazy [orders] at the mine, read 
them out to us at the naryad [the pre-shift task assignment meeting]. Now they 
don't. ... According to the health and safety rules we have to have a naryad We 
have to go along there and sign to say that we've had it. But before it was more 
interesting; we found out more there. And we could tell management what was 
wrong and what we needed. We talked there .... Before I used to get up and I was 
happy that I was going off to work. Now I wake up and I don't want to go to 
work: we don't even get paid. And the collective was better before. Before I'd 
even say that it was very good. But now people have turned nasty because of all 
the difficulties, and that influences relations. 
These sentiments were echoed by the brigadier from the zaryadnoe: 
I liked it better in the communist period. Then we had the plan. We had to run 
round and meet it and if we did then we got rewarded - people had an interest in 
their work ... 
The collective has changed. It was much more united before. Now it's 
fragmented [razroznennYI]. And people have become aggressive .... Before there 
was something to aspire to - there were the medal givings, the bonuses, it all 
meant something. I used to run round. I was in the shop Party committee, the 
shop trade union committee, the civil defence, I was bursting with energy and 
used to manage to get everything done .... Now if I'm honest I've lost interest in 
work a bit. For example, a wagon might come up dirty from the mine - whereas 
before I would have hosed it down, now I can't be bothered -let it stay dirty. 
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Institutions such as the plan, the Party and medals certainly had their downside: 
workers often complain of the divisiveness of the old system. But at the same time 
they miss the sense of common endeavour and belonging that was fostered in the 
past. 
The collective between the past and the future 
Workers do not only regret the decline of the mine as a focus of communal 
sociability, they also have very concrete concerns about the decline of social 
provision and the threat to employment. For although the household has increased 
its relative importance as a productive unit, workers cannot survive without the 
mine: as one worker put it, 'we don't bake our own bread'. Indeed, the fact that 
many public services, such as hospitals and higher education institutes, have 
begun to charge fees means that workers are in many ways even more dependent 
on the mine as a source of monetary income than they were in the past. For 
example, the worker mentioned above who made a million a month through 
selling milk was still forced to apply to the mine for an urgent loan of five million 
roubles to pay for hospital care after her son was involved in a serious accident. 
Meanwhile, the mine still provides workers a variety of other services such as free 
coal, loans of machinery for activities such as hay-making, holiday vouchers, as 
well as organising potato growing: as argued in Chapter Three, the domestic and 
enterprise economies are closely intertwined. Thus, even if they are beginning to 
expect less from the enterprise than they did in the past, workers' jobs are still 
very important to them and they continue to look to the mine for protection in 
times of acute need. 
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Moreover, after what has been said about their attachment to their collectives, it is 
no surprise that workers generally only seek work outside the mine out of 
necessity: they are not lured away from the dark, satanic pit by the intrinsic appeal 
Russia's new 'service sector'. As argued above, although Vishnovka does have 
some entrepreneurs among its mineworkers, regular involvement in paid work or 
trading is generally only sought when workers incur on-going financial 
commitments, such as bills for their children's education. Compared to the 
stimulation offered by the collective, trading in particular is seen as boring. As one 
woman worker confided: 
For me, it feels like a waste of time. I don't like it. You have to sit there wasting 
time waiting for people to come and buy things. I like to be doing something 
active. For example, this summer I sold some of my cucumbers. I sold them very 
cheaply, cheaper than everyone else, because I couldn't be bothered to sit there 
for ages - I wanted to get rid of them quickly. I suppose it meant that I sold my 
own work short. 
Moreover, serious traders are required to travel regularly to Novosibirsk to buy 
cheap goods to sell. This is very tiring, especially when combined with work at 
the mine. One woman worker at the mine and her husband, a face worker, had 
discussed going into trade but had decided against it for this reason: 
We personally live on our pay. Volodya said - why don't I start trading? But I 
said no. I don't like the idea of it - I think it's a bit risky, although now we have 
the right to trade or do business if we want to. I could do it. I know how it's 
done. I've got a friend who was made redundant from a gannent making factory 
and she now sells bras and knickers at Osinniki market. She sold so much before 
8 March [Women's Day], she made a million. It's quite a stable business - it is 
the sort of thing people have to buy. I could do it too. I used to work as a shop 
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assistant, so I have experience. But I'm scared that I would get too sucked into it 
and would be forever going off to Novosibirsk. I'd be travelling all the time and 
I'd forget about my children. The house would be a mess ... ' 
Moreover, such 'unproductive' labour is still stigmatised and unfavourably 
compared with the honest productive labour of mineworkers. Indeed, some 
workers talked about trading as if it was some form of prostitution, as the 
following exchange between two women workers, discussing an acquaintance 
who had become a trader, graphically illustrates: 
Good on her. She retired from the mine and now she trades at the market there. I 
see her there all the time. She seems to be doing well. I couldn't do it though. I 
just couldn't bring myself to ... I don't think any of the girls from the lampovaya 
do it. 
I think it's probably just the first time that's hard. Once you've done it once 
probably it's easy - you just get on with it after that. 
Thus, while the mine is now less central to workers' lives than it once was, the 
alternatives to work in the mine are not viewed as attractive. Individual strategies 
are an important means of surviving the transition, but in most cases they still only 
constitute a supplement to the declining support provided by the mine. 
Nevertheless, even as such they are gradually transforming the nature of the local 
economy. 
'Those who do make regular trips to Novosibirsk confinn that it is indeed very tiring, far more so 
than work at the mine. Through the change in their grafik women in particular have managed to 
achieve what they see as a desirable balance between home and work at the mine. 
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Alienated collectivism 
Since the mine is still important to workers, it is not accurate to portray the labour 
collective as simply being eroded by the individualising pressures of the market 
economy: individual survival strategies are complemented by the search for 
collective salvation within the context of the labour collective. But, as the 
preceding chapters have shown, the Soviet system of surplus appropriation and the 
internal dynamics of the enterprise to which this gave rise constitute a barrier to 
the collective expression of workers' specific interests. For this reason, their 
collective aspirations take the alienated form of dependence on the figure of the 
paternalist who is supposed to insulate the labour collective from the chilly neo-
liberal winds. The situation described in the lampovaya is thus replicated at a mine 
level: although the workers do not generally attempt to defend their position 
through organised activity, they do attempt to address their problems by hunting 
for that elusive strong leader, capable of guiding the mine through the troubled 
waters of transition. 
This desire for protection is collectivist in the sense that it recognises that the fate 
of individuals is inextricably linked to the fate of the community of the labour 
collective. It should be stressed, however, that workers' aspirations only really 
find expression in the individual act of voting. Workers' lack of organisation 
means that even when they are gathered together at all-mine meetings to make 
decisions they do so as an aggregate of individuals rather than as a collective. The 
324 
individualised character of supposedly collective deliberation is well captured by 
this miner's description of the conduct of meetings at the mine:8 
For example, a former director stood for president [of the mine] .... He had 
forbidden someone, let's say, material help. He didn't help another person build 
a house .... Or he arrived, for instance, at the lampovaya and a miner came [up 
from the pit] early. He says to the lampovshchitsi: note down that he's early ... . 
Then the miner doesn't get his bonus. That's that. Everyone has their revenge ... . 
Because of every private vengeance - he did badly by that one, that one and that 
one - they won't vote for him. But for the enterprise as a whole - as an 
industrialist he's good, he's clever, he's got connections, and as an industrialist 
he understands everything. He can keep the mine together, keep it on the right 
track. But people don't understand ... 
This is how it works here: if I've got the gift of the gab, I've got a little bit of 
understanding, I can speak in front of a meeting, don't get embarrassed, can get 
across my point of view to the men - they'll get behind me. After me there'lI be 
the next speaker - he'll give his point of view. And then they won't go with me 
but against me. The third one will speak, he'll again speak for me and the men 
will go along with him. See, they sway here and there: they don't have their own 
opinion. Even when we're discussing some kind of proposal. They are that 
stupid that on the same question that they can put their hands up to vote both for 
and against. Before my very eyes someone has voted in favour of something, 
-This was part of a long lamentation about the political life of the mine, prompted by a question 
about the trade union. In his discussion of meetings the speaker did not distinguish between trade 
union meetings and meetings of the AO. In this he is typical: workers have a hazy conception of 
the different functions of the various types of mine meetings. 
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and then someone else has spoken against it and he already puts his hand up to 
vote against. 
Although this account is obviously highly coloured, it is not a complete 
exaggeration. Workers 'don't have their own opinion' because they are relating to 
the questions as individuals who have, as was established in previous chapters, a 
shifting sense of collective identification. Thus, workers themselves do not 
organise to promote one or other candidate in mine elections, they respond to the 
campaigns run by the management factions. Despite their lack of organisation, 
however, their aspirations on behalf of the collective are in fact very similar and 
constitute an aggregate pressure for protection. 
This could be seen in the contest for post of director at the mine at the end of 1995 
in which workers were united in their desire for a more adequate protector. The 
previous director was a democratic populist whose main virtue was considered to 
be the fact that he did not put up barriers between himself and the workers. The 
following compliments - the first from a miner, and the second from a 
lampovshchitsa - are typical: 
I like him. For example, he knows I live near him and jf he sees me he'll offer 
me a lift home. He'll give a few of us a lift at the same time .... He's attentive to 
people; he tries to help. 
He doesn't raise himself above others. You can go to him with any question. If 
he's got the time he will definitely see you. You can ask him anything and he'll 
give you an answer. 
He had been elected because he was a popular shop chief who was seen as being 
'close to the people': this qualification, it was felt, would ensure that he would 
look after the workers. He did, as the quotes above illustrate, often do personal 
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favours for individual workers, and he did not attempt to tighten discipline at the 
mine. But the labour collective as a whole suffered under his populist regime: 
production, and hence wages, fell relative to past levels, the mine fell into debt. 
Moreover, because of his (popular) lowly status as a former shop chief this 
director did not have the connections required to extract resources from the 
concern and from Moscow: wage arrears began growing as soon as he was elected. 
He attempted to compensate for this by making concessions to pacify particular 
groups of workers, the result of which was a growing belief that he had allowed 
discipline to collapse at the same time as failing to protect the majority of workers. 
The new candidate for director, a deeply reassuring patemalist and former 
communist-era mayor of a nearby town, directly appealed to workers' desire for 
security.9 The most important plank of his programme was the fact that he had 
good connections which he would exploit to the full in order to gain resources for 
the mine. As he put it in an interview: 
At the moment I can help the mine through my personal contacts. They are 
crucial. If you don't have them, you could spend two days outside an office door 
waiting to be seen. Whereas I can just pick up the phone. For example, we've 
got a new complex. We haven't paid for it yet. We are going to pay for it in coal 
over several months. I was able to arrange that because they know and trust me. 
They know that I'll keep my word. 
While these possibilities exist I will use them. I will get all I can from my 
contacts ... I am trying to resist the policies of Moscow. They told me to shut 
'7his alternation between populist and authoritarian directors has been a common feature of the 
post-perestroika era, particularly in the coal-mining industry. 
327 
down Vishnovskii raion [part of the mine], I invested money in it; they told me 
to close one of the faces, I put money into it. 
He also promised, as this quote indicates, to revive the 'Vishnovskii raion', and to 
find the money to finish building the blocks of flats, the construction of which had 
been frozen under the former director. The points workers most often recalled 
from his programme were his (well advertised) good contacts with the local coal 
concern, and his promise to finish the flats (something, as Chapter Three 
indicated, he duly did). Having had a taste of life under the leadership of an 
'outsider' workers were keen to return to an experienced pair of communist hands. 
What does this contest say about the political implications of workers' 
'colIectivist' strategy? First, yet again, it highlights the structural constraints on 
collective organisation imposed by the (post-) Soviet production system. Because 
the labour collective does still constitute a supplicatory unity in the face of the 
'outside world' of the concern, Rosugol' and the government, it is very difficult 
for workers to break out of the form of politics in which their interests are 
represented by the managers who do battle on their behalf, whether within the 
mine, or, in the case of the director, outside it. Again, the example of 1989 is 
relevant here. In this case, workers did try to develop their own demands, but their 
struggle for a decent standard of living nonetheless ended up being fused with the 
struggle of the managers to forward the claims of the industry and region in 
MoscoW. 
Secondly, the alienated form of workers' collective action severely limits its 
political impact: such action ends up reproducing precisely those structures which 
caused the problem which promoted the action in the first place. Acquiring a more 
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capable director can sometimes improve the position of the enterprise, but it does 
not challenge workers' dependence on the beneficence of the paternalist director. 
And, as the discussion of the labour collective revealed, they are very often 
disappointed in the performance of their protectors. 
As has been stressed at the end of each chapter in this section, however, the 
Russian economy is changing. Although so far the structures within which conflict 
has been contained have been largely preserved, the system is subject to increasing 
strain. 'Alienated collectivism' has its limits and contradictions. First, it is 
becoming increasingly hard for managers to protect their enterprises, no matter 
how good their contacts. The new director of Taldym may be far better connected 
than his predecessor, but that has not insulated the mine from the problem of wage 
arrears which was endemic in the South Kuzbass in summer 1996. And he is 
aware that contacts do not offer a long-term solution to the mine's problems: 
If government policy doesn't change then the mine will slowly die. That is 
definite. But I am going to do all I can - use every contact - to make sure it's the 
very last to close .... But there may come a time in the future when all the leaks in 
the system are shut off. I might phone up my friend and he might say, 'I trust 
you, you're a good friend, but there's nothing I can do to help you'. Life is life 
and economics is economics. 
Secondly, economics being economics, the community of interests between 
workers and managers is not without its contradictions. For the director is unlikely 
to deliver the sort of protection that workers are looking for: their aspirations are 
actually very different from those of management. Both want to preserve 
particular elements of the 'Soviet Way of Life', but they are not nostalgic for the 
same aspects of the authoritarian paternalism of the traditional Soviet enterprise. 
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While mine management focuses on authoritarianism and looks back to the days 
of order and discipline when the boss's word was law, the workers focus on the 
paternalistic features of the traditional enterprise and look back to the security that 
was guaranteed by the collective. Workers' desire for protection does express 
itself in the search for a 'strong leader', but they are nonetheless deeply 
ambivalent about such strength when its effect is to reduce their autonomy and 
increase the intensity of their work. The return to communism at Taldym is by no 
means, therefore, an unambiguous yearning for the restoration of the past, but 
rather expresses two very different perspectives on the future development of a 
new Russia. Neither management nor workers want to renounce the opportunities 
and independence which they believe that they have achieved with the destruction 
of the Soviet system and the development of a market economy. But for 
management, order and discipline will provide the framework within which the 
enterprise can adjust to the demands of the changing economy, while for the 
workers, paternalism will provide the means by which they can be partially 
protected from the ravages of the market. 
Workers' desire to be defended by strong leaders during the transition period does 
not only manifest itself at the mine level. It is also apparent in their attitude to 
national politics, in particular in the Kuzbass where support for the Communist 
Party is strong. While they aspire to the security of collectivism, however, they 
can only envisage the realisation of this through the benevolence of a line 
manager, a patemalist director or the President of Russia who personify the 
collective at each level. This alienated collectivism is exerting a major influence 
on the development of Russian politics. On the one hand, workers scurry around, 
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too absorbed in their daily struggle for survival to organise, while on the other 
their combined aspirations further the development of authoritarian-patemaIist 
strands of politics in the enterprise, the region and the country as a whole. Thus, 
ironically, workers' conscious attempts to improve their position do little to 
transform the structures which define their subordination: their dependence on 
increasingly authoritarian leaders only makes them more vulnerable. Meanwhile, 
however, their improvised, individual survival strategies are actually transforming 
economic relations and, regardless of their intentions, helping to foster market 
relations in Russia. 
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Conclusion 
'We need a khozyain [at the mine] ... Russia needs a khozyain.' (Worker, 
kotel'naya, August 1996). 
The 1996 presidential elections did nothing to satisfy workers' craving for a 
protective patemalist, for a 'firm, but fair' khozyain. Instead, they were left to cope 
with the ravages of a 'bad father' (indeed a quintessential bad father with a drink 
problem). In August 1996 the trade union president was unusually laconic: 
Yeltsin's election victory meant that the mine's difficulties would only deepen. 
His sole remaining hope was that, 'there must be a social explosion now .... People 
just can't endure this forever'. But, as noted in Chapter Five, the summer before, 
the same man had warned darkly that when Russians ran out of patience 'then it's 
a nightmare'. A 'social explosion' has been long-predicted and has so far failed to 
materialise. This thesis has shown the many mechanisms through which conflict is 
contained within the enterprise. The result is that workers do not have their own 
organisations and have a shifting sense of where their interests lie. In this 
situation, as the previous chapter argued, their conscious action tends to reproduce 
existing relations of domination rather than transform them. The trade union 
president is in a sense right to be nervous of workers 'breaking out'. In the 
absence of workers' self-organisation this is not likely to bring any form of 
liberation: as the 1989 miners' strike shows, in the midst of truly spontaneous and 
largely unorganised outbursts new hierarchies can emerge with surprising rapidity. 
The Bolshevik revolution stands as a tragic example of where this can lead. 
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But collective organisation is not easy, even among miners. Dennis et al. argued 
that 'Solidarity, despite the division into interest groups among the miners in a 
given pit, is a very strongly developed characteristic of social relations in mining; 
it is a characteristic engendered by the nature and organisation of coal mining: it is 
a characteristic that has been given added strength as a result of the high degree of 
integration in mining villages. A miners' first loyalty is to his "mates'" (p. 79). 
Similarly, Bulmer (1975) stressed the solidarity of mining communities in his 
ideal type. Certainly, as was argued in the introduction, as a group Russian miners 
have been a great deal more active than their counterparts in most other industries. 
But they are not organised. What the foregoing chapters have shown is that 
solidarity and organisation do not emerge naturally: some circumstances may be 
more conducive than others, and the Russian environment is unquestionably 
unconducive, but even in more favourable climates organisations have to be 
created through purposeful political action. As Beynon and Austrin (1994) argued 
with regard to the establishment of a miners' union in the Durham coal field, 'In 
arduous and often brutal working and living conditions, the miners combined to 
form a stable union, supporting it with regular subscriptions, and invested in 
banners which symbolised their involvement. The village as a "community" 
became a vital aspect of their identities, but this development was not simply 
inevitable and should not be taken for granted: solidarity had to be built' (p. 364). 
The question is, how? This thesis has implicitly explored the potential of two very 
different models: organisation 'from above' or from the outside, and self. 
organisation of the workers 'from below'. Although the thesis has stressed the 
importance of workplace organisation, it has not prioritised either one of these 
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possibilities from a theoretical perspective. Democratic workers' organisations or 
trade unions have been established through both these routes in other contexts, and 
there is no intrinsic reason why one means should be preferred to another, as long 
as organisations established with the help of outsiders or reformed 'from above' 
are eventually left to be democratically directed by their members. 
The initiative for the creation of workers' organisations does not necessarily have 
to come from below (and this applies equally to their reformation). There are 
certainly examples of unions being successfully established through the activity of 
'organisers'. For example, a recent book on gold miners in South Africa illustrates 
exactly this process. Moodie (1994) demonstrates how the South African National 
Union of Mineworkers was established in the gold mines in 1982 through the 
work of organisers from the Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA). 
Recruitment began with the simple action of signing up workers, but was then 
followed up by the establishment of local democratic structures in the form of an 
elected shaft steward system (p. 254 - 5). This structure did take root, supplanting 
the representative role of the head black officials in the compounds (known as 
induna). As one steward quoted by Moodie put it: 
Now, if ever there's a problem, ... you are allowed to sit down and given a 
chance for a hearing .... (Now] with the presence of the union, nobody can accuse 
you without your representative. The representative all the time, we find, is the 
shaft steward. He must be there all the time. It doesn't matter whether the issues 
are related to the hostel or the workplace (p. 255 - 6). 
The establishment of such a culture in a short space of time is an impressive 
achievement and constituted an enormous gain for workers: Moodie claims that , 
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whatever the workers felt about the political radicalism of some of the shaft 
stewards, he did not encounter one black worker who did not view this 
representation as beneficial (p. 256). Certainly, informal organisation and forms of 
resistance had existed before this, but dealing with issues such as unfair dismissal 
could be done by the union far more effectively than through such means. Thus, 
organisation promoted by political activists outside the work place can be 
successful in the right circumstances. What this example also shows is the 
importance of creating structures which involve the workers in the union: an 
earlier attempt to create a gold miners' union in the 1940s, the African Mine 
Workers Union (AMWU), had foundered precisely because of the failure to do 
this (pp. 213 - 241). This was also the failure of the NPG: its activists did initially 
attempt to sign up members through mine meetings, but there was no follow-up to 
this, and the union, as argued in Chapter Two, never gained a foothold in the 
mines. 
At the same time, however, self-organisation among workers is possible without 
the help of 'conscious' comrades (though whether, left to their own devices, 
workers will enact the fantasies of such comrades is another matter). Indeed, this 
has occurred in other former state socialist societies. For example, reacting against 
those commentators who argued that Solidamosc had only been established with 
the help of intellectuals in the Committee for the Self-Defence of Society (KOR), l 
'Among such commentators, Jadwiga Staniszkis (1984) is the most dismissive of the political 
capacity of the working class. Basing her argument on Basil Berstein's ideas of language she 
argues, among other things, that workers are unable to progress beyond what she characterises as 
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Roman Laba (1986) and Lawrence Goodwyn (1991) have conclusively shown that 
the demand for a free trade union arose from the workers and that they organised 
Solidarnosc themselves.2 Indeed, Laba has gone further than this arguing that, 
'Solidarity has shown that ordinary working people can rise above serving 
economic interests and undertake coherent political activity without being injected 
with ideology by intellectuals' (p. 47). Bill Lomax (1979) has drawn exactly the 
same conclusion from his analysis of the 1956 revolution in Hungary, arguing that 
the events of this year provide convincing refutation of liberal and Leninist views 
of the need for intellectual inspiration in working class movements: 'The main 
motivating force [of the revolution] - before, during and after the uprising of 
October 1956 - was the independent self-activity of workers, and its most 
primitive wage demands because of their 'self hatred, ... limited semantic confidence' (p. 122) and 
, linguistic shame' (p. 119). 
2Laba has shown, through a detailed analysis of workers' demands in 1970, 1971 and 1980, that 
the demand for free trade unions independent of Party, government and factory management arose 
in 1970 before the social activation of the Catholic Church and the founding of KOR (which 
occurred in 1976). Meanwhile, the Baltic coastal workers, who were cut off from the influence of 
KOR, were the first to set up an inter-factory strike committee (at the Lenin Shipyard in August 
1980), thus demonstrating that the organisational lessons learned by workers in the course of the 
1970s, rather than the ideas of KOR, were what were crucial in 1980. Meanwhile, Goodwyn, 
proceeding from the idea that 'social knowledge is experential' (p. xix), has traced the roots of 
Solidarity as far back as 1956. His rich account, based mainly on oral histories gathered over 
seven years, shows that Solidamosc was 'a cumulative political evolution' among workers 
(p.xxix): the 'ensemble of elaborate organising techniques' (p. xxiii) displayed in different parts of 
the country during 1980 had been learned over a long history of struggle. 
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important creation their autonomous organisations - the Hungarian workers' 
councils' (p. 28). Again, the evidence he employs in support of this proposition is 
impressive. 
But what are the prospects of either one of the processes discussed being 
successful in Russia? The failure of the NPG to organise miners outside the 
official union was partly, as mentioned above, a matter of strategy. But the fact 
that Rosugleprofhas had no more success with its 'reform from above' highlights 
the structural constraints on the development of organisations representing 
workers' interests in post-communist Russia. Most importantly, the position ofthe 
enterprise within the post-Soviet economy means that trade unions end up 
representing the interests of the labour collective as a 'supplicatory unity' rather 
than the specific interests of workers. This pattern of relations is difficult to escape 
both because the labour collective does have a common, and presently overriding, 
interest in survival, and because trade union committees, given their distance from 
workers, are dependent on managers to tolerate their existence. Courting the 
workers is therefore a risk which, if it does not payoff, can lead to the expulsion 
of the union from the enterprise.3 But it is not simply a question of structure 
constraining the action of well-meaning agents: the trade union president at 
Taldym does not even consider working in a different way. So far the essential 
3As shown in Chapter Two, the NPG also ended up facing this dilemma as they lost contact with 
the few members they did have and the union began to administer barter on behalf of 
management. Even with a large and active membership, however, (something which none of 
Russia's trade unions have) the pressure to co-operate with management would be very strong. 
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features which have prevented the trade unions from representing the specific 
interests of workers remain precariously in place. Even as conditions change, 
however, there is no guarantee that the union, or the workers, will adapt with any 
rapidity to their new environment: as Bourdieu has pointed out, the tendency of 
groups to persist in their ways partly results from the fact that they are composed 
of 'individuals with durable dispositions which can outlive the economic and 
social conditions in which they were produced' (Bourdieu, 1990: 62). At present 
there is no indication that the union is about to transform the practice which leads 
workers to condemn it as 'a pocket trade union'.4 Change will only come about 
through protracted and complex interactions between union officers, workers and 
management in the context of a 'reforming' economic and political system. 
The other possibility which has been considered is a process of change initiated 
from below. First, it has been argued that workers are not exerting pressure on the 
union to reform because conflict within the enterprise is channelled up the 
enterprise hierarchy of line management, rather than being dealt with by the shop 
trade union committees which primarily function as part of the enterprise welfare 
infrastructure. Moreover, the relation of the mine trade union committee to 
management also structures the way in which the shop trade union committees 
4Workers will only begin to support the union if they feel it unequivocally represents their 
interests. To refer to the South African example again, the growth of the NUM was greatly 
boosted by its success in representing workers in cases of unfair dismissal. News of such cases 
quickly spread and, at a time when the labour market was tight and computer blacklisting was 
being introduced, so did the union (Moodie, 1994: 251-2). The contrast with Rosug\eprofs 
discretionary approach to defence of its members in cases of dismissal is obvious. 
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relate to workers: the committees are not encouraged to represent workers' 
interests and worker involvement at shop level is not promoted by the union. 
Thus, increasing tension within the enterprise has not provided a catalyst for 
'reform from below', but has instead placed management structures under strain. 
Second, workers are not organising outside the union. They are 'getting by' as 
best they can, increasingly relying on production within the household and 
networks outside work, while at the same time clinging to the protection of the 
labour collective. They recognise that this entity is deeply divided but, at a time 
when its very existence is under threat, conflicts over distribution within the 
enterprise are eclipsed by the struggle to secure resources from outside agencies. 
Thus, what Clarke et al. (1993) have termed the communist era 'production pact' 
(p. 99) between workers and managers, based on their common interest in 
maximising resources available to the enterprise and in attaining plan targets, has 
not been broken by the collapse of communism, but strengthened by it: now it is a 
matter of survival. 
Despite this 'production pact', however, under communism the endemic disputes 
over distribution within the enterprise did foster an oppositional mentality in 
which workers saw the world as divided between an underprivileged 'us' and a 
corrupt and parasitic 'them'. But the apparent unity of the 'simple workers' 
concealed the fact that the discretionary nature of the distribution and disciplinary 
regime within the enterprise obliged workers to become involved in the very deal-
making and system of blat which so enraged them. The centrality of 
individualised informal relations in the administration of the enterprise not only 
meant that workers became personally dependent on their superiors, it also 
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ensured that their reflex response to any problem was to seek an individual rather 
than a collective solution.s There is some evidence that money is replacing the 
informal 'currency' of blat, but the culture of individualised relations extended 
beyond the distribution of the benefits in kind which are now being axed by 
enterprises. It is deeply rooted and will not be eroded overnight. Indeed, in a 
period of intense uncertainty the protection of powerful patrons is more valuable 
than ever. 
Meanwhile, a system of collective dependency exists alongside this culture of 
individual dependence. Work collectives rely on their line managers to represent 
their interests within the enterprise in the same way that workers expect the 
director to do battle on behalf of the labour collective in the' outside world'. Thus, 
neither the collectivity of the labour collective nor the close relations of work 
groups have formed a basis for workers' self-organisation. Instead, workers' 
search for collective salvation expresses itself in an 'alienated collectivism' in 
which their aspirations are focused on the figure of the leader. Their political 
response to the crisis has thus been to turn to 'strong' leaders who claim to be 
SGaJina Monousova (1996) provides a very good example of this in her case study of the Moscow 
enterprise she calls 'Pizza'. Here, the management decided to restrict the amount of annual leave 
its predominantly female workforce could take during the summer, despite the fact that according 
to the law women with school-age children have the right to take their vacations whenever they 
like. Although the main production workers were opposed to the change, however, they did not 
mount a collective response to it: as one of them put it, 'we are afraid to speak openly. Some are 
waiting for an apartment, some for an allotment' (p.170). In interviews most of the women 
claimed that they would resolve the problem individually by going on the sick list in the summer. 
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capable of affording them the protection for which they yearn. When they are let 
down by these 'representatives' their solution is not to challenge their dependence, 
but to seek a replacement for the inadequate protector. 
How far do these conclusions specifically refer to mining, or indeed to Taldym? 
This depends on whether the structural forms which shaped the processes which 
have been identified exist in other branches and enterprises. The arguments 
developed above rely on a general characterisation of the nature of the production 
relations which existed within the communist system and their development in the 
post-Soviet era, and in this sense it is clear that I do not consider that the processes 
I have identified have a purely local character. This assertion does not merely 
depend on the argument that the Soviet system was highly centralised and 
'monolithic' in character, however. It is also based on empirical evidence that 
similar processes do indeed occur within other enterprises in other branches of 
industry, in particular evidence drawn from the collaborative research programme 
of the Centre for Comparative Labour Studies at Warwick University and the 
Institute for Comparative Labour Relations Research in Russia which has 
involved longitudinal case studies of a variety of different types of industrial 
enterprises in Moscow, Kemerovo oblast', Samara, Syktyvkar and Vorkuta. 
Individual chapters have frequently referred to the published results of this 
research, although the thesis has also been informed by the discussions conducted 
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at research seminars of this collaborative programme and by individual 
discussions with members of the group.6 
The material gathered from other former state industrial enterprises (although not 
new commercial enterprises, which were established in different conditions) 
shows that th~ structural similarities between post-Soviet enterprises in terms of 
management hierarchies, patemalist social provision, the legacy of the state 
planning system and the position of the former communist trade unions have 
given rise to similar forms of social relations within labour collectives. For 
example, my account of the nature of informal relations within the enterprise is 
very similar to that discovered by Sergei Alasheev in industrial enterprises in 
Samara (Alasheev, 1995a), Marina Kiblitskaya in a Moscow Metro train repair 
plant (Kiblitskaya, 1995), and Marina Ilyina and Vladimir Ilyin in a Syktyvkar 
passenger transport enterprise (Ilyin and Ilyina, 1996). Taldym does have specific 
features, which I have drawn attention to at various points, but these do not 
invalidate the key elements of the arguments outlined above. 
In terms of Taldym's specificity, one of its particular characteristics constitutes the 
reason why it was chosen as the site for the case study: the fact that it has a highly 
61 received invaluable assistance from Olga Pulyaeva and Konstantin Bumyshev in the Kuzbass, 
and benefited greatly from my discussions with other members of the Institute for Comparative 
Labour Relations Research about their findings in other enterprises, in particular Marina 
Kiblitskaya (who has carried out research in a metro train repair plant in Moscow, as well as a 
variety of new private firms), Vladimir I1yin (who is intimately familiar with a whole range of 
enterprises in Syktyvkar) and Pavel Romanov (who has conducted research in a variety of 
industrial enterprises in Samara). 
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active trade union committee which is affiliated to the union which is considered 
to be one of the most 'reformed' and militant of the former communist trade 
unions. This only serves to highlight the degree to which the constraints on union 
reform are structural in nature. It is the case, as was argued in Chapter Two, that 
the coal industry'S dependence on subsidies means that the trade union's role in 
lobbying for resources is particularly important. But this process still occurs in 
other industries, albeit in an attenuated form. Former state enterprises are currently 
constituted as besieged entities rather than surplus value-extracting, profit-making 
concerns and thus 'one enterprise' politics persist even where the struggle between 
the labour collective and state agencies does not take the form of a ritualised 
'beating out' of the subsidy. 
Another distinguishing feature of Taldym is its status as a closed AO. Workers' 
search for the perfect paternalist occurs within the context of the mine electoral 
system laid down in the constitution of this AO: 'democracy' at the mine has 
reinforced workers' expectation of directoral defence from the outside world. The 
right to elect the director is not confined to this type of privatised enterprise, 
however, and neither are aspirations only focused on the director when it is 
possible to replace him or her. The most important way in which the situation at 
Taldym differs from that at other enterprises is that the form of privatisation opted 
for has institutionalised a particular balance of power between workers and 
managers. Workers at Taldym are fortunate in working at a relatively 'good' mine 
at which their influence over the divided administration has spared them some of 
the privations generally associated with reform. The workers have preserved shift 
systems which allow them to combine home and work in a way that suits them 
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(which is increasingly important at a time when production within the household 
is vital for survival), and so far management has done its best to avoid making any 
compulsory redundancies. Thus, the labour collective's series of 'protectors', 
though considered by its members to have been deeply inadequate, have actually 
delivered them more benefits than more secure management teams at other 
enterprises. 
Taldym is in a better situation than the average Soviet enterprise but as a labour 
collective it is still in a state of slow decay. It can no longer provide for workers 
and they are increasingly thrown back on their own resources in order to secure 
their physical survival. This disintegration of one of the key institutions of Soviet 
society has profound consequences. For although the labour collective, as the 
means through which workers were integrated into the communist system, was in 
many ways a repressive institution, it was also the forum in which workers defined 
their identity. The ideas of the dignity of labour and the value of collectivism 
which were fostered within it were, as has been demonstrated, double-edged. On 
the one hand, the emphasis placed on the importance of pride in work was used as 
a means to stimulate workers to meet plan, often against all the odds, but at the 
same time such ideas formed the basis on which workers defined themselves 
against their 'unproductive' managers. Meanwhile, the collective was a locus of 
control, but it was also a community, a focus of sociability, which contained 
within it an albeit unrealised germ of liberation. There was some prospect that the 
emancipatory potential contained within the labour collective could have been 
realised after the collapse of communism, but as the account of the /ampovaya's 
history in the post-communist period demonstrated, this did not occur. As the 
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financial situation of the mine deteriorates, there is less and less prospect of such a 
development: as argued above, now the only priority is survival. The unrealised 
potential of reform is well captured by the comments of the senior teacher at onc 
of the mine's kindergartens which, at the time of the interview in August 1996, 
was about to be transferred to the local authority under the auspices of which it 
faced a highly uncertain future: 
There have been lots of negative aspects of reform, but it also has positive 
aspects. Before there was just one programme which all kindergartens were 
obliged to follow. Now the new tendency is to develop the personality of every 
child. The word Iichnost' [personality] has arrived in our language. We now try 
to bring up well rounded ['many sided'] children. I'd even say we try to develop 
their souls. For 70 years this didn't happen. Now we think about the emotional 
development of the children and of the collective. 
The children are much more comfortable here now because of the changes in the 
system. Before it was awful- if the inspector came round and one of the children 
couldn't sing the Soviet national anthem, then you got it. It meant that the 
teachers weren't paying sufficient attention to the development of patriotic spirit 
in the young. We were terrified of the inspectors. They used to come round 
looking for faults. Now we're not scared of them, they come round to help us. 
Things have unconditionally improved in that regard. Now we are their 
colleagues, whereas before we were subordinates. 
The work is much more interesting now - we can choose any programme we 
like, the only problem being, as I said, that there's no money for retraining. We 
need it. Basically, we can take everything they taught us before, put a big cross 
beside it and forget it. Before politics came first. When I remember how scared 
we were of that history of the CPSU ... 
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But in our collective the women were always kind and motherly to the children, 
and they haven't turned nasty because of their financial problems. We can say 
that the children don't suffer. We have also got some more equipment in the last 
few years, but generally we live much worse. 
Unfortunately, the arrival of the word Iichnost' in the language coincided with the 
launch of a structural adjustment programme which imposed financial constraints 
so stringent as to inhibit most forms of individual and collective self-realisation. 
Indeed, the fate of kindergartens is a very good example of this. These were 
adjuncts of the traditional Soviet labour collective which had their faults, but at 
the same time their destruction represents a huge loss for the communities which 
they served, especially at a time when it has finally become possible to redefine 
them as nurturing rather than controlling institutions. 
The gradual waning of the labour collective is destroying the communality which 
formed the basis of Soviet working class identity. The nature of class relations in 
the Soviet Union (and class formation in the transition period) is a vexed 
question,? but in terms of the creation of workers' organisations, which has been 
'The problem with Marxist and Weberian traditions of class analysis in this context is that they 
were fonnulated with reference to capitalism. In both traditions classes are defined by their 
economic status, their possession or otherwise of property. Under state socialism there was no 
private property and technically everyone up to and including the General Secretary of the Party 
was a wage labourer. This has led the sociologist David Lane to define the Soviet Union as a 
'unitary class society', claiming that 'no theoretical or empirical reasons have been put forward 
which substantiate the view that a ruling and an exploited class exist' (Lane, 1976: 64). The Soviet 
system was a regime of politicised surplus extraction in which position within the political 
hierarchy was the main detenninant of status and access to resources. It does not follow, however, 
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the focus of this thesis, the definition offered by E.P. Thompson is apposite: 
'Class happens when some men, as a result of their common experiences ... feel 
and articulate the identity of their interests as between themselves and as against 
other men whose interests are different from (and usually opposed to) theirs' 
(Thompson, [1963] 1980: 9 - 10). The labour collective in some ways inhibited 
such a happening, but its decomposition presages the destruction of the 
communality of experience which did exist among Russian workers. In 
Vishnovka, this pushes workers towards an impoverished peasant existence,· 
while in larger towns the gradual demise of enterprises plunges workers into a 
'world-in-between' in which 'they live on handouts from friends and relatives, 
from subsistence agriculture, from occasional casual labour, petty trading or petty 
crime' (Clarke, 1996a: 75). Down river from Vishnovka in the small village of 
Kuzedeeva the closure of the settlement's main employer, a small toy factory, has 
meant that the majority of those who were once its workers are now living off the 
land. Such developments not only mean a huge drop in living standards for those 
affected, they also destroy the basis of the erstwhile workers' self-identity. Since 
decaying labour collectives take on few young workers, and young people are not 
that it was classless. As Moshe Lewin has commented with regard to the Soviet theory that state 
socialist society was composed of two 'non-antagonistic classes' (workers and peasants) and a 
'strata' made up of the intelligentsia, 'somebody else up there was actually ruling over the 
economy, the state, culture and ... "the two nonantagonistic classes" themselves' (Lewin, 1994: 
383). For an interesting discussion of such problems see Siegelbaum and Suny, 1994. 
• As has been argued, the economies of the household and enterprise were closely intertwined, so 
the closure of the mine really would force unemployed mineworkers into extreme poverty. 
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attracted to enterprises that pay wages several months late, the 'Russian working 
class' which was defined by its common existence within the labour collective is 
fragmenting. And this, as the experience of Western democracies in recent years 
testifies, poses a whole series of new problems in terms of forging solidarities and 
forming workers' organisations. 
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